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Abstract 
"Agrarwende: Cognitive-normative approaches to policy change in German agro-
biotechnology. 
In the year 2000, Germany's biggest post-war food crisis, BSE, changed the terms of the 
public debate on agro-biotech significantly. Before the BSE-crisis, Germany's policy had 
been predominantly driven by a neo-liberal framing of biotechnology as a central tool for 
innovation and international competitiveness. After BSE, biotechnology policy became 
caught up in a broader reform effort to change agricultural and food policies - the 
''Agrarwende''. This thesis concerns the question of the policy shift in agricultural 
biotechnology as it developed in Germany between the years 2000 and 2004 as a result 
of the Agrarwende. It analyzes why the BSE crisis had an effect on the German agro-
biotech subsystem, how it affected regulation and to what extent it led to the 
. institutionalization of new types of socio-political practices and relationships. To fulfill this 
purpose the thesis uses cognitive-normative frameworks, in particular Maarten Hajer's 
discourse analytical framework and Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework. By 
looking at the German case of agro-biotech regulation the thesis asks, how can policy 
change be explained and illuminated by the use of these two theories? What are their 
relative or different contributions to the study of policy change? Are these approaches 
contradictory or complementary? It can be concluded that, over the years, a great deal 
has changed in German agricultural biotechnology policy with regard to legislation, the 
political institutions and the actors involved in the subsystem. The cognitive normative 
frameworks applied both contributed to a better understanding of the policy process and 
policy change. In the analysis, Hajer's concepts were found to have more strengths and 
fewer weaknesses than Sabatier's. Being rooted in different theory traditions, the two 
approaches showed contradictory as well as complementary features. There was, in any 
case, much to be gained from looking at the interaction between discourse and belief 
dynamics. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The research question 
In Europe the public controversy over agricultural biotechnology is long-standing and 
ongoing. Since the onset of the technology its suggested beneficial claims have been 
strongly propagated by some and strongly contested by others. Yet the debate is not 
static and the parameters, themes and regulation have changed over time. From concerns 
in terms of environmental safety and health the debate seems now to have shifted to 
questions concerning the freedom of market participants and the safeguarding of their 
execution of choice. This shift can be observed in many European countries and yet each 
country shows specific discursive and developmental trajectories. 
In Germany the change in debate was very pronounced. With the advent of the first SSE 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known as 'mad cow') case in the country at the 
end of 2000, a radical break with old-style productivist agricultural and food practices was 
announced - the" Agrarwende". With the ensuing move towards more sustainable and 
consumer oriented agricultural practices, biotechnology policy became caught up in 
broader reform efforts. This thesis concerns the question of the policy shift in agricultural 
biotechnology as it developed in Germany between 2000 and 2004 as a result of the 
"Agrarwende". It will analyze why the SSE crisis had such an effect on the German agro-
biotech subsystem, how it affected regulation and to what extent it led to the 
institutionalization of new types of socio-political practices and relationships. 
To fulfill this purpose the thesis uses cognitive-normative frameworks, in particular the 
approaches offered by Maarten Hajer and Paul Sabatier. As opposed to more realist or 
rationalist approaches to public policy, this research orientation stresses the point that 
both the way actors explain and understand the world and the way problems get defined 
and framed determine policy developments and outcomes. It seems that the controversy 
surrounding agricultural biotechnology regulation lends itself to the use of such 
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frameworks, as it is a conflict that is ascribed with many meanings and values. Some 
argue that it is a conflict about environmental safety, food production or health. For others, 
however, it is about innovation and technological progress, or about consumer autonomy. 
In the same vein, neither the risks nor the benefits of the technology are given facts. What 
is at stake has always been contested. 
The aim of this work is thus to determine whether the controversy surrounding GM 
policies can be well and insightfully analyzed by focusing our attention on the role of 
beliefs and discursive constructions and interaction in the policy sub-field. In this sense 
the thesis will ask: 
1) How can policy change be explained and illuminated by these two theories? What are 
their relative or different contributions - as two different cognitive and normative 
frameworks - to the study of policy processes and outcomes? 
Related to these main questions the thesis will ask the following sub-questions: 
2) What are the strength and limitations of each theory? 
3) How are these theories contradictory or complementary? 
1.2 The origin of the thesis 
This thesis developed within the framework of a European research project on the 
precautionary principle in agro-biotechnology. In the year 2002 I became the German 
research partner in the research project "Precautionary expertise for GM crops" (PEG) at 
the Institute for Sociology, University of Munich, Germany. The aim of the research project 
was to analyze the way in which current European practices - regulatory measures, 
expert judgements and stakeholder roles - compared with different accounts of the 
precautionary principle (PP). Coordinated by the Open University, UK, the project had a 
duration of thirty months, the case study covering the six year time period 1997-2003. 
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Before working as a researcher on this project I had already planned to write a PhD on 
questions concerning the (global) food system, an area in which I developed a growing 
interest over the course of my studies. More specifically I wanted to work on the 
relationship between food, agriculture, the environment, and their political regulation. As a 
political scientist it struck me that the issue of food was so little understood as something 
inherently political. I thought that the decisions taken in the food system were not only of 
concern to us as consumers but as citizens. This is what I wanted to write about. Taking 
the BSE crisis in Germany from the year 2000 as a starting pOint of my analysis, I finally 
decided to work on public/private food regulation in Germany, and the changes that the 
post-BSE "Agrarwenden policies brought about by looking at the German retail sector. 
This empirical focus, however, changed when I started to work on the subject of agro-
biotech regulation. 
The research into the use of the precautionary principle in the field of agro-biotech in 
Germany offered a lot of interesting insights into a current German/European/global food 
system conflict and its development over a specific period of time. Furthermore, it turned 
out that a lot of the material that I had already collected and the theoretical issues that I 
had considered before could be linked to this case study. Taken together, this all lent itself 
to a more in-depth study that could be laid down in a PhD thesis. Moreover, the PEG 
project aroused my interest in the area of cognitive-normative frameworks. While 
conducting the research on the PP on agro-biotech regulation, it became apparent that 
different risk framings influenced the understanding of the PP. Over the investigated 
period of time the relevance of these framings and the framings themselves changed. The 
most significant trigger for change was, however, the BSE crisis. This was a very 
interesting by-product of the study and warranted a deeper look into the dynamics of 
framing and its impact on policy change. Having taken the decision to make this my focus 
in a PhD thesis, at the time of finishing the EU project I had significantly developed my 
theoretical frameworks and research questions to be tested on a national empirical study. 
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1.3 The theoretical approaches 
The thesis discusses the role of beliefs and discourse in the German example of policy 
change in the field of agro-biotechnology regulation. In answering the questions posed 
above the following two approaches will be used: Maarten Hajer's discourse coalition 
framework (DCF) and Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (ACF). 
In his study "The politics of environmental discourse" Hajer (1995) uses discourse 
analysis to examine environmental policy-making. Therein he advances his central claim 
that "the developments in environmental politics critically depend upon the specific social 
construction of environmental problems." For Hajer a discursive approach highlights the 
fact that the understanding and framing of an issue is influencing the way in which the 
problem is handled and solved politically. In opposition to other variations, Hajer's 
understanding of discourse analysis does not simply refer to the analysis of discussions 
(text) around the subject but includes the institutional context within which things are said 
and done. Hence discourse is analyzed as a particular practice. A specific interpretation of 
the subject matter then privileges one social practice over the other, gives rise to specific 
relationships and forecloses certain strategies. Identifying coalitions that gather around 
and form and interpret story-lines, as well as relating these to specific social practices and 
policy change is the key analytical effort to be made in this approach. Using this approach 
policy analysis is advanced as an interpretative activity that follows the argumentative 
struggles that form and decide a particular policy area. 
Sabatier's theoretical approach (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998), the 
advocacy coalition framework, focuses on the role of beliefs in the policy process.1 
Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework advances the claim that policy processes are 
best understood as products of competition between advocacy coalitions that try to 
advance certain policy beliefs. Central to the ACF is thus the idea of a shared belief 
system amongst coalitions. Within these belief systems, the ACF identifies three 
1 For the sake of simplification, the following discussion on the ACF will mainly draw on Sabatier (1998). Yet it 
should be remembered that the approach was actually developed together with Jenkins-Smith. 
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hierarchically structured categories: a deep core of fundamental ontological and normative 
beliefs. A second range of policy core beliefs that represent a coalition's basic normative 
commitments in the policy domain and finally a set of secondary aspects comprising 
instrumental considerations. The ACF perceives policy change as a transformation of a . 
hegemonic (deep or core) belief system within a policy subsystem. This can be the result 
of two processes: First, policy change can result from non-cognitive events originating 
outside the policy subsystem, which can impact on the power distribution among actors. 
As a second element the ACF introduces the idea of policy oriented learning which can 
lead a hegemonic coalition to redefine and adapt its belief system in order to reach their 
goal. The ACF thus requires policy analysts to identify coalitions and to map their 
respective belief system. It further requires identification of the causes of change, be it 
through learning or external events. Policy outcome can then be partly understood as the 
victory of a certain belief system. 
Hajer's discourse analytical framework and Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework both 
offer a way of analyzing the policy process from a cognitive-normative angle. Although 
they share some analytical components, the approaches differ considerably, espeCially 
with respect to their ontological and methodological grounding. The thesis will sketch, 
compare and discuss the two analytical frameworks. Taking the empirical material as a 
basis, it will use these frameworks as analytical lenses in order to test their explanatory 
power for understanding the German GM regulatory process. 
1.4 The empirical case study 
The concepts and framework given will be applied to the German GM crops/food debate 
from the early 1990s up to July 2004. The story is briefly told as follows: 
The first mad cow disease case in Germany in November 2000 and the subsequent Foot 
and Mouth disease, which spread across the EU, sent shock waves through the agri-food 
production system in Germany. The crisis changed the institutional framework of the food 
safety system and triggered a reorientation of overall agricultural policies. Under the 
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slogans "Agrarwende" (turnaround in agricultural practices) and "precautionary consumer 
protection" ("vorsorgender Verbraucherschutz"), policy changes were brought on track by 
the new Green Minister for Agriculture Renate Kunast in order to reform a system, which 
was identified as productivist, oblivious to consumer preferences and unsustainable. 
The crisis also affected GM food policies. The new GM policy line proposed by the new 
Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture was framed around "Agrarwende" 
and "consumer choice". This way for the first time a government institution propagated a 
new way of conceptualizing of agro-biotechnology applications by linking it to the broader 
problematique of agriculture and food production. For the sake of agricultural change 
Minister Kunast propagated organic agriculture as a model for more sustainable forms of 
farming. In this vision, new technologies needed to prove their contribution toward the 
goal of sustainable agricultural change and to stand the test with consumers and 
producers and their food/feed/seed choices. 
This new approach towards agro-biotech was, unsurprisingly, highly contested. Before the 
SSE-crisis, Germany's policy had been predominantly driven by a neo-liberal framing of 
biotechnology as a central tool for innovation, technological progress and international 
competitiveness. The official regulatory controversy was confined to questions of safety 
and risks, which were in turn held to be answerable within a strict scientific paradigm. As 
opposed to this, rather then focusing on risk the new discourse stressed options and 
solutions for agricultural and food systems. The choice and "Agrarwende" debate thus 
challenged the established understanding of what GM policy-making should be about and 
threatened entrenched institutional perceptions, arrangements and power relations. 
Ultimately, an animal disease brought a very different dynamic into the biotech subsystem 
and opened up space for a new policy approach, for institutional and legislative change. It 
is this remarkable development that the thesis will re/deconstruct in light of the two 
theories. 
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1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is arranged in nine chapters. 
Chapter two will locate the thesis theoretically and cover in greater depth the theoretical 
assumptions of Hajer and Sabatier. 
Chapter three will lay down the methods used and explain the research design and 
information sources. 
Chapters four to eight follow a chronological order: 
Chapter four will begin the empirical section starting with the area of the early 1990s. The 
objective of the chapter is to capture the beliefs, central policy discourses and coalitions of 
the period by using Hajer and Sabatier as lenses. Setting the stage, the chapter will 
introduce the application of the theories and define the terms of reference for 
understanding the nature and extent of policy change following the SSE crisis. 
Chapter five will look at the transition period between the years 1998 and 2000. This 
chapter describes a gradual departure from the GM policies of the 1990s and explains the 
pre-SSE status quo. 
Chapter six will look at the "trigger" for the policy shift - the SSE crisis in November 2000. 
The two frameworks will be used as explanatory devices to understand the 
food/agricultural crisis and its initial effects for agro-biotechnology policy. 
Chapter seven will take the narrative further and look more deeply into the most important 
event in the subsystem in the year 2002, the stakeholder conference "Diskurs grOne 
Gentechnik". As the SSE crisis has changed the terms of the debate this chapter will 
analyze how this new policy language affects the argumentative developments between 
the coalitions. 
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Chapter eight will look into the most recent developments of the agro-biotech subsystem. 
Again using Hajer and Sabatier, it will analyse and explain the German coexistence 
debate and the institutional and legislative changes in the agro-biotech subsystem up to 
the year 2004. 
Chapter nine will summarize the work, answer the main research questions and conclude 
the thesis. 
In a nutshell, the thesis will: 
• Trace the history and development of German policies for agricultural biotechnology 
• Identify and analyze key discourses and belief systems held by various coalitions 
• Identify and analyze key (social, political, discursive, normative) factors that have 
shaped the developments and brought about changes in institutions and policies 
• Contribute to a better understanding of cognitive-normative frameworks in policy 
analysis 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. Theoretical analysis 
This chapter will set out the theoretical framework of the thesis in relation to public policy 
theories as a whole and cover in greater depth the theoretical bases of the approaches of 
Hajer and Sabatier. In order to answer the research question one needs to have a sound 
understanding of the approaches, their theoretical claims, assumptions and the similarities 
and differences between them. The chapter will begin by situating cognitive-normative 
approaches in relation to other public policy approaches. This will give an idea of where 
these kinds of approaches come from and the kinds of problems to which they can 
potentially be applied. It will then go on to sketch the approaches and compare their key 
concepts. Finally the main concepts, which will be tested on the empirical case study, will 
be summarized in a table (Table 1). 
2.1 Cognitive-normative frameworks in policy analysis 
What factor(s) do we need to look at in order to understand the process of policy-making? 
A great many social scientists have already wrestled with this question and, 
unsurprisingly, produced almost as many answers. Since there is a need to reduce 
complexity, the different approaches developed gave varying advice on the factors found 
to be critical and those, which could be rather ignored. For many years the analysis of 
public policy - whether in the field of politics or international relations - was very much 
influenced by so-called 'models of a rationalist understanding' of policy making under 
which one could include rational choice inspired, as well as institutionalist approaches. 
There are, of course, many different strands within these specific research traditions but 
broadly speaking, in rational choice inspired approaches policy was conceptualized as the 
result of rational actor's preferences and interests. Examples from the vast number of 
approaches are, in the field of politics, the game-theoretic tradition or institutional rational 
choice (for example, Weingast 1996; Scharpf 1997); in the field of international relations 
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Axelrod/Keohane (1985). In contrast to this, in the institutional tradition the research focus 
was on structural and institutional factors that shape, mediate and determine the policy 
process (for one example, Skocpol 1979). 
Another strand to be included under rationalist models in policy research is the 'stage 
heuristic' or policy cycle model. As opposed to a more static institutional analysis, the 
emphasis is placed upon a procedural dimension ('politics' rather than 'polity') in policy 
making. The policy process is thus defined as a sequence of stages in which problems 
are conceptualized, brought to government for solution, and in which policy options get 
selected and finally implemented. This model is based on a set of assumptions, for 
example, methodological individualism, which allowed for simulating actor's behaviour and 
policy maker's decisions (for example, Windhoff-Heritier 1987). 
To sum up briefly, from a rationalist point of view interests or institutions (actors or 
structures) were the central categories identified as being decisive in the policy process -
a process which could be understood and described in a schematic and linear fashion. 
Dissatisfaction with these rather limited approaches in explaining 'real existing' policy has 
led researchers to develop and refine alternative models of explanation, both within and 
outside these research traditions. Additiona"y, some authors point to the emergence of 
new problems, especially with respect to environmental risks and uncertainties, which 
have spurred this search for new analytical models (Seck 1986). One of these more 
recent research developments point to approaches that emphasize cognitive and 
normative frameworks. A definition of these frameworks is given by Surel (2000): 
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"Cognitive normative frames ... are intended to refer to coherent systems 
of normative and cognitive elements which define, in a given field, 'world 
views', mechanisms of identity formation, principles of action, as well as 
methodological prescriptions and practices for actors subscribing to the 
same frame. Genera"y speaking these frames constitute conceptual 
instruments, available for the analysis of changes in public policy and for 
the explanation of developments between public and private actors 
which come into play in a given field" (ibid.: 496). 
As opposed to rationalist approaches to public policy, the key argument here is that 
developments in public policies are, to a large extent, determined by the framing of policy 
problems and solutions. In opposition to what they claim to be overly simplistic 
interest/structure based models, these approaches suggest that ideas, beliefs and 
discourse play an important role in understanding and describing public policy making. 
Recent years have seen a proliferation of literature covering such approaches. In policy 
science and international relations alike, talk is now of "systems of meaning" or "the role of 
ideas" (Jachtenfuchs 1995), "worldviews" (Goldstein/Keohane 1993), "interpretative 
schemes" or "frames" (Rhein/Schon 1993), "epistemes" (Haas 1992), "paradigms" (Hall 
1993, Capone 2001), "discourses" (Dryzek 1997; Hajer 1995; Escobar 1996) or "belief 
systems" (Sabatier 1998), highlighting that there is more to the policy process than just 
institutions or rational actors. Yet apart from the common assumption of the importance of 
cognitive and normative 'variables' these various conceptual models are informed by a 
number of different perspectives. For instance, dissatisfaction with the rational actor 
approach has led some scholars to develop a more sociological line of inquiry, which 
recognizes that actor's preferences might be influenced by cultural rules and norms (in 
sociological institutionalism, Powell/DiMaggio 1991). Others have tried to combine 
individual normative components with rational choice assumptions (for example, Braun 
1998), while yet others integrated 'ideas' in a historical materialist type of analysis (Cox 
1996). In accordance with this wide variety of approaches, the status and Significance of 
cognitive/normative concepts varies greatly. For instance, for some, cognition, discourse 
or norms are the main object of analysis while for others discourse or ideas are more 
'intervening' or 'mediating' variables, to be integrated into a more traditional kind of 
research design (Nullmeier 2001). 
The two approaches that will be used and tested in this thesis come from two different 
theoretical backgrounds. Maarten Hajers "argumentative discourse theory" can be located 
in the tradition of constructivist, post-modern approaches in policy science (for example, 
Fischer/Forester 1993), while Paul Sabatier's "belief system" approach developed out of a 
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rationalist public policy tradition, more specifically, the policy cycle and rational choice 
model. When Hajer speaks of "discourse" and Sabatier of "belief systems", they are 
referring to different things with different consequences for their respective models of 
policy-making and explanations for change. In other words, in cognitive normative 
frameworks, the use of a certain language may well point to similar concepts but not 
necessarily need to do so. The use of a supposed common language does not 
necessarily imply where these cognitive/normative 'factors' reside or how they work or 
function in the policy process. 
For understanding the dynamics of policy changes, cognitive-normative frameworks go 
'beyond' the interplay of actor's interests or institutions. Yet the interesting question is not 
only whether these concepts matter (and how they are possibly linked to 'older concepts'), 
but to find out when, how and with what effects. By using two representatives of these 
frameworks one can highlight the differences between these approaches and thus 
evaluate their relative 'usefulness' that is, each of their contributions and limitations to 
policy research in the case of German agro-biotechnology policy. 
2.2 The theoretical frameworks 
2.2.1 The advocacy coalition framework by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
The advocacy coalition framework (ACF) has been developed and applied by Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith over a number of years (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998). 
The following discussion draws mainly on Sabatier (1998) as one of the more recent 
statements of the approach. As mentioned above, the ACF developed out of a rationalist 
public policy tradition. Being mainly opposed to 'stage heuristic' and conventional political 
science theories, such as institutional rational choice, perceiving them as over-simplistic, 
the ACF was put forward as a more promising theoretical public policy framework that 
combines insights from different theory traditions (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1993). The 
main arguments in the ACF are as follows: 
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The ACF views the policy process as a competition between coalitions of actors who 
share and advocate beliefs about policy problems and solutions. This competition of 
coalitions takes place within a policy subsystem (see Figure 1). Within the policy 
SUbsystem it is assumed that there will be a small number (usually one to four) of 
advocacy coalitions, which are comprised of various actors ranging from governmental 
organizations to private organizations, all actively concerned about a policy. Thus 
advocacy coalitions can include policy makers, business representatives, pressure 
groups, scientists or even journalists. According to Sabatier (199B: 103) these actors of a 
coalition both: 
"a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and b) engage in an non-
trivial degree of coordinated activity over time." 
Central to the ACF is the idea of a shared belief system. Within these belief systems, the 
ACF identifies three hierarchically structured categories: At the top is a deep core of 
fundamental ontological and normative beliefs that define a vision of the individual, society 
and the world. These deep core beliefs are resistant to change; for Sabatier, change 
amounts to religious conversion. Below the deep core beliefs come the policy core beliefs 
they: "represent a coalition's basic normative commitments and causal perceptions across 
an entire policy domain or subsystem" (ibid.: 103). They include fundamental value 
priorities, examples being the relative importance of economic development versus 
environmental protection or the division of authority between governments and markets. 
According to the ACF, these policy core beliefs "are the fundamental 'glue' of coalitions" 
(ibid.) and are difficult but not impossible to modify. Below the policy core beliefs is a set 
of secondary aspects comprising instrumental considerations on how 'to implement a 
policy. These are the most easily adaptable elements and susceptible to change. 
Advocacy coalitions, the ACF argues, form around beliefs, and particularly around policy 
core beliefs. In order to realize the goals generated by their beliefs, coalitions are 
instrumentally rational and adopt numerous strategies to influence policy makers. 
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Conflicting strategies between coalitions are normally mediated by a third party, the policy 
broker. 
Apart from beliefs, Sabatier identifies a set of exogenous, non-cognitive variables that also 
impact on the subsystem actors and the policy-making process. First are relatively stable 
parameters, such as basic institutional structures or fundamental socio-cultural values and 
the social structure. Second are external events, such as changes in socio-economic 
conditions or changes in governing coalitions. 
The ACF perceives of policy change as a transformation of a hegemonic (deep or core) 
belief system within a policy subsystem. This can be the result of two processes. First, 
policy change can result from non-cognitive events originating outside the policy 
subsystem, which can impact on the power distribution among actors. As a second 
element the ACF introduces the idea of policy oriented learning, which can lead a 
hegemonic coalition to redefine and adapt its belief system and their strategies in order to 
reach their goal. 
Policy oriented learning is instrumental and defined as " ... relatively 
enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from 
experience and/or new information and which are concerned with the 
attainment or revision of policy objectives" (ibid.: 104). 
However, as Sabatier argues, policy oriented learning should not be over-stated for it can 
alter secondary aspects of a coalition's belief system but hardly ever results in changes of 
policy core beliefs. Hence: 
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" ... changes in the policy core aspects of governmental programmes 
require a perturbation in non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem" 
(ibid.: 105). 
Based on this model, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith developed a comprehensive set of 
twelve hypotheses to test the ACF empirically (Annex 1). 
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Figure 1: Diagram ofthe ACF (Sabatier 1998: 102) 
2.2.2 The discourse coalition framework by Hajer 
Maarten Hajer's discourse coalition approach (DCF) stands in the tradition of social 
constructivist perspectives. Hajer views his policy approach as part of a 'post-positivist' 
research tradition that draws attention to the role of language or narratives in explaining 
policy processes. Rather than viewing the constructivist approach as a, mere refinement to 
more traditional approaches in public policy, Hajer argues for a need to establish the 
constructivist approach on a more 'robust footing', as pOinted out in his study 'The Politics 
of environmental Discourse" (Hajer 1995). Against this claimed need, Hajer introduces his 
own "argumentative approach" to the study of environmental politics. Insights for his 
theory are taken from Michel Foucault's discourse theory and Rom Harre's and Michael 
Billig's social-psychological thinking. 
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For Hajer, a discursive approach to politics highlights the fact that the understanding and 
the framing of an issue is influencing the way in which the problem is handled and solved 
politically. According to the DCF, politics is thus conceived as "a struggle for discursive 
hegemony in which actors try to secure support for their definition of reality." (Hajer 1995: 
59). Central to Hajer's thinking is the concept of discourse: 
"Discourse is here defined as a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, 
and categorization that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a 
particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities" (ibid.: 44). 
A discourse analysis tries to make sense of regularities of variations in what is being said 
and written. However, this does not simply refer to the analysis of discussions around the 
subject but has a clear institutional dimension. It involves looking at the context in which a 
statement is made or to whom statements are directed. Discourse is thus internally related 
to the social practices in which it is produced and reproduced. 
Means for the creation and maintenance of a specific discursive order are story-lines. 
Story-lines are another key concept in the DCF: 
"Story-lines are narratives on social reality through which elements from 
many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set 
of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding" (ibid.: 
62). 
Story-lines selectively problematize specific aspects of reality. They fulfill an important role 
in the clustering of knowledge, the positioning of actors and ultimately in the creation of 
coalitions amongst the various actors in a policy subsystem. As story-lines get widely 
used they become ritual in character and give permanence to the debate. By simply 
uttering a specific element one effectively re-invokes the whole story-line. Metaphors, as 
another concept, stand for something else and create important linkages between 
different issues. 
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For Hajer story-lines fulfill the role of facilitating the reduction of discursive complexity of a 
problem and hence create possibilities of problem closure. Story-lines do not primarily 
derive their discursive power from the fact that the specific elements fit together in a 
logical way, but because the elements exhibit discursive affinities and "the story sounds 
right" (ibid.: 63). The political power of a text, as Hajer goes on to say, does "not derive 
from its consistency but comes from its multi-interpretability" (ibid.: 61). In this way, in 
Hajer's DCF story-lines are understood as important vehicles for political change. The 
emergence of new story-lines can re-order understandings and/or provide for a different 
access to a certain issue. 
Directly connected to the concept of story-lines is the important concept of discourse 
coalitions. These are formed by actors who "for various reasons are attracted to a specific 
(set of) story-lines (ibid.: 65). Story-lines are the discursive cement that keep a coalition 
together. For Hajer, discourse coalitions have a linguistic basis, that is, story-lines - not 
interests or beliefs - form the basis of a coalition. More importantly, story-lines can even 
change an actor's understanding of his/her own interests and can thus contribute to 
change. 
Apart from the disciplinary/constraining effects of discourse Hajer stresses the possibility 
of it having enabling functions, as mentioned in Foucault's idea of 'tactical polyvalence of 
discourses': 
"This refers to the way in which the various discursive elements, that 
might have been introduced for various unrelated strategic purposes 
create a new discursive space within which problems can be discussed. 
Here the structuring capacity of discourse gains its meaning within the 
context of consciously operating actors" (ibid.: 50). 
However, Hajer criticizes Foucault for being ultimately ambivalent as to the role and 
agency of the discoursing subject. For Hajer, Harre and Billig's focus on argumentative 
interaction between individuals and the production of story-lines serves as a correction to 
Foucault's theory. From this point of view politics is seen as an argumentative struggle in 
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which actors try to persuade others of their views and seek to position themselves and 
others in a specific way. Against the background of and with insights from social-
interactive theory Hajer finally claims that "the subject can be studied as actively involved 
in the production and transformation of discourse" (ibid.: 55). 
In Hajer's view, a discourse has finally become hegemonic in a given domain when: 
a) the conditions of discourse structuration exist, that is: " ... if the 
credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to draw on ideas, 
concepts, and categories of a given discourse ... " (ibid.: 60). 
b) when discourse institutionalization has taken place and " ... a given 
discourse is translated into institutional arrangements ... n (ibid.: 61). 
2.2.3 Comparison and discussion of the approaches 
Hajers's discourse analytical framework and Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework both 
offer a way of analyzing the policy process from a cognitive-normative angle. Although 
sharing some components in analysis, the approaches differ to a considerable extent. The 
following section will compare and discuss the two approaches along a number of key 
issues. 
Hajer and Sabatier agree that the most useful level to focus on is the policy subsystem. 
The concept of the subsystem focuses on groups/people or organizations interacting 
regularly to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given policy problem 
or issue. The nation state does not constitute a boundary since policy subsystems will 
involve actors from several levels of government. Both authors stress this as one of the 
advantages of their framework as it allows focusing on relationships and processes that 
transgress sub-national and national borders. 
Furthermore, in order to analyze the subsystem Hajer and Sabatier both use coalitions of 
actors as primary units of analysis. Therefore, they both eschew more conventional 
approaches to policy analysis that focus on individual actors, structures or institutions. 
Their research objectives are identified empirically as 'various people and institutions 
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involved in the policy process'. In this way they point their attention to the fact that policy-
making is often informed by ideas, representations and institutions that originate outside 
of what is defined as 'the political realm'. 
The basis of coalitions: Beliefs versus discourse 
Although both authors use coalitions of actors as primary units of analysis, the basis of 
their coalitions differ fundamentally. Sabatier aggregates actors around shared beliefs and 
he requires that these advocacy coalitions show a degree of coordinated activity over 
time. Hajer does not share this idea of stable belief systems. For him it is discourses and 
story-lines that build the basis of a coalition. In the DCF there is also no emphasis on 
common interaction or any kind of institutionalized relationships. In contrast to advocacy 
coalitions, Hajer's discourse coalitions can take account of multiple motivations for 
coalition building, independent of specific beliefs, and are therefore much more readily 
changeable and amendable for specific political purposes. Coalitions can then be built for 
strategic purposes on the basis of a perceived common political project. Accordingly, for 
Sabatier, beliefs are the basis for maintaining and extending a coalition whereas 
discourse coalitions live and die with discursive developments. 
The role of language 
Hajer's constructivist approach is built on a theory of language and representation. 
According to this understanding, things do not 'exist' unless they are brought into being by 
language and discourse. Hajer claims that "the dynamics of environmental politics [Le. the 
specific 'reality' of an ecological problem (added K.B.)] cannot be understood without 
taking apart the discursive practices that guide our perception of reality" (Hajer 1995: 17). 
In other words, for Hajer environmental issues only become political issues once they are 
constituted as such in environmental discourse. Language "constitutes meaning and this 
self-proclaimed "anti-realist" (Hajer 1995: 264) stance clearly separates Hajer's approach 
from that of Sabatier. Sabatier takes the existence of an environmental problem as a 
starting point. Even though he holds on to the constructivist notion that "actor's 
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perceptions are strongly filtered by their preexisting normative and other beliefs" (Sabatier 
1998: 109), and that one of the main problems for coalitions consists of "coming to a 
common understanding of the policy problem" (ibid.: 115), Sabatier does not look into the 
process of reality construction through argumentative interaction. 2 Instead he offers a 
framework that builds upon and integrates more traditional factors such as institutions or 
socio-political parameters. 
The role of expertise and knowledge 
The question of how scientific knowledge and empirical evidence is treated in both 
theories merits some closer elaboration. Both authors hold that the question of science is 
of high importance to policy-making, particularly in the field of environmental politics. 
However, their views on the subject differ fundamentally. In the ACF, Sabatier/Jenkins-
Smith (1993) argue that "many aspects of a coalition's belief system are susceptible to 
change on the basis of scientific and technical analysis" (ibid.: 41). In this respect the 
authors speak of the "enlightenment function" (ibid.: 42) of scientific research. In fact 
Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith entertain a rather idealized picture of science. They establish 
technical knowledge and expertise as something separate from beliefs and the policy 
process and work on the assumption that science could be an unbiased, objective arbiter 
in a conflictive policy situation. In this vein they suggest that the participation of experts 
can playa leading role in bringing about policy consensus. 
In the light of their research Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith make some qualifications to the 
science-policy relationship, for instance they admit that knowledge - however 'objective' -
may be rejected once it clashes with core beliefs or that "scientists are not necessarily 
'neutral' ... but instead, are often members of coalitions" (Sabatier 1998: 108). However, 
2 Sabatier himself is very critical of the constructivist theory tradition. He agrees that "it is clear that much of 
social 'reality' is 'socially constructed'" (Sabatier 1999: 11) but criticizes constructivism mainly for leaving ideas 
unconnected to socioeconomic conditions, institutions and individuals. Most of all, however, it seems that 
Sabatier criticizes the constructivist framework from a Popperian point of view arguing that these approaches 
are non-falsifiable and cannot be rendered empirically concrete. Thus, constructivist approaches do not seem 
to fulfill Sabatier's basic criteria for scientific theory building which consist of identifying important variables, 
relationships, and causal connections and in developing a set of falsifiable hypotheses which are put to the 
test. This point then weighs most heavily in Sabatier's critique on constructivist approaches. This 
argumentation in turn puts him - from the point of view of radical constructivism - Into a positivist corner. 
22 
this does not seem in principal call into question their belief in the virtue of the scientific 
method in policy debates. 
Hajer's take on knowledge and expertise, in comparison, is very different. Again arguing 
from the standpoint of constructivism, Hajer strongly rejects the positivist assumptions as 
exemplified in Sabatier's approach. Referring to the sociology of science tradition, such as 
in Wynne (1992) and Jasanoff (1990), Hajer clearly defies the objective, enlightening 
character of scientific knowledge and expertise. Instead he states that the boundary 
between scientific expertise and politics is in no way preordained or clear. This also 
applies to the fact-value boundary. This is due to the socially constructed nature of 
science, meaning that scientific practice does not take place in a vacuum but is embedded 
in a social, cultural and political environment and hence influenced by these contextual 
variables. 
Bringing this knowledge together with his discourse analytical thinking the science-policy 
relationship is thus "analyzed as a set of discursive practices in which rival groups of 
actors seek to impose specific authority claims and understandings of the problem on a 
policy community" (Hajer 1995: 140). Hajer also emphasizes the role of power in relation 
to science and knowledge: "Power should be analyzed as inherent in the knowledge 
claims and the various practices through which specific scientific claims gain authority and 
credibility" (ibid.: 139). Scientific claims thus become only another field of discursive 
practices that play into the conflict over the meaning and solution of problems. 
The basis and role of policy oriented learning 
The ideas on policy oriented learning playa great role in Sabatier's approach. 
Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith define policy oriented learning as " ... an ongoing process of search 
and adaptation motivated by the desire to realize policy core beliefs" (Sabatier/Jenkins-
Smith 1993: 44). In their approach to learning empirical evidence comes to playa crucial 
role. Sabatier's policy oriented learning is concerned with changes of beliefs of people 
within a coalition and across beliefs systems (Le. between coalitions). As deep values and 
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policy core beliefs are less susceptible to change, learning processes mostly affect 
secondary aspects. External shocks, for instance new information, can lead a coalition to 
reconsider and change the secondary aspects of their belief systems, and can affect their 
strategies in ways compatible with their core beliefs. 
Learning processes that lead to changes in policy core beliefs are thus highly unlikely. 
When core beliefs conflict, there is rather a tendency for each coalition to talk past each 
other resulting in the "dialogue of the deaf' (ibid.: 55). Yet Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 
elaborate on conditions that are conducive to policy learning processes between 
coalitions. They argue that the probability for such learning taking place is higher in an 
apolitical forum dominated by professional norms, and in the case that problems are 
concerned that involve natural systems rather than purely social or political systems. 
Hajer, on the other hand, does not have an explicit idea of policy learning. Yet he certainly 
criticizes Sabatier's understanding as it reveals a strong rationalist, linear and modern 
conception of learning processes and cognitive change. As outlined above, much criticism 
of Sabatier's idea of learning is due to his uncritical treatment of scientific knowledge on 
policy processes and conflict settling. Against this conception of policy learning, Hajer's 
idea of a similar process - he calls it reflexivity - and its effects are based on the discourse 
rationale. Hajer does not believe in a fixed value (belief) composition of individuals. 
Instead he considers that cognitive patterns are subject to discursive influence. As 
discursive interaction (i.e. language in use) is a constant process, the construction of new 
story-lines can create new meanings and cognitions and thus generate new inSights. Yet 
he claims that for such 'clarifying deliberations' to take place there is a need for "reflexive 
institutional arrangements" (Hajer 1995: 286). For Hajer, the process of learning is thus a 
quality of discursive practices in which actors engage in order to come to a common 
understanding of the problem. A newly emerged common understanding can then again 
influence coalition formation and possibly help in overcoming policy conflict. 
24 
The treatment of power 
Sabatier speaks of power, but he does not link power directly to belief systems (rather 
'those belief systems in power have power'). Thus from his framework one can detect a 
rather conventional, modern understanding of power. For instance, Sabatier uses stable 
external factors, such as basic constitutional structures or social cultural values as 
explaining variables. Non-cognitive events originating outside the policy subsystem, such 
as national elections, can have an impact on the power distribution among actors as they 
increase resources (money etc.) and open up opportunities for change through the "raw 
exercise of power" (Sabatier 1993: 45). The framework thus also acknowledges central 
features of institutional models, namely "that rules create authorizations" (ibid.: 28). With 
respect to the state Sabatier does not think in terms of the hierarchical centralized power 
of the state but of power as being more dispersed in federal and intergovernmental 
structures. 
For Hajer, following Foucault, power is not a centralized concept that resides in a 
particular institution (e.g. the state or capital) rather it is more dispersed and omnipresent. 
The DCF puts its focus on the "micro-physics of power" (Hajer 1995: 252), that is, the 
more subtle features of various power practices. Discourse can be one such practice, but 
discourse does not by itself exert power. Rather the question is how a specific discourse 
is taken up in the process of creation and structure of fields of arguments, how it pOSitions 
actors and issues and what definition it gives to the problem. As such, the "discursive 
construction of reality [thus] becomes an important realm of power" (ibid.: 21). 
The question of interests 
The central feature of the ACF is its focus on belief systems of advocacy coalitions. 
According to the model, belief systems guide the behaviour of coalitions, and struggles 
between different antagonizing advocacies drive the policy process. To quote Sabatier: 
"the framework explicitly rejects the view that actors are primarily motivated by their short 
term self-interests" (Sabatier 1993: 27). The ACF does not deny the existence of 
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economic or political interests and distributional conflict. Yet it holds this to be more 
relevant in case of "material groups" who only maximize their self-interests, whereas 
purposive groups act on the basis of an ideology, e.g. collective welfare (Sabatier 1998: 
116). Nevertheless in the ACF it is assumed that actors act on the basis of instrumental 
rationality (presumably 'rational' refers to means) and that ultimately actor's motivations 
are complex, including values, self-interest or organizational interest. 
Based on the constructivist notion, for Hajer "interests cannot be taken as given a priori 
but are constituted through discourse" (Hajer 1995: 51). In this sense story-lines play an 
important role. The emergence of a new policy discourse may alter the perception of 
problems and opportunities, create space for the formation of new coalitions and 
reposition coalitions in the struggle for discursive hegemony. In this way story-lines can 
change an actor's understanding of his/her own interests and can contribute to policy 
change. 
The cause of policy change 
The ACF has two principal sources of change: a) the values of coalition members and b} 
exogenous shocks to the subsystem. As outlined above, for Sabatier learning processes 
constitute one of the key variables for policy change. However, policy learning only affects 
secondary aspects of a belief system, which is why changes to the core aspects of a 
governmental programme require the perturbations in non-cognitive factors. Such factors 
external to the policy subsystem, for example, fundamental change on socio-economic 
conditions or elections, have the potential of altering the resources of coalitions and are 
thus primary determinants of political change. Yet because the impact of such events is 
unclear, Sabatier argues that significant external perturbations "are necessary but not 
sufficient, cause of a change in the policy core attributes" (ibid: 118/119). Instead they 
provide a "window of opportunity" which needs to be skillfully exploited and tactically used. 
For Hajer discourse fulfills a key role in processes of political change. The emergence of 
new story-lines can re-order understandings and/or provide for a different access to a 
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certain issue. Story-lines can even change an actor's understanding of his/her own 
interests and can thus contribute to change. It is most important to him to highlight that 
discursive interaction can create new meanings, identities and forms of mediation that 
change the dynamic of the struggle for discursive hegemony. In this process, Hajer 
emphasizes the role of credibility, acceptability and trust in the explanation of policy 
change. Actors must believe in what they are told, arguments need to be plausible, 
attractive and need 'to fit'. In short, for Hajer it is argumentative exchange, the 
interpretation of an (external) event and the change in perspectives that explain the 
developments in policy making and change. 
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Table 1: Comparison of the theoretical approaches 
Policy 
analysis 
Level of 
focus 
Core unit 
to study 
Coalition 
basis 
Cause of 
policy 
change 
Policy 
learning 
Role of 
expertise, 
knowledge 
Power 
Interests 
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Policy making as "interpretative 
activity" (what is the problem?) 
Politics as struggle for discursive 
hegemony 
Constructivist, anti-realist, Hajer 
positions himself against what he 
calls a "realist tradition" that takes 
problems and interests for granted 
Policy sUbsystem 
Discourse coalitions 
Linguistic base solely (formed for 
various reasons) 
Story-lines hold coalitions together 
Cognitive power of the story line and 
its "attractiveness" 
Story-lines are essential in 
reproducing and transforming 
discursive orders 
Story-lines can change an actors 
understanding of his/her interests 
Credibi lity, acceptabi lity, trust 
Result of language and argument 
Need for new reflexive institutions 
Socially constructed nature of 
science, science claims as 
authoritarian practice (power) 
Dispersed, depending on positioning 
effects of language, power as 
performative 
Are not given but subject to 
"arguments" 
Policy making as competition over the 
authoritative allocation of values 
Problem given 
Sabatier positions himself against a policy 
tradition that is caught in stage heuristic 
and simple rationa l choice models 
"Public policies incorporate implicit theories 
about how to achieve their objective . .. they 
involve value priorities" 
Policy subsystem 
Advocacy coalitions 
Common policy core beliefs + degree of 
coordinated activity 
Policy learning (although only on 
secondary aspects) or strategies 
Major socio-economic changes, changes 
in public opinion. Changes in government 
are sine qua non for major change in policy 
core. These provide opportunity, but 
change depends on skillful exploitation of 
minority coalition. 
New subsystems may emerge out of new 
conceptualization of problem 
Process of search and adaptation in order 
to realize core beliefs. 
Result of experience and/or new 
information 
Does deliver objective information and 
instigate learning 
Experts can bring about policy closure 
More traditional idea of power as located in 
institutions and "resources" 
Does talk of interests as a basis for 
coalition, assumes that actors are 
instrumentally rational, but holds that 
actors goals are complex 
Conclusion 
In order to answer the research question on policy change in German agro-biotechnology 
regulation I have chosen to apply Hajers' argumentative discourse approach and 
Sabatier's advocacy coalition approach. As representatives of cognitive normative 
frameworks, these authors understand that cognitive normative frames not only 
significantly influence the process of policy-making, but that these dimensions are 
organizing principles on the basis of which policy makers act and the process of change is 
unfolding. A complex web of discourses or belief systems respectively, configure the 
process of public policy making and change in policy implies certain modifications to these 
systems. 
The approaches of Hajer and Sabatier appear to some extent similar. However, when 
looked at more closely, the differences are quite substantial. In Hajer's DCF we are facing 
a theoretical body, which is highly interpretative. Sabatier's approach, in contrast, remains 
selective and limited in its interpretative scope. There, traditional elements of institutional 
rational choice are combined with insights from cognitive and social psychology.3 On the 
basis of these differences, the different kinds of insights into the dynamic of policy change 
offered by these two analytical lenses will be shown. 
3 Interestingly in the German discussion the ACF is partly categorized as belonging to the 'interpretative' 
theory approaches. In the United States, however, Sabatier's work is discussed as radically opponent to the 
interpretative or argumentative policy theory tradition (Bandalow 1999; Fischer 2003). While this is certainly 
interesting in terms of perception history It shows how theories themselves are subject to perception biases. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Methodology and operationalization 
This chapter will focus on the process of research and interpretation, explaining the 
methods and information sources used to address the research questions and to test the 
theories. In focusing on both approaches, it will be shown how the main concepts were 
operationalized, which sources of information were used, and what the rationale for the 
analysis and the specific interpretation was. In the research process, I tried to stay as 
close to the theories as possible, that is, to collect and analyze the material in ways in 
which Hajer and Sabatier would presumably do so. In this way the theories could be 
tested to the full, and the contribution of each theoretical body to answering the research 
questions judged. 
The PEG project as a methodological forerunner 
As mentioned earlier, the idea to use cognitive normative theories to understand the policy 
process and the process of change arose from research done within the framework of the 
European research project on "Precautionary expertise for GM crops" (PEG). The aim of 
PEG was to analyze the use of the precautionary principle (PP) with respect to regulatory 
measures, expert judgements and stakeholder roles in the area of agro-biotechnology. 
Even though the PP is a widely accepted regulatory principle in this field, its meaning is 
contentious, and subject to interpretation. Given this ambiguity, it became part of the 
research project to analyze how specific constituencies defined these issues and what this 
in turn meant for their judgement on biotechnology and for policy solutions. 
With this, the investigations into the PP became a matter of dealing with different 
judgements. The study showed that rather then being an abstract principle, precautionary 
expertise included dimensions far beyond questions that might be typically associated 
with a principle in environmental law; It included value commitments, political interests in 
the agro-food chain as well as questions of sustainable development or technological 
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decision-making. This is when the concept of 'risk framings' proved to be a helpful device 
to cluster the data and to make sense of the findings (Soschert'Gill 2004). 
Even though PEG was not set up as a research project to deal with cognitive-normative 
theories, the project theme and the method proved helpful and inspiring for such an 
analysis. In the wake of the research, the material was thus increasingly collected and 
interpreted in light of these theoretical insights. 
3.1 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis deals with the question of change in agricultural biotechnology between the 
years 2000 and 2004. However, I decided to begin the empirical study in the early 1990s. 
I believe that only by taking such a 'long duree' can the analysis best trace the changes 
and breaks in discourse and beliefs systems and show the specific nature of change in 
agro-biotech policies in Germany after the SSE crisis. In other words, this thesis 
undertakes, following Foucault, a "genealogy" 4 of the GM conflict in Germany (or, 
following Sabatier, one could say it traces the evolution of a subsystem). To this end the 
thesis is structured into nine chapters, of which Chapters four to eight follow a 
chronological order and entail the bulk of analytical and interpretative work. 
Given the focus, the analytical scrutiny over this relatively long period of time is not evenly 
spread. I identify a specific event in the year 2000, the SSE crisis, as a trigger of major 
change. I use this event to divide the period of investigation into specific sequences, 
looking at the period before, but mainly focusing on the time after the event. Accordingly 
the time period from around 1990 up until 1998 will be presented in one chapter (Chapter 
four). In this I rely mostly on secondary sources. Following this will be a transition phase 
(Chapter five). informed by secondary material and newly collected sources. The following 
Chapter six is one of the key chapters, focusing on the trigger for change, that is, the SSE 
crisis and its effects. As this chapter is more current and analyzes the events in greater 
depth - covering a time period of only one year - it is mainly informed by primary sources. 
4 This is only to capture the idea of Foucault that history is not meant to be some unfolding of any ideal 
schema but a constant struggle between different social forces (Barret 1991). 
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The last two empirical chapters (Chapters seven and eight) will cover the time period from 
2001 up until 2004 and will be additionally supported by participatory observation and 
interview material. Finally, Chapter nine will compare the results and answer the main 
research questions. 
3.2 Operationalizing central components of both theories 
How can policy change be explained and illuminated by these two theories? What are 
their relative or different contributions to the study of policy processes and outcomes? In 
order to address these major research questions the research process was organized in 
the following way: 
3.2.1 Information sources 
The policy subsystem and the relevant actors 
According to Sabatier, a subsystem focuses on "groups of people and/or organizations 
interacting regularly ... to influence policy formulation and implementation within a given 
policy area" (Sabatier 1998: 111). Following this definition, in this thesis the 
actors/institutions were selected empirically. The DCF does not have a clear idea of the 
delineation of the subsystem, as the policy domain is not a clear-cut space but 
discursively created. 
However, what about changes in the subsystem and to the range of policy actors 
involved? From the DCF point of view, change in discourse can change the policy 
subsystem. With a redefinition of a problem the people affected by a policy decision may 
change. New actors from other subsystems become stakeholders and/or policy makers. 
From the ACF point of view, new subsystems may emerge when new issues gain 
importance. Methodologically this means analyzing why new actors appear in the 
subsystem and on what basis (discourse of belief) they join coalitions (see below). 
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Documentary information sources 
Since the policy subsystem of agro-biotech regulation spans a wide variety of policy 
actors (e.g. regulatory agencies, advisory bodies, scientific research institutes, industry-
wide bodies, seed companies, retailers, environmental NGOs, consumer NGOs, farmers' 
organizations etc.), an extensive range of texts needed to be selected. These relevant 
public and private information sources included primary documents in printed form or from 
web pages, position statements of organizations, and articles in the mass media and 
scientific press. Given the chosen time frame, the thesis also drew upon and integrated 
available secondary studies on the development of biotech regulation in Germany, or on 
more specific aspects of the historical events and subjects. The responses of the public 
were equally important, and could be evaluated through public opinion polls, surveys, 
election results, the statements of interest group leaders, opposition parties, and so forth. 
This collection of printed material was an ongoing process throughout the thesis 
development. As most of these information sources were printed in German, I myself 
translated the cited sections into English. These translations were checked by a bilingual 
native English speaker. 
Face-to-face interviews 
As an important source of information, the study draws upon a series of twenty-four face-
to-face interviews with individuals representing constituencies from the wide range 
mentioned above (Annex 2). The interviewees were selected on the basis of relevance 
and representation. In particular I wanted to make sure that every group or institution that 
played a role in the policy process or had a stake in regulation was represented. 
Altogether over forty requests for interviews were written, followed up by numerous phone 
calls. In the end there was a broad and comprehensive range of actors on my interview 
list. The interviews themselves were semi-structured, based on very broad standard 
questions of the PEG project, but subject to variations and framings depending on the 
interviewee. Principally open-ended, most interviews had about 90 minutes in length and 
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were both, recorded and transcribed, though translated only where used in citations. Cited 
sections have been sent to interviewees for clarification and authorization. 
The interviews were a very rich and important source of information for the analysis, 
especially because some of the information was, so to speak, first hand and brand-new (a 
major stakeholder conference, the Diskurs grDne Gentechnik was taking place at the 
time). The interviews were used to analyze how actors interpreted the events, how they 
framed the issues and what they saw as being important or unimportant in the policy field. 
The interviews were thus used to facilitate and complete the mapping out of discourses 
and beliefs. Moreover, the interviews facilitated analysis of comparison and interaction 
amongst policy actors, i.e. when interviewees explained their position/action in relation to 
others or commented on other stakeholders. They were used to generate additional 
information about causal chains, argumentative exchange and the state of the art of 
discussion in the field. Equally importantly, the interview material provided more of a 
sense on how 'to read' the various documentary sources provided by specific 
constituencies. They thus proved to be valuable guidelines for sorting and interpreting the 
huge amount of printed material. 
Participant observation 
When looking at discourse and beliefs system change it is indispensable to consider the 
interactive processes involving those most prominent in policy-making. The interviews 
already delivered information in this respect. However, equally informative was participant 
observation. Due to the current and topical nature of the subject, throughout this research, 
I have had the opportunity to attend many conferences, workshops and meetings on 
agricultural biotechnology issues. For instance, the German PEG team took part in the 
opening session for the "Diskurs grDne Gentechnil<', as well as other issue-related 
stakeholder conferences. These events to some extent guided the direction and content 
of my research by vividly illustrating the argumentative dynamic and the level of 
agreement or disagreement amongst key players in the biotechnology debate. Last but 
not least, participation provided an opportunity for personal communication with a number 
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of stakeholders, to contact potential interview partners and to get a sense of the 'who talks 
to whom' or 'who hangs out with whom' in the bar after the formal sessions. 
Interesting with respect to observing interactions, for instance, proved to be the 
preparation and the conduct of a national workshop as part of the PEG project. From the 
difficulties encountered in bringing stakeholders to participate ("another pointless 
discussion on biotech"), and from the process of the workshop itself a lot could be learned 
about the current national context, the (new) relationships between the actors, the 
ongoing polarization, and the state of the art of the arguments used in the topical 
discussion on biotech regulation (Boschert/Gill 2003). 
3.2.2 The advocacy coalition approach 
Where to look for beliefs? 
One of the main differences between the approaches lies in the distinction between 
discourse and beliefs. The main methodological difficulty therefore lies in identifying these 
hierarchical beliefs systems and separating them from discourses. For Sabatier, methods 
for investigating the content of belief systems include elite surveys, panels of 
knowledgeable observers, and content analysis (Sabatier 1993: 33). Sabatier/Jenkins 
Smith (1993) stress in particular content analysis of government documents and interest 
group publications as appropriate tools to acquire "intersubjectively reliable data" (ibid.: 
237). In a long-term study on environmental policy this method was applied by coding the 
content of public documents (legislative and administrative hearings) and in applying 
regression analysis (Sabatier/Brasher 1993). Combining qualitative analysis with a 
quantitative method, the hearings were coded according to the hypotheses made in the 
ACF. This way beliefs and belief affinities between the central actors were determined, 
and the dynamics of coalition behaviour traced. In this thesis I exclusively used qualitative 
data in order to reconstruct the beliefs of the coalitions involved. I used a combination of 
content analysis of government documents, newspaper accounts and interest group 
publications, as well as elite interviews and personal observation (more detailed below). 
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How to identify related beliefs across levels? 
The advocacy coalition framework identifies three hierarchically structured categories, a 
deep core of fundamental beliefs, a second range of policy core beliefs and a set of 
specified instruments. The central idea is that from more general beliefs flow the more 
specific ideas in a policy area. For this to be true, policy preferences need to be traced 
back to more abstract values (normative and ontological beliefs) rather than to political or 
economic short-term interests. This can be done by searching for beliefs of a more 
general kind, that is, for explicit and implicit value-policy links in specific policy statements: 
Example: In a policy statement we can identify the policy core belief: "Biotech does not 
serve societal interests." This sentence is uttered within the following context: 
Quote: "Certain technologies are not beneficial toward to the goal of a 
more sustainable agriculture. Some people act as if there was a free 
market for technologies, yet this does not exist as there are always 
economic interests involved." 
This means the policy core belief "biotech does not serve societal interests" can be traced 
back to a generally skeptical worldview about technological progress and the way 
innovations are introduced in contemporary societies. This finding can then be tabulated 
in the following way: 
Wofldviews ,; Policy core belief T. t" Specified instruments 
Deep core belief Secondary 'aspects , 
New technologies are Biotech does not serve societal Technology induced 
not per se beneficial to interests. regulation rejected. Support 
societies. There is no of alternative agricultural 
'free market' in technologies, especia lly as 
technical innovations. found in organic farming 
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How to separate discourse from belief? 
As we have only language sources at our disposal, this method still leaves us with the 
validity problem. How do we know that these "expressed preferences" are beliefs rather 
than just discourse? Sabatier/Jenkins Smith (1993) argue the following case: 
a) We look for consistencies in policy preferences over time. As Sabatier/Jenkins Smith 
argue: "In the policy subsystem there are reasonable incentives for representatives to 
adopt and maintain consistent beliefs because inconsistency can result in loss of 
credibility and support" (ibid: 243). 
b) The situation of the testimony/hearing situation (like personal interview) can give an 
indication for the validity of an argument (ibid). For instance, it could be reasonably argued 
that the private interview situation, as opposed to a situation of political confrontation, is 
less prone to strategic arguing also because responses can be instantly questioned. 
Interview records could then be compared to official texts as a way of tracing belief or 
contextual positioning/strategies. 
Criteria for coalition building of advocacies 
According to Sabatier, advocacy coalitions (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs 
and (b) engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier 1998: 
103). Coalitions are made up of different actors that can span a range of different 
institutions and groups. As the debate on agro-biotech involves many different areas, the 
categories for the identification of specific beliefs we get empirically from the texts 
(categories such as technology, nature, decision-making). As an indicator for relationships 
between actors we use common issued statements, frequent information exchange or 
personal relationships. According to the theory, new actors would join coalitions on the 
basis of shared beliefs. The aggregation of actors into an advocacy coalition is dependent 
upon restrictive criteria, they are thus relatively well defined and clearly bound and to be 
tested on this basis. 
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A precise reconstruction of a belief system and an advocacy coalition depends upon the 
empirical material and its validity. I do not claim to present such a 'true' reconstruction of 
beliefs, as it would be presumptuous to do so. The beliefs and coalitions identified remain 
social constructions, however, they serve our analytical purposes. 
Criteria for policy change/learning 
The ACF has two primary forces of change: a) the values of coalition members and b) 
exogenous shocks to the subsystem. As the result of new information or external effects 
each advocacy coalition may revise its beliefs, primarily in secondary aspects, and their 
strategies. Major policy change requires significant external shocks to result in shifting 
resources and power balances between coalitions. 
Given the basic tenets in the approach and the assumptions about coalition behaviour, 
certain guiding questions can be posed. What are the primary sources of change in the 
German case, external shocks or belief system change? How did a certain event (e.g. 
BSE) impinge on the power relations between the coalitions? Because of its focus on 
belief systems, the ACF leads us to focus on agency and its behaviour in the face of new 
situations. How did advocacies react when facing constraints and opportunities? How is a 
certain event (BSE crisis) used to undermine or promote specific beliefs? As a result of 
new information or external events, what aspects of a belief system changed through 
learning, and with what effects? What were the (new) strategies of the advocacies? 
In case of change, the tiered approach to beliefs allows to focus on the depth of change in 
policy programmes/preferences. Have core attributes changed, or have secondary 
aspects simply been adapted to fit the new political situation? A change of policy cannot 
simply be judged by the words used. One needs to analyze how the new terms relate to 
the previously existing values, principles and beliefs of the respective coalitions. Only this 
allows judgement on whether policy change is mere discursive co-option or indication of 
'real' transformation. 
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The policy broker 
The policy broker aims at facilitating a compromise between the competing advocacy 
coalitions. In order to identify the broker one needs to look for an actor or institution that 
somehow mediates between the coalitions. It will be asked: Who plays the role of the 
broker, how and with what effects for policy? 
3.2.3 The discourse coalition approach 
Discourses, metaphors and story-lines and where they reside 
In discourse analysis 'discourse' is both object of investigation and methodological 
instrument (8ublizt 2001). In this sense, for Hajer a discourse analysis is the examination 
of the argumentative structure as well as the practices through which these statements 
are made. The main methodological effort is in finding and tracing these argumentative 
structures in discourses, metaphors and story-lines deployed in the field. 
Discourse analysis through content and context analysis 
In order to investigate the argumentative structure Hajer identifies a set of steps. He 
suggests to begin with a general survey of the developments and positions in the field to 
be able to make a first chronology and to identify key events (Hajer 2003). Then follows a 
close analysis of texts to map out the discourses, metaphors and narratives that exist in 
the subsystem or public policy decision-making. Content analysis of different sources 
(texts and records) allows a detailed examination of the phrases and words that are used. 
In particular one needs to look for common textual patterns, common assumptions, 
common ways of reasoning, or common ways of mapping the field or judging the various 
actors involved. In discourse analysis it is most important to understand the usage of 
terms. Often the same terms can come to mean different things depending on how they 
are framed and deployed by different coalitions. Thus I used the methodological means of 
comparison in order to analyze the differences between coalitions in the reception of key 
concepts (e.g. the concept of 'consumer choice' or 'coexistence'). 
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To get a better sense of the meaning and power of texts, one also needs to study the 
context within which something is being said. It doesn't just matter what is being said, but 
also by whom it is said, where and at what time. There is therefore an institutional 
component in Hajer's discourse analysis. Once discourses have been identified, it can be 
asked: what are the effects of certain discourses, how are these discourses related and 
how do they relate to power and dominance in the field (Le. which aspects of a problem 
are included, which ones are left out in dominant representations)? 
Criteria for the building of discourse coalitions 
In contrast to the ACF, discourse coalitions are based on language rather than belief 
patterns or common activities. A deconstruction of texts along the lines outlined above 
allows grouping of actors into specific discourse coalitions. Whether a coalition exists can 
then be decided, based on whether there is a common use of discourses and narratives 
and whether they engage in common social practices. Hence discourse coalitions are, in 
comparison to advocacy coalitions, much more encompassing, potentially involving many 
more actors. However, these actors do not need to be physically present or interacting; all 
they share is a common construct. Joining a discourse coalition is simply a matter of 
language and practice rather than a change in beliefs. Again, discourse is not so much 
connected to a particular person but to the practices within which they get (re)produced. 
As opposed to beliefs in the ACF, discourse is working more as a structural environment 
in which actors are functioning and acting. 
How to study and judge the process of change? 
According to Hajer change and permanence come to depend on discursive reproduction 
or transformation. Hajer describes various discursive mechanisms that contribute to an 
understanding of policy change. This leads to a focus on the following: 
'Events' are only constituted through interpretation, and interpretation in turn is dependent 
upon the structure of the discursive field. Discourse can thus explain why the response to 
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a set of conditions (e.g. mad cows) has taken the form of X rather than Y. We need to ask: 
What are the discursive dynamics around SSE? How did agriculture interact with the 
discursive field of biotechnology? With what effects? 
For Hajer, story-lines are the prime vehicles for change. The emergence of new story-
lines can reorder understandings, change interests and (re-)position actors. Therefore we 
need to look for the discursive interaction between discursive coalitions, for the creation of 
new meanings, interests or proposals for policy solutions. What led to an actual 
reframing? What aspects were chosen, with what effects? How did actors and coalitions 
relate to it? What links were drawn between specific issues? And we must look for 
changes in the composition of discourse coalitions. 
As an indicator of change we can investigate whether certain (alternative) discourses 
have been adopted by other actors/coalitions in the field (discourse structuration) or 
whether a discourse has successfully influenced policy-making/practices/institutional 
arrangements (discourse institutionalization). This means there is a need to check 
whether and how new concepts appear in policy. 
3.3 The sub-questions 
In order to explain change and to judge the theories, the thesis asks two sub-questions. 
These questions will not be directly answered in the empirical sections, but summarized in 
the concluding chapter. 
How to identify strength and weaknesses of the two approaches? 
The theories will be judged according to the following criteria: 
• Do they both work as interpretative lenses? 
• How well do they explain the changes? Is one approach better than the other in terms 
of illuminating developments? 
• What aspects of the story cannot be explained by one or either theory? 
41 
• Do findings contradict theory? 
How to judge whether the theories are contradictory or complementary? 
• Are their explanations/assumptions contradictory, that is, are certain explanations. 
exclusively confined to one approach (its either this, or that but it cannot be both?) 
• Similarly, with respect to whether they are complementary, can one approach be 
used to go beyond the weaknesses of the other approach? 
3.4 Interpretation and presentation of the results 
What I aim to do in this thesis is interpret a specific event and its political effects by using 
the categories that are provided for by two different approaches. I based my selection and 
interpretation on large quantities of empirical data. However, how the data was selected, 
the material reconstructed, and what kind of relationships and connections were 
eventually drawn is ultimately a result of a combination of my own interpretative ideas and 
those offered by the theories. Since the aim of the thesis was not to produce quantitative 
data on discursive repetitions, I was faced with the problem of having to constantly decide 
what (detailed) information is important for testing the theories - without forcing the data 
into the categories - and to justify on what basis I can uphold these claims. I used as 
much as I could the criteria offered by the two approaches, always with the research 
questions firmly in mind. However, this still left me with many decisions. Having 
sometimes struggled through this process I can surely confirm that in qualitative discourse 
theory, data selection and data interpretation cannot be neatly separated (Schwab-Trapp 
2003). In comparison to Grounded theory (Glaser/Strauss 1967), questions are not posed 
in the beginning and worked off in the wake of the research process. Instead questions 
are being constantly reframed, and material re-read and there is a constant interaction 
between methods, theory and empirical data with the result that the shape of the thesis 
changes continually. 
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With respect to the presentation of the result, I faced a similar problem of having to 
somehow separate the descriptive/narrative and the interpretative part of the thesis 
(without messing up the chronological order). Being aware of the difficulties, I 
nevertheless chose to present the results in a sequence, presenting first a narrative 
section, which more closely follows the empirical texts and is rather descriptive. This is 
followed up by an interpretative section, which goes beyond the text and interprets the 
data using the questions and categories as selected from Hajer and Sabatier. There is 
thus some repetition because the same data is used twice and the theories do show some 
similarities. Yet I chose to take that risk in order 'to give both theories a chance', For a 
better understanding and improved clarity, in some cases I used tables in order to show 
the results. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. The 19905: Productivist innovations and risks/alternatives 
This chapter will focus on the period from the beginning of the 1990s up to 1998. In order 
to be able to understand the present changes and new dynamics in German GM policy it 
is necessary to go back to that period as it was during this time when the main regulatory 
features were set, the respective coalitions built and the practices and political spaces for 
the years to come were determined. The objective of this chapter is to capture the beliefs, 
central policy discourses and coalitions of the period by looking at the most important and 
illustrative events. The chapter will thus provide the basis for understanding the nature 
and extent of change of GM policy that is going to be explained in later chapters, and 
functions, so to speak, as the frame of reference. Using firstly Hajer's discourse analytical 
approach it will identify the main competing discourses, their respective story-lines and the 
coalitions that hold on to and constitute or are constituted by this framing of the issue. The 
period's events will then be examined in terms of Sabatier's advocacy coalition approach, 
focusing on coalitions that formed around specific beliefs. 
4.1 Policy narratives in the 19905 
4.1.1 Regulating GMO safety and its promotion: the Genetic Engineering Act 
(GenTG) 
The development of biotechnology regulation in Germany dates back to the 19705. In 
1978, German jurisdiction incorporated the US National Institute (NIH) guidelines on 
biotechnology regulation. It was twelve years later" in 1990, that Germany designed and 
agreed upon its own national law, the Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG). The law was the 
product of intensive and highly conflictive debates in the 1980s, triggered by events such 
as the birth of the first German test tube baby or the attempt by Hoechst to establish a 
plant for the production of human insulin using GM technologies. Also of importance in the 
1980s was the battle against nuclear technology. which went along with the power of new 
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social movements and the rise of the German Green Party. However, instead of putting an 
end to political controversy the act perpetuated it (Gill 1995). The mere existence of the 
act acknowledged the fact that biotechnological developments were of a quality such that 
they needed special provisions, and yet the act equally declared that research and 
development should be fostered. The Genetic Engineering Act thus incorporated elements 
from the critical discourse of "uncertainty" by asking for risk assessments or public 
involvement. At the same time the act endorsed state support, thus fostering the debate 
on "modernization based on technological innovation", which had already begun to take 
hold in the 1970s (Gottweis 1998). These twofold provisions of the GenTG read as 
follows: 
• To protect life and health of humans, animals, plants as well as to protect the 
environment in its integrated setting ('WirkungsgefOge"). 
• To create a legal framework for the research, development, use and promotion of the 
scientific, technological and economic potentials of biotechnology. 
Through the act, biotechnology was reduced to a regulatory problem and no longer called 
into question (ibid.). The critics feared that "rather than inhibiting the advance of genetic 
engineering, the efforts to regulate risk must be seen as an important move in faCilitating 
the project of genetic engineering" (ibid.: 147). This fear was nurtured by the special 
provisions of the act: The risks of biotechnology were seen to lie in the area of health and 
environment, and it was understood that these risks could be managed through "scientific 
knowledge and technology". The act thus used a technological, scientific framing of the 
risks, without addressing any of the social or ethical hazards that biotech opponents 
tirelessly stressed. Risks and damage were okay - the applicant was granted a right to 
approval ~ as long as they were "acceptable". The Ministry of Health (BMGS) was put at 
the center of regulation (an institution that was said to have friendly relations with industry) 
instead of the Ministry of Environment (BMU). The definition of risks was left to a small 
circle of experts, the Central Advisory Committee for Biological Safety (ZKBS), which was 
dominated by molecular biologists. 
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The act thus mirrored the split in society with respect to the acceptance and support of the 
technology. The groups supporting and rejecting biotechnology were basically 
diametrically opposed. The coalition of the supporters was led by the scientists, involving 
leading research institutions, such as the German Research Society (OFG) and the Max 
Plank Society (MFG).5 This group was mainly challenging the need and rationale of a law 
because they feared massive restrictions on their fundamental right to "freedom of 
research". Industry circles initially spoke out against the law, but later gave in and 
supported legislation on the grounds of creating a "reliable legal framework" for innovation 
while promoting social acceptance. Parts of the German regulatory system, such as the 
Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) and the Ministry of Health (BMGS) were 
also amongst the biotech supporters, as were many members of the liberal/conservative 
government and parts of the social democratic opposition. The anti-biotech movement 
was a broad coalition made up of environmental groups, women's groups, groups of 
disabled people, religious groups and critical research institutions such as the Cko-Institut. 
This group was supported by the German Green Party. 
4.1.2 Risk framing and conflict handling: The WZB technology assessment 
procedure (1991-1993) 
As mentioned above, a genetic engineering bill was intensively debated during the 1980s. 
At the end of the decade however, due to a series of events, the legislative process 
picked up speed and the law was passed relatively quickly by parliament. The opposition 
criticized the legislative procedure as it did provide neither the space nor the time for 
discussion of questions that they deemed to be fundamental. Instead with the law they 
claimed that "a bureaucratic procedure replaced the necessary socio-political decision-
making process" and that "biological risks were negotiated behind closed doors" 
(Spelsberg 1990: 32). With respect to ongoing opposition and critique, throughout the 
5 The big German chemical and pharmaceutical industry were late entering the field of biotechnology and thus 
had to first decide where their interests lay. Dolata gives three reasons for that. First, late efforts to 
systematically combine basic research with product application. Second, an underdeveloped financial system 
with respect to venture capital products and a German research community critical towards commercialization. 
Third, industry Itself was relatively oblivious and arrogant towards the developments (Dolata 1996: 113). 
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1990s regulators followed a "duck and cover strategy" (Hampel et al. 2001: 202) and kept 
the volume of political debate to a minimum. A means to accommodate the public protest 
and to channel the hostile debate was seen in the establishment of a few technology 
assessment procedures, of which the "Technology Assessment Procedure on Herbicide-
resistant Crops", organized by the "Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin" (WZB), a public 
research centre, was the most prominent. 6 
The WZB TA -procedure was organized as a participatory, discursive procedure, which 
involved some sixty participants representing a range of scientific, business and 
environmental groups and public bodies. According to the organizers the "participants in 
the procedure were put together so as to reflect the interests and the positions of the 
ongoing political conflicts over the new technology in Germany" (van den Daele et al. 
1997: 1). However, against these political claims of openness and neutrality of the T A 
procedure, biotech opponents were expressing their doubts. First they criticized the 
narrow framing of the subjects to be discussed. The WZB TA began with the question 
"whether uncertainties with respect to the properties and behaviour of plants produced by 
genetic engineering can be distinguished from uncertainties due to natural processes 
which occur in all plants" (ibid: Foreword). In this way the relevant issues to be discussed 
were narrowed down to aspects of rational, sound scientific arguments about the 
technology's relative safety while the question on alternative future concepts for plant 
protection/weed control and agriculture in general could no longer legitimately be raised 
(Gill 1993). 
In addition, the WZB procedure was only looking at risk scenarios built on plausible causal 
risk hypothesis, while the debate about "unknown or specific risks" was relegated to the 
realm of speculation (von Gleich 1996). On the basis of these assumptions, the organizers 
concluded that there was no empirical evidence for special risks (van den Daele 1996). 
6 At the Lander level, two other extensive public discourse initiatives on GMOs should be mentioned: The 
Academy for Technology Assessment in Baden-WOrttemberg, commissioned by the government of Baden-
WOrttemberg. between 1993 and 1995 conducted a combined procedure of expert discourses and public 
forum. The Protestant Academy Loccum conducted between 1995 and1996 a discourse scheme 
commissioned by the government of Niedersachen. Between 1994 -1996 there was another private dialog 
between Unilever and BUND (FoE Germany). 
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This narrow, scientific-technical, evidence-based framework of the WZB procedure was 
thus perceived as politically biased by biotech opponents. As a result, the WZB 
procedure, constructed as a means for appeasement and mediation between the 
opposing camps, failed. In the eyes of biotech opponents the TA procedure was a mere 
public relations exercise for increasing social acceptance of an elsewhere-decided 
technological development (Gill 1993). In the end, the biotech opposition walked out of the 
process, while the organizers declared the technology to be safe ("no special risks"). 
Industry went along with field trials. 
4.1.3 Deregulation, innovation and competitiveness: The "Standort" debate 
Shortly after the legislation had been passed by parliament and regulation started to have 
effects on implementation practices, the debate about regulation was brought up again, 
this time, however, from biotech proponents. Two issues began to dominate the political 
debate that finally Jed to the relaxation of approval criteria of the Genetic Engineering Act 
in 1993. First there were the scientists, who criticized what they claimed as disproportional 
"administrative hurdles" put up by the law. As biotechnological research took place in a 
relatively regulation free environment before 1990, the new law did in fact impinge upon 
research practices by asking for approval procedures (mainly contained use) and public 
involvement. More importantly though, at the beginning of the 1990s biotechnology 
development was broadly discovered as an economic imperative. In the economic 
recession following German reunification, increasing importance was given to economic 
competitiveness and job creation. The life sciences, including biotechnology, were 
identified as "key technologies" contributing to the preservation of Germany's competitive 
strength as a business location ("Wirtschaftsstandort"). With this in mind, the GenTG was 
portrayed as being too restrictive for development and commercialization purposes and 
had thus to be "deregulated". Otherwise companies would have to leave the country in 
search for better conditions, in which case Germany would lose out in the "battle for global 
innovation and competitiveness". 
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In the new neo-liberal "Standort" discourse, industry and the sciences together pushed 
forcefully for the improvement of Germany's international business and research 
competitiveness and thus a deregulation of the act (Dolata 1996; Gill et al. 1998). The 
new economic issues pushed aside the debate about "uncertainties and risks" in 
biotechnology and had silenced the critical voices: "in political parties, the unions and in 
the media, all of a sudden economic experts were dominating the biotech discourse while 
environmental and social expertise had vanished from the scene" (Gill et al. 1998: 226). 
On the basis of these developments the conservative/liberal majority in parliament, with 
the support of parts of the social democratic opposition (backed by strong economic and 
science interests, and in a situation of a marginalization of critical groups) finally relaxed 
provisions of the GenTG by lowering safety standards, reducing approval criteria and 
curtailing public involvement. At the same time Germany increased its efforts to push for a 
deregulation of the Deliberate Release Directive on the European level (Bandelow 1997). 
In the wake of the "Standort" discourse, public biotech promotion programmes had 
become an increasingly strategic field. While in the 1980s Germany was concerned about 
catching-up with international technological and scientific developments, biotech 
promotion in the 1990s was about gaining supremacy in the European and global 
competition for high-tech markets (Dolata 1996). Under the lead of the Ministry for 
Research and Technology (BMTF), the German "competition state" (Hirsch 1995) acted 
as a catalyst and coordinator for several well-funded biotech programmes.7 These aimed 
at supporting public biotech research and infrastructure in order to improve the start-up 
and commercial activities in the sector and to foster co-operation between science and 
industry.S 
During the 1990s, for German science and technology policy, biotechnology had become 
an area of highest priority. Biotech promotion was one of the main objects of the ministry's 
7 For an overview on the ongoing initiatives see: (BMBF 2000). 
8 To mention just one of the funding highlights, the promotion programme called the "BioRegio Competition". 
This programme was aimed at improving the commercial activities in the sector and fostering co-operation 
between science and Industry in a special region. The "BioRegio Competition" programme sparked intense 
activities and proved highly successful. In 1999 the number of start-up companies in Germany was higher 
than In any other European country (Hampel et al. 2001). 
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funding policies, while safety research only played a minor part in the promotion rationale. 
Over the years the two leading political parties, the Conservatives and the Social 
Democrats9, have continued to express their support for the technology on the grounds of 
its allegedly high economic potential and in the face of global competitive pressures and 
rising unemployment. This general line of biotechnology framing was kept even after the 
great political changes in 1998, when sixteen years of conservativelliberal rule were 
replaced by a coalition between the SPD Party and the Greens. However, green 
pressures eventually had an impact on the biotechnology policies of the country, as will be 
shown later. 
4.1.4 Alternative spaces of resistance: The turn to market strategies 
The "Standort" debate in the 1990s had pushed aside the risk and control problematique 
or delegated these themes into politically meaningless, albeit publicly supported, 
discourse projects such as the previously mentioned WZB technology assessment 
procedure. Additionally, the rhetoric of the "special risks of the method as such" was 
losing ground10 and the battle over establishing an alternative political debate on societal 
trends, modernization or innovation was lost to the biotech industry and science 
interests.11 Furthermore, in the 19905 the theme of biotechnology became increasingly 
differentiated and, depending on its application, i.e. medical or for food uses, differently 
perceived (Grabner et al. 2001). These developments together forced the German critic's 
scene increasingly onto the argumentative and political defensive.12 As a result, the 
coalition of critics that was brought together against the legislative activities at the 
9 The Social Democratic Party (SPD) does consider biotechnology to be a "key technology", which needs to 
be developed and promoted. However, with respect to agro-blotechnology the SPO does not have a common 
position. An ecological faction within the party stresses uncertainty. Furthermore there is a strong faction that 
favours consumer protection, restrictive labeling policies and risk research activities. Overall, however, there Is 
no fundamental rejection of the technology as such to be found (Behrens et al. 1997). 
10Even within the critics scene voices of conditional acceptance were getting louder (Bandalow 1999). 
11Critics from within the critic's camp have blamed the biotech opposition for having too stubbornly focused on 
the special risk problematique and thus missed out on developing alternative images and frames with which to 
counter the mainstream developments (Gill 1994). 
12 It should also be mentioned that the Green Party missed reelection to parliament in the federal elections in 
1990. This way the critics fraction lost in important coalition partner that could bring to bear pressure on the 
constitutional/political arena (Schneider 2001). 
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beginning of the 1990s slowly broke apart and was replaced by issue-related, local and 
partly ad-hoc initiatives (Hoffmann 1997; Dolata 2003). 
For the biotech critics, by the mid 1990s the battle against biotechnology in the regulatory 
sphere was lost and a biotechnology start-up boom, most of all in the area of medical 
applications, was on its way. Yet, apart from ethical debates, such as on cloning or 
reproductive medicine, public protest in Germany was generally shifting towards 
agricultural biotechnology and its food uses. By the middle of the decade, legislative 
procedures concerning GM labeling and 'Novel Foods' taking place at the European level 
and new material developments opened up new opportunities for resistance strategies, 
campaign activities and coalition building. The year 1996 marked a watershed for strategy 
. 
and debate in the realm of agro-biotechnology when the first GM soya-beans reached 
Hamburg harbor and transgenic crops finally entered the German market. These first 
imports of GM crops increased the awareness of genetiC engineering in everyday life and 
made its products at last tangible (Hampel et al. 2001). However, even though the 
products were now present, they could not be identified as "genetically modified" as they 
were placed on the market without being labeled as such. This situation of 
commercialization in the face of high consumer rejection in the field of agro-and food 
biotechnology finally caused a shift in the oppositions and the debate's focus from safety 
regulation to market strategies. 
This lack of labeling regulation, together with the ongoing discussions on labeling and 
Novel Food regulation at the EC level sparked an intense labeling debate in Germany, 
which involved various actors and regulatory initiatives (Dreyer/Gill 2000). There was a 
widespread consensus on the need for "comprehensive labeling", however, this 'common' 
position entailed very different motives and demands. Consensus resulted from the 
concerns about "consumer acceptance" and "free consumer choice". To quote the 
liberal/conservative Government in a press release in 1995: "food innovations cannot be 
pushed through against the will of the consumer" (quoted in Behrens et al. 1997: 55). 
Labeling was thus considered to be necessary to enhance "consumer trust" and to make a 
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market for these 'useful products' possible.13 At first GM opposing groups were not in 
agreement on whether to engage in the labeling debate out of fears that this would be 
looked at as a final GMO acceptance (Riewenherm 1997). After this initial hesitation, 
however, the opposition groups entered the debate, unsurprisingly, placing a different 
emphasis on the consumer and choice issue. "Informed consumer choice" was 
pronounced as a means against "clandestine commercialization". Comprehensive labeling 
was here seen as a basic prerequisite to keep the market for GM products as restrictive 
as possible and to create the conditions for the establishment of a non-GM food market. 
The differences in debate were reflected in the opinions about the level of urgency and 
the necessity for taking action to protect the consumer against unlabeled, 'deceptive' 
products. Biotech critics and the political opposition, the Green Party and the SPD Party, 
demanded a special German law to be implemented immediately. A parliamentary 
initiative, however, remained unsuccessful because the government favoured voluntary 
labeling and pointed to up-coming regulation on the European level, which would deal 
with the labeling issue (Behrens et al. 1997,2000). Initiatives for closing gaps in European 
regulation with respect to "without genetic engineering" or negative food labeling were 
eventually taken up at the federal level, partly as a response to strong and media-effective 
pressure-group activities at the Lander level.14 Interestingly, the labeling initiatives in 
Bavaria, "Gentechnikfrei aus Bayern" (GM-free from Bavaria), was linking the objective of 
consumer information with that of regional preservation of the "Standort". In the draft law 
initiative: "The aim of the law is the preservation and support of Bavarian agriculture, 
seed, food and feed production as well as the information of the consumer" (quoted in 
131n a publication from the agricultural ministry of 1997 consumer protection was primarily associated with 
questions of consumer health. The question of consumer choice is mentioned but not made central. Yet 
reading the publication one can tell that consumer choice is more about making GM products acceptable than 
providing differentiated public information. For instance, the question whether new health risks are to be 
expected by the use of GM food is blandly answered with no. Similarly the question whether there are special 
allergy risks caused by GM food is equally answered with a straight no (BML 1997). However, the tone of 
voice In the agricultural ministry's publication is rather restrained in comparison to a publication of the Ministry 
of Education and Research from the same time period. In the BML publication at least most of the usual 
critical points of the debate are taken up, even though the answers are problematic. The BMBF publication 
(title: Why we need biotechnology). in contrast, does not mention most of the objections brought forth, and if it 
does it dismisses them as irrational (BMBF 1996). 
14 Two initiatives for referendum were started in Bavaria and Niedersachen. The Bavarian initiative ended up 
not getting enough votes to force the referendum. However the activities sparked public interest and media 
coverage and can at least partly be made responsible for the government's proposal for "non-GM" labeling 
regulation (Dreyer/Gill 1999). 
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Muhlenberg 1997: 10). Non-GM production, consumer information and food transparency 
was thus framed as a local "Standort" advantage. 
More importantly though, in parallel to the labeling initiatives larger environmental NGOs, 
such as Greenpeace Germany, started to pursue consumer oriented strategies to inform 
the public about the GM-policies pursued by food processors and retailers. 15 This 
consumer information practice was combined with a debate on food safety, with the 
emphasis placed on the "un-naturalness" and (thus) "un-healthiness" of "Gene-food". 16 
Through these initiatives and activities powerful economic actors of the food ch'!lin were 
drawn into the conflict. In particular the retailers, which are closest to the consumer and 
most vulnerable to consumer boycotts, supported far reaching (process) labeling and 
restrictive product stocking policies, such as GMO exclusion from own brand products. 
These pressures to exclude GM ingredients were not exclusive to Germany, but operated 
across Europe (Levidow/Bijman 2002). However, the special German situation of hesitant 
and at times contradictory government policy (Behrens et al. 1997), in combination with a 
particularly hostile marketing situation allowed the German retailers in particular to play 
the role of the "advocates of consumer interests" (Behrens 1998: 17). In this situation the 
biotech and food industry was increaSingly running the risk of losing credibility by denying 
consumer choice through an ongoing rejection of labeling and the argument of "irrational 
consumers". As a response to the difficult marketing situation, the biotech proponents 
increased their efforts to improve public relations 17 and began to join forces via the 
establishment of the "Gesprachskreis grune Gentechnik" a public-private round table on 
plant genetic engineering. Thus, against the background of commerci~lization, a 
fragmented opposition movement could nevertheless achieve a great deal of success by 
15 Up until 1996 Greenpeace International had not been engaged in the biotechnology debate. In spring 1996 
Greenpeace Germany started the campaign "Green peace-Shopping net", a Greenpeace consumer service. In 
the context of this campaign, Greenpeace provides information lists on the Internet on retailers and producers 
stance on GM sourcing and labeling policies. 
16 Friends of the Earth Germ~ny, together with the "Gen-ethisches Netzwerk" already started an anti "Gene-
Food" campaign in 1991. The running line was "Food from the laboratory? Naturally not!" This way, Gene-food 
was portrayed as unnatural and artificial, removed from everyday knowledge, practice and control. This 
campaign was at its peak in the years 1997/1998. 
17 The food industry thus started an "information campaign" ("Aufklarungskampagne") with the aim of 
convincing consumers of the benefits of biotechnology, and to deliver 'objective' information that could counter 
the "fear campaign" of biotech critics (Muhlenberg 1997a). 
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using thematic campaigns, food safety and quality language and specific targeted 
strategies, such as the Greenpeace shopping net activities. As Dreyer and Gill (2000a) 
suggest, in Germany these market developments have brought more pressure to bear on 
the technologies developmental perspectives than regulatory blockades have. 
4.1.5 Institutional practices: Review of approval procedures 
As could be shown above, the 'fate of agro-biotechnology' in Germany in the 1990s 
seemed to be less decided in the realm of safety regulation than in the process of market 
introduction - a dynamic which was for the most part not anticipated by the developers 
and proponents. Despite the developments in the market place, the German government 
stuck to the rhetoric of biotechnology as a "key technology" and addressed public 
skepticism by joining in with information campaigns and half-hearted labeling activities. 18 
Officially, however, the Competent Authority (CA) has not seen itself as a mediator of 
conflicting interests but as a politically independent institution that takes decisions on the 
basis of the law and sound scientific expertise (Dreyer/Gill 2000). It was on this basis that 
the German CA gave approval to several GM crop applications. In order to show how the 
German CA interpreted the implementation of the Genetic Engineering Act it is informative 
to look into its approval decisions on GMO crops. However, before turning to the actual 
decisions it is necessary to introduce the institutional set-up and legal provisions as 
foreseen in the act. 
Box 1: GenTG - Institutional set up and legal provision 
In Germany until the year 2004 the Ministry of Health and the Center for genetic 
engineering at the Robert-Koch Institut (RKI) was assigned the role of the national 
Competent Authority in GMO release and market approval. In case of GMO field trial 
approvals two other units, the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA) and the Federal 
Biological Research Center for Agriculture and Forestry (BBA) needed to consent; in case 
of market approval these units only needed to be consulted. With regard to GM food 
approval, responsibility was shared between the RKI and the food safety agency (BgW) 
of the Ministry of Health. In its decisions on the risks in genetic engineering the RKI is 
16 For instance, the Competent Authority, the Robert-Koch Institut (RKI) participated in the cooperative 
initiatives of the biotechnology industry in the "Gespri:ichskreis grOne Gentechnik". 
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furthermore consulting the Central Advisory Committee for Biological Safety (ZKBS) a 
specifically dedicated scientific advisory body (see Table 8, p.161). 
The legal provisions for approval decisions stated in the act - the core questions to be 
answered in the risk assessment - read as follows: In principle approval for release into 
the environment must be granted if: 
All required safety provisions are met according to the present state of the art in science 
and technology. 
According to the state of the art in scientific knowledge and proportional to the purpose of 
release 19 unacceptable harmful effects to the goods stated in Art. 1 (health and 
environment) are not to be expected." (For market approval only the last condition must 
be fulfilled.) 
The Genetic Engineering Act - as well as the EU Deliberate Release Directive - leave 
crucial questions open to interpretation and hence open up the terrain to normative and 
political judgements. The act neither defines a level of protection (what is "unacceptable 
harm") nor does it give guidance on the "state of the art in science" nor does it give 
information on an 'appropriate' risk philosophy to use (what uncertainties to conSider). It 
left these decisions to scientific experts and administrators who then by exercising their 
specific risk practices decide upon a more innovation-friendly or protection-based 
interpretation of the law. 
Critical assessments of the German approval decisions state that the CA interpreted the 
Genetic Engineering Act as requiring assessment of only narrowly defined "adverse 
effects" (Sauter/Meyer 2000; VogellTappeser 2000). This is mainly due to the fact that 
RKI regarded conventional agricultural practices as a normative baseline for evaluating 
the effects of transgenic crops. That is, as long as GM crops did not pose any higher or 
additional risks compared to conventional ones, its effects were deemed to be acceptable. 
For example, with respect to Bt maize20, the RKI judged it to be acceptable if Bt became 
ineffective for contrOlling pests, since the development of resistance is considered to be a 
19 This provision suggests a weighing of purpose and possible damage as a criteria for approval. However, in 
the practice of risk assessment this clause has not been applied In any of the approval cases. So far 
regulators always found a way to reduce the risk by imposing specific safety measures, that is, there was no 
need for a risk-benefit analysis. 
2°Bt maize contains bacterial genes to produce the Bt (Bacillus thuringiensis) toxin, which protects the plant 
from certain pests, such as the corn borer. 
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classic agronomic problem and not specific to GM plants.21 Similarly, the RKI disregarded 
indirect or long-term effects of herbicide use that could result from a widespread 
application of herbicide tolerant crops (e.g. effects on biodiversity). Only in the case of a 
development of multiple herbicide resistance has the RKI in the past shown concern, but 
again, this has not been identified as an ecological but rather as an agronomic problem. 
Thus by basing its decision on a narrow interpretation of the relevant regulation, the 
Competent Authority defined what uncertainties to consider, what to count as an adverse 
effect and to what extent such effects were deemed to be acceptable. By choosing 
conventional standards in agriculture as a baseline, the CA thus excluded the broader 
environmental concerns as underlie the concepts of sustainability and biodiversity in 
agriculture. In this way the RKI did not accommodate demands and critique raised by 
GMO critical groups, namely to request evidence that a new transgenic crop should 
provide an environmental improvement over conventional methods or should not exclude 
other potential options of more sustainable farming practices. For critics this involves not 
just looking at the trait as such but considering the plant in the practical context of its 
application, including indirect effects. Instead the authority claims to approve in isolation, 
keeping the referential frame narrow, meaning "scientific". 
This is not to say that there were no tensions between the regulatory bodies involved in 
GM approval. As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Environment (SMU) had lost the 
struggle for the status of being the leading department in the legislative process at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Gottweis 1998). The one concession made to the ministry was its 
integration, together with the Federal Biological Research Center for Agriculture and 
Forestry (SSA), into the process of GM authorization. In fact, the Federal Environmental 
Agency (USA) had in the past advocated for a different, more precaution-based approach 
in risk assessment. For instance, the USA advocated the consideration of secondary 
effects in risk assessment. Furthermore, opposed to the RKI, it considered pest resistance 
(in case of Bt) to be an environmentally relevant issue as it implies the loss of an 
21 1n the same case the Austrian competent authority rejected approval because it considered the development 
of resistance to be an adverse effect, which would jeopardize agricultural options in organic farming. 
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environmentally friendly pesticide, and it had pOinted to insufficient knowledge, for 
example with respect to the effects of Bt on non-target organisms (Dreyer/Gill 2000). The 
UBA thus favoured a broader interpretation of the relevant regulation, taking into account 
sustainability considerations.22 However, equal weight in expertise between the different. 
agencies involved was only foreseen in the case of field trial release. In market approval 
the UBA needs to be consulted, though there is no requirement for consent. This way 
these more environmental precaution-based schemes remained marginalized in German 
GM approval and regulatory practice (Boschert/Gill 2004). 
Hence while in other European countries the public conflict was trickling down to the 
regulatory level and former initiatives to deregulate the EU Directive 90/220 were 
gradually turning towards the opposite, meaning even stricter regulation, German 
government policies and regulatory practices remained mainly unaffected. Even though 
the German Competent Authority had expressed some reservations about some 
marketing applications it had never rejected any of them on the grounds of safety 
concerns (VogelfTappeser 2000). At a time of a growing pan-European tendency to put 
approval decisions into question, as, for instance in the case of Austria, France or 
Denmark, Germany vehemently pushed for the implementation of Europe-wide 
authorizations (Seifert 2000; Heinrich Boll Stiftung 1999). As could be clearly understood 
from the practices and debates: In the 1990s the German government wanted the 
technology to be developed and introduced even against widespread (European) public 
disapproval. Consequently, Germany was not amongst the supporters for the de-facto 
European moratorium on GM crop approval. 
4.2 Understanding policy development in the 1990s 
In the following section, Hajer and Sabatier's approaches will be used to look more 
analytically at the narrative. Key concepts of both authors will help in illuminating specific 
aspects of the policy developments in the 19905. 
22 Consequently, the environmental agency also follows a different approach in biosafety research. For an 
improvement of the knowledge base in terms of GMO releases it advocates for more eco-systemic, 
uncertainty based safety research. 
57 
4.2.1 Discourse and story-lines as in Hajer 
Chapter two shows that in Hajer's discourse analytical framework it is discourses and 
story-lines that are considered to be crucial for an understanding of the policy process. 
Discourse refers to the concepts, ideas and categorizations that are used in a particular 
practice while story-lines are the narratives that link particular elements and provide the 
symbolic references to suggest a specific understanding of a problem. Most importantly, 
story-lines - the principle 'thrust of an argument' - constitutes the basis for a coalition, or 
respectively excludes certain actors and practices. Using these categories the German 
GM policy debate in the 1990s can be represented as a struggle between a variety of 
competing discourses and story-lines. The mobilization of specific story-lines and the 
reconstruction of the dynamic of the discourse coalitions can thus show how the definition 
of the problem evolved, and what the impacts were on regulation and practices. 
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Table 2: "Innovations and Standort" discourse coalition 
"Sound science" 
"There is no evidence of special risks" 
"Decision should be science based and not informed by 
politics" 
"Decision should be left to experts (scientists)" 
"Biotechnology is nothing new" 
"Products are substantial equivalent" 
"There are no special risks" 
"Biotechnology is a key technology for the German 
economy" 
"Biotechnology will create jobs" 
"Biotechnology can solve agricultural problems" 
"Biotechnology can serve consumer interests and create 
new products" 
"Let the market decide" 
"Excessive regulation hinders innovation and progress" 
"We need a reliable legal framework for innovation" 
"Over-regulation" 
"Over-bureaucratization" 
"Innovations cannot be pushed through against the will of 
consumer" 
"Consumer choice will enhance consumer acceptance" 
"Consumer choice needs to be real" 
"The public just does not know of the potential benefits" 
"Rejection rests on irrational fears and misleading 
information" 
"Fear campaigns" 
Scientific objectivity 
Normalization 
"Standort" debate 
Technological 
modernization 
(Market) Liberalism 
Consumer choice 
Irrational public 
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Table 3: "Risks therefore alternatives" discourse coalition 
"GM crops threaten nature" 
"We do not know enough" 
"Biotechnologica l interventions have a new quality and 
pose specia l risks" 
"Risks should not be taken if there are alternatives" 
"Genetic treadmill" 
"Biotech perpetuates problems and causes new problems" 
"High-tech lifestyles" 
"Decisions on technologies should be transparent and 
decided democratically" 
"The market is hierarchical and unfair" 
Uncertainty 
Precautionary 
Principle 
Technological 
pessimism/control 
Modernization 
critique 
"Fundamental questions about such technologies cannot be Market rejection 
left to the market" 
"Citizens not consumers should decide" 
"Clandestine commercialization" 
"Consumer deception" 
"Consumer interests are not respected" 
"Biotech does not serve societal interests and needs" 
"Environmental protection is neglected. There are no 
benefits foreseeable" 
"GMOs are about profits for industry" 
"Technicians reconstruct our food" 
"Gene-food is unnatural" 
"Genetic pollution" 
Consumer choice 
Societal need 
Food/Nature 
The 19905 • a wide variety of story-lines and risk discourses 
As Tables 2 and 3 show, in the German debate over GMOs in the 1990s a wide variety of 
story-lines and discourses have been deployed. Grouped according to the story-lines and 
discourses used, two competing discourse coalitions can be distinguished. For each 
coalition we can identify a small number of key discourses, which are comprised of 
specific combinations of story-lines. Some of the key story-lines of biotech proponents 
are: "there are no special risks inherent in biotechnology" or "biotechnology is a key 
technology for the German economy". In contrast, there are arguments put forth by the 
opponents, such as: "biotechnology has a new quality and entails uncertain risks" or 
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"consumers have a right to informed choice". These story-lines can either stand alone or 
can be combined with one another, for instance, when arguments of "scientific 
uncertainty" are linked with "modernization critique", or the argument of "sound science" is 
linked with that of the "irrational public". According to Hajer, a specific linking may be done 
because there is an affinity between the story-lines or for tactical or strategic reasons. 
Taken together these arguments, used in the struggle for discursive hegemony, delineate 
the discursive space within which the GM controversy was played out in Germany during 
the 1990s. 
Story-lines in the formation of the main coalitions 
For Hajer, story-lines, the specific use of metaphors, language and ideas, form the basis 
of a coalition. Story-lines allow for overcoming fragmentation between different beliefs and 
interests and suggest a common understanding of a certain issue. This notion works well 
to explain coalition building at the beginning of the 1990s. Here we were looking at two 
antagonistic coalitions, which themselves consisted of groups ranging from science to 
environmental and including women's or animal protection as well as religious or industry 
interests. The coalitions were so broad, especially on the opposition side, that in order to 
hold together they needed a powerful common frame. This could be found in the 
discourses on "uncertainty" and "technology pessimism/control" which dominated the anti-
biotech coalition in their common political project. In case of the biotech proponents the 
common will 'to make biotechnology happen' could relate the discourse of the scientist's 
"freedom of research", to the industrialist's focus on "reliable legal frameworks" and to pro-
biotech politicians' stances. 
The power of referential frames: the "Standort" discourse 
Discourse and story-lines not only playa central role in bringing together a diverse set of 
actors and practices, but discourse can also change an understanding of a problem and 
this way contribute to policy change. This notion is useful in the case of the neo-Iiberal 
"Standort" debate, because it could explain the strong convergence between the 
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researchers and industry and the building up of a powerful 'deregulation' coalition, 
including the political opposition. In framing technology regulation as a "Standort" topic, 
the regulation of biotechnology was up-graded to a 'hard economic issue', impossible to 
ignore in times of economic recession. The discourse of "over-bureaucratization", as led 
by the scientists, delivered a rationale for poor economic performance. But more 
importantly, with the "Standort" debate these concerns became more than just a matter of 
selfish researcher interests, becoming a national concern. "Over-regulation" and the 
"Standort" question thus closely linked the domains of research and the economy and 
created a common bond between the scientists and the industrialists. Even though the 
causal relationship between (over-)regulation and national competitiveness was 
contested, the combination/affinity of the elements reified a very common anti-state story-
line of the neo-liberal discourse which was very prominent at the time (Barben 1997a). 
The story-lines thus "sounded right" and provided a powerful and legitimate rationale for 
deregulation. This way even "exaggerated risk claims" and acceptance problems within 
society became framed as "Standort" disadvantages.23 
"Consumer choice" - or how new framings bring in new aspects and dynamics 
The power of discourse can also be shown in the case of the newly arising "consumer 
choice" discourse. With this framing entirely new aspects came into play which again had 
their impact on coalition building and policy development. By the time it hit the market, 
biotechnology had evolved from a terrain of technology regulation to the realm of tangible 
food regulation, thus triggering a whole set of new concerns by opening it up to new 
images and interests. At a time of a growing significance of consumption and when the 
provision of food becomes increasingly problematized (and politicized) "food quality" and 
"consumer choice" take on a new meaning. Additionally, with the rise of own brand labels 
and structural changes in the food chain, retailers increasingly take on responsibility and 
economic risks in the provision of foods (Marsden et al. 2000). The new framing of GM 
23 Critics within the critic's camp have blamed the biotech opposition for having put the case for this kind of 
economic argumentation. The critics themselves, so the argument goes, have reified the mainstream 
economic arguments and a technical-determinist logic by using these in their counter-discourse to discredit 
the aims of industry. This was now back-firing in the "Standort" debate (Barben1997; Gill 1994). 
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products as matters of "consumer choice" and "consumer health" thus brought a new and 
powerful economic player into the GM opposing discourse coalition, namely the retail 
chains. 
Everybody talks about choice - the condition of discourse structuration 
As shown, the power of the new discourse was very wisely anticipated and successfully 
placed by the NGOs, especially by Greenpeace. This new advocacy of a solution to the 
GMO issue was, however, not uncontested, as the initial hesitation on the side of the 
biotech opponents shows. Yet "consumer choice" was pervasive and came to be 
employed by both antagonizing coalitions - albeit using very different story-lines. This is 
not of much surprise since "consumer choice" is, after all, part of a neo-liberal rhetoric and 
thus difficult to counter by GM supporting liberal interests (Gabriel/Lang 1995). The food 
industry, for instance, reluctantly acknowledged that the concept of "consumer choice", 
which it otherwise espouses, also applied in the case of GM products. Thus for the food 
industry the concept of "consumer choice" became a balancing act between being openly 
supportive of biotechnology while accepting the right of the consumer to choose, and at 
the same time suggesting that in the case of GMOs the consumer wasn't really qualified 
to make a rational choice ("irrational consumer"). In this case one could say that the 
discourse of "consumer choice" had become hegemonic and that the condition of 
discourse structuration existed, because actors were required to speak the same 
language to keep their credibility. Therefore, as Hajer's approach nicely shows, new story-
lines have not only the power to change the meaning of specific issues, but they can also 
redefine economic interests, as happened in the case of the retailers. In this way 
discourse could drive a wedge between the actors within the food chain, disrupting 
patterns of formerly common political and economic interests (Behrens 1998). 
Scientific discourse as Internally related to social practices 
As stated by Hajer, discourse is internally related to the social practices in which it is 
produced. Practices in turn reinforce discourses and specific story-lines. The science-
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politics interface can be regarded at as one of the most crucial sites of practices in the 
conflict on biotechnology through which discursive power is exercised. As shown in the 
narrative, the Genetic Engineering Act was built on a "scientific-technical framing" of the 
subject. This principle narrow framing of the issue was confirmed in the WZB technology 
assessment procedure, where biotechnology was dominantly phrased as a question of 
"relative technological safety", subject to scientific rationality. Accordingly, when special 
risks were not foreseeable, the result (and the logic) of the WZB procedure was that the 
scientific risk issue was considered to be dead and the "riskification" of other issues 
portrayed as politically motivated. The same logic was applied in the case of the 
implementation of the Genetic Engineering Act. Again, in the approval procedure a 
discursive boundary was drawn between 'science' and 'politics'. In choosing a narrow 
frame of reference, for instance conventional intensive practices in agriculture, it 
delegated socio-economic concerns to the realm of "other legitimate factors", declaring 
these as irrelevant in risk assessment. 
Discourse - dominance & marginalization and its effects 
The WZB technology assessment procedure, as well as the GMO approval procedure, 
can thus be interpreted as examples for showing how a dominant, institutionalized risk 
discourse is marginalizing other, explicitly socio-cultural frames, for example on types of 
agriculture or paths of modernization. As the WZB procedure impressively shows, by 
drawing a strict boundary between scientific and non-scientific arguments this framing 
portrayed the biotech opposition as being ideologically motivated while it declared its 
science approach as value-free (Gieryn 1983; Levidow/Carr 1997). Such a framing thus 
authorizes scientific expert knowledge whilst de-legitimizing other 'non-scientific' 
demands. Furthermore, the treatment of uncertainty, as in allowing only plausible cause-
effect hypotheses and the assumption of relative damage, allow for the simplification of 
the assessment procedure and ultimately normalize risks in biotechnology. Consequently, 
as the WZB procedure and the German approval practice show, such a type of framing 
makes negotiations and the mediation of underlying social conflicts difficult - if not 
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impossible - and thus contributes to the polarization and alienation of the discursive 
coalitions. In Germany, powerful institutions such as the Ministry of Education and 
Research or the Competent Authority RKI and its scientific advisory body ZKBS, 
reproduce the discourse on "sound science". The discursive approach shows the 
consequences of such framings in terms of who is allowed to speak, decide and act, and 
on what grounds, in the realm of biotechnology. 
4.2.2 Advocacy coalitions and belief systems in Sabatier 
To recall, according to the ACF it is assumed that actors act on the basis of beliefs, and 
that they form relatively unified coalitions in order to push through their ideas. The policy 
process can thus be understood as a process of competition between coalitions that 
advocate their specific belief systems. Policy core beliefs are the fundamental glue that 
keeps a coalition together. These beliefs are only to a certain extent changeable. Policy 
change and developmental dynamics are explained by either belief system change or 
through external factors. This section will show how belief systems determine the policy 
framings and the actions of the coalitions involved in the biotech subsystem during the 
19905. 
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Table 4: Belief system 1: "Innovation and Standort" 
New technologies improve 
the quality of life. Society 
benefits from technological 
progress and innovations. 
sk and uncertainties can 
not stop societies from 
advancing. Risks need to be 
taken. 
Risks are cribable by 
the use of science. 
Not everybody's voice can 
and should be heart. 
Markets are 
evolving, self regulating, 
efficient institutions 
Trade is beneficial to 
societies 
a 
riculture is land cultivation 
for the sake of human needs. 
Nature will always find ways 
to balance itself. 
fine, however 
should not be used to 
suffocate innovation. 
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Biotech is useful and will help 
solving problems and 
addressing needs. 
Biotech does not pose great 
additional risk, if anything 
benefits outweigh risks. 
Science can provide a common 
and objective basis for decisions 
about risk. 
Decision should be left to 
experts. 
Excessive state regulation is 
inhibiting market forces. Biotech 
should not be ·over-regulated'. 
Trade barriers should be 
minimized. 
Consumers should be able to 
choose, however, choices must 
be real and not artificially 
created (GM/non-GM) or 
misleading (GM as unsafe). 
Agro-biotech is a method used 
in different types of land 
cultivation. 
Agro-biotech improves 
agricultural methods. 
Biotech does not jeopardize 
nature. 
The that biotech products 
need approval is proof of 
precautionary approach. 
programmes: 
Biotechnology 2000 
BioRegio Competition 
"GAB I" 
RA as only regulatory 
problem. 
Provisions in GenTG: 
"acceptable damage" 
"Sound science" 
GenTG: "state of the art in 
science and technology" 
Support of expert based 
decision-making structures 
(ZKBS), opposition to 
widening participatory basis. 
Regulation of biophysical 
risks only 
Product-based labeling 
schemes. 
High thresholds for 
adventitious presence. 
Product-based labeling 
scheme finally accepted. 
Support biotech research 
and application 
Status quo of intensive 
agriculture as baseline for 
damage acceptance. 
GenTG: "Approval must be 
granted if ... conditions are 
fulfilled" 
Table 5: Belief system 2: "Alternatives instead of risks" 
New technologies are not 
per se beneficial to societies . 
There is no 'free market' in 
technical innovation 
Risks should not be taken if 
there are alternatives 
Risks do not reveal 
themselves in the full by any 
scientific method. 
Every voice needs to be 
heard 
Markets are hierarchical and 
need to be regulated to work 
better 
Trade and competition are 
hierarchical and hence lead 
to unjust results . 
Consumer choice is a 
valuable concept 
Agriculture is more than land 
cultivation for the sake of 
human needs. Agriculture is 
also affecting nature and 
culture conservation . 
Agriculture needs to be 
socially and ecologically 
sustainable. 
Nature is a very delicate 
system, which can be 
irreversibly damaged by 
human intervention 
Precaution is indispensable 
to behave in a more 
environmentally friendly 
manner. 
interests . 
Biotech is new and does pose 
unacceptable unforeseen risks 
Science cannot provide an 
objective basis for decision 
about risks in biotech. The 
"scientification" of the question 
serves to hide its political 
character 
Decisions should be taken 
democratically, that is demand 
for more transparent and open 
procedures 
State regulation is needed and 
alternative food/agricultural 
markets need to be created 
Environmental and social 
regimes need to have priorities. 
Consumer choice needs to be 
real! Consumers need to be 
given a choice to reject all 
GMOs. 
Organic and GM are not just 
different forms of agriculture but 
are based on overall different 
concepts. GM continues 
intensive agricu lture. 
There is a need to raise the 
environmental standards for new 
technological innovations. 
PP goes beyond the requirement 
for approval. PP allows including 
social and ethical factors to be 
taken into account. 
Technology induced 
regulation rejected. Support 
of alternative agricultural 
technologies, especially as 
found in organic framing 
Uncertainties and lack of 
need justifies ban or at least 
high restrictions 
Selection of science 
criticized. 
Demand for changing ZKBS 
composition and demand for 
broader public participation . 
Support of alternative 
models in agriculture. 
Support of process-based 
labeling . 
Support of maximum 
declaration (labeling) and 
strategy of "stigmatization" 
(through campaigns, 
blacklists ... ) 
Organic agriculture needs to 
be pushed - its potentials 
need to be realized, 
research priorities need to 
be changed. 
Organic agricultural 
standards as baseline. 
Out of precaution biotech 
should be banned or at least 
strictly regulated. 
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Beliefs as determining different risk frames 
In the ACF, advocacy coalitions need to fulfill two conditions: they share a set of 
normative and causal beliefs and engage in coordinated activities over time. Looking at 
the actors and institutions existent in the period in question, there are two obvious 
coalitions that differ considerably over the appropriate form of biotech regulation. Those 
individuals and organizations comprising a coalition hold on to certain policy core beliefs 
and there are numerous indications that deeper, more fundamental worldviews are 
underlying these policy stances. As shown, the debate on biotech involves many different 
areas, such as technology, nature, and decision-making, and actors share a considerable 
number of different beliefs when forming an advocacy coalition. 
When looking at Tables 4 and 5, it can be seen that both advocacy coalitions have 
distinctive and opposing belief structures. In belief system one, new technologies are 
basically welcomed and perceived as progressive and beneficial to society. In this sense 
risks need to be taken and these can be handled scientifically on the basis of expert 
knowledge. State regulation is looked at very critically, since it is perceived as hindering 
innovation, the market mechanism and international trade. Agriculture is viewed as a 
method for land cultivation for the sake of human needs and it is believed that in case of 
negative impacts on the environment nature will find ways to balance itself. In sharp 
contrast to these ideas stands belief system two. Here new innovations are not principally 
perceived as beneficial. Risks should only be taken on the basis of a societal consensus 
and in case there are no alternatives. Science does not have the status of a source for 
objective knowledge about risk judgements. It is believed that state regulation is 
necessary since markets are hierarchical and need to be regulated to work better. In this 
sense, trade barriers are justified on the grounds of environmental and social goals. 
Agriculture stands not only for land cultivation, but includes a social and cultural concept. 
Finally, nature is perceived as a delicate system that can be irreversibly damaged by 
technological interference. 
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According to the ACF, these abstract principles determine the basic commitments and 
main causal perceptions in the policy domain. This idea is helpful in that it offers an 
explanation for the different risk framings that we encounter across the biotech 
subsystem. In belief system one, "innovation and Standort", the risks in biotechnology are 
considered to be minimal. Nature is viewed as a robust system, which is used for human 
ends. These advocates believe in scientific methods, the possibility of technical 
assessment and the management of biotechnological risks by experts. Given this risk 
perception they suggest that biotechnology provides useful and innovative methods for 
improving agricultural production. Hence advocacy coalition one demands that regulation 
should be 'reasonable', allowing biotechnological innovations in society. 
Belief system two, "risks therefore alternatives", in contrast exhibits a very different 
perception about the risks involved in biotechnological applications. These advocates hold 
that biotechnology poses unpredictable risks and uncertainties, even beyond biophysical 
ones. Nature is considered a delicate system, which could be irreversibly damaged by 
technological manipulation. There is a pervasive sense that science does not provide the 
tools for evaluating or controlling, let alone judging the risks. Assessing risks is most of all 
understood as a social and political exercise, which is not, and shall not be confined to 
experts alone. Given this rather negative perspective biotechnology is seen as 
aggravating environmental and social risks, which is why restrictive regulation and the 
development of alternatives is considered to be a more desirable goal for society. 
Coalitions share beliefs - to a certain extent 
At the beginning of the 1990s, at the time of the legislative developments, the following 
coalitions could be found. The pro-GM "coalition one" was mainly made up of scientists, 
involving leading research institutions such as the German Research Society (DFG) or the 
Max Plank SOciety (MFG). In their support for biotechnology the scientists were backed by 
industry circles most of all coming from the chemical industry. Parts of the German 
regulatory system, such as the Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT), the Ministry 
of Health (BMGS) or the RKI were also amongst the biotech supporters, as were many 
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members of the liberal/conservative government. "Coalition two" was a much broader-
ranging coalition made up of environmental, women's, handicapped and religious groups, 
organic farmers, part of the labour unions, and critical (research) institutions, such as the 
Cko-Institut or the Gen-ethische network, and was supported by the German Green 
Party.24 Could these opposing coalitions be examples of 'true' advocacy coalitions? 
Certain general observations can be made at this point. When looking at the material, it 
can be discerned that members of the respective coalitions share beliefs and that they 
have engaged in joint activities. However, within the coalitions themselves the member 
groups have differing beliefs and priorities and the extent of institutionalized interaction 
between the groups is not uniform. There are substantial differences between, say the 
beliefs and motivations dominating the women's groups and the environmental groups 
with respect to their stance on biotechnology. The same could be said about the belief 
system of scientists and industry circles. As is stated in the material, the scientists were 
driven by their quest for research autonomy while industry circles were more interested in 
questions of application and commercialization. This means that members of one coalition 
may have an opinion on other subjects within the overall belief system, for example 
scientists with beliefs regarding trade or the market, but not necessarily need to do so. 
Similarly, the non-institutional interactive nature of (partly) ad-hoc social movements can 
be quite different from the well-established ties that exist between industry circles, 
regulators and scientific institutions. Nevertheless, as can be seen, they engage in 
common activities and propagate a specific regulatory approach. That is, the coalitions 
that we find in the subsystem show elements of Sabatier's advocacy coalitions, but do not 
wholly fit into the restrictive scheme. The retailers, who could be considered as part of the 
"consumer choice" discourse coalition by the mid-1990s, WOUld, from an ACF point of 
view, not classify as a member of an advocacy coalition. The retailers would be judged as 
24 Bandalow (1999) makes the interesting observation that leading figures of the protest coalition in the 1980s 
and early 1990s were mostly made up by women, whereas the proponent coalition was dominated by men, 
and suggests that this was mainly due to the subject of reproduction medicine which was a central issue at the 
time (ibid.: 194). 
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a "material group" which seeks to maximize its self-interest rather than specific values 
("purposive group") (Sabatier 1998: 116). 
Policy change through change in beliefs/strategies or external factors 
The ACF has two primary forces of change: a) the values of coalition members and b) 
exogenous shocks to the subsystem. As the result of new information or external shocks 
each advocacy coalition may revise its beliefs, though mainly in secondary aspects, and 
their strategies. How does ACF make us look at the changes during the 1990s? The 
deregulation phase began directly following the implementation of the Genetic 
Engineering Act at the beginning of the decade. As was mentioned earlier, this phase was 
strongly driven by arguments about the preservation of the German economy. In 
Sabatier's terms, German reunification and the recession could be understood as 
'external factors' changing the contextual variables of the policy process. Subsequently 
economic considerations and thus economic actors could be expected to gain in 
importance. However, apart from these external factors, the question remains whether 
changed beliefs or strategies played a role in the loosening of provisions of the act. 
Bandalow (1999) claims that policy-relevant scientific information regarding risks 
confirmed the scientist's stance on "over-regulation". As biotech wasn't as dangerous, 
controls could be relaxed. It could thus be argued from an ACF point of view that, on the 
basis of new information, the scientists and the industrialists (members of the same 
coalition) joined forces in order to push for deregulation. However, against this 
interpretation, Gill et al. (1998) assert that 'experience' at this point could only be 
provisional and thus hardly justifiable as a hard scientific fact leading to knowledge-based 
cognitive change. Here it may be more appropriate to speak of changed strategies on the 
side of the scientists, who realized that by jumping on the bandwagon of the "Standort" 
debate it would open up a "window of opportunity" for getting rid of tiresome regulation. 
Against the background of the agro/food biotechnology problematique, by the mid-1990s 
there is a similar mechanism discernable. Here again, Sabatier would possibly explain the 
contextual changes by external factors, the new GM grain entering the market and strong 
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consumer rejection. Leaving out the interpretative schemes that would be required at this 
point of the analysis (such as coming to realize that working through the market could be 
more successful), how would one understand the policy shift towards consumer 
protection? Did Greenpeace start a market-based campaign on the basis of changed 
beliefs or rather a change in strategy (after all, the NGOs were even having arguments 
about entering the labeling debate on the grounds that this could dwarf a policy of total 
non-acceptance)? As the material showed, by the mid-1990s the battle on safety 
regulation was lost and GMO products were arriving on the market. Instead Greenpeace, 
and to a certain extent other GM critical groups, could be understood as having used the 
labeling and consumer choice debate and action strategically as another different way of 
realizing their core beliefs. "Consumer choice" was used as a means to keep GMOs away 
from the market by blocking the introduction of the technology. Accordingly the labeling 
criteria demanded by these groups focused on full declaration, which would allow 
consumers to fully exercise their right to reject GMOs. The action of GMO proponents 
could be explained in a similar way, that is, with respect to tactical, strategic behaviour. 
GMOs had reached an impasse and GMO proponents felt compelled to respond to these 
political and market constrains. In this sense labeling was merely a tactical response and 
the labeling criteria kept as minimalist as possible. Policy change towards market-based 
strategies can thus be explained as a mixture of 'external' factors and changed strategies 
on the side of both advocacy coalitions, but not as a result of belief change. 
Defending core beliefs: strategic argumentation and struggles for meaning 
According to the ACF, advocacy coalitions act and interact regularly to influence policy 
formulation in a given policy area. In order to reach their policy goals and to defend their 
core values they engage in all kinds of activities and strategies. Even though Sabatier's 
understanding of science in policy is problematic, the notion of beliefs may be helpful to 
get a clearer understanding of the science-politics interface and how and why it is being 
used the way it is. As we have seen in the narrative, two different understandings of agro-
biotechnology were advanced by the coalitions. On the one hand a scientific/technical 
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understanding of biotech and on the other hand a science-informed, but principally 
political, understanding of biotech. In the first case biotechnology is a matter of scientific 
expert judgement, while in the latter case biotechnology is claimed to be subject to (much) 
broader political deliberations. 
When looking at the coalition's belief systems, one could argue that this cleavage might 
arise from different accounts of science. In belief system one, risk perception is informed 
by methodological and epistemological certainty. This means questions on risks can be 
solved within the realm of objective science and 'non-risk concerns' appear to be political 
(politics needs to be avoided because it is not 'objective'). In belief system two, the belief 
in the limitations of the scientific method constitutes a principle source of uncertainty. As 
science cannot be an objective arbiter of a technology's safety, other, non-scientific, 
normative judgements are needed in order to come to a decision. From such an 
uncertainty point of view the insistence on science appears at best reductionist, at worst 
partisan. 
These questions of demarcation played a great role not only in the WZB TA procedure, 
but also in the GM crop approval system. Yet looking at the concept of "relative safety", 
"acceptable harm" or proposed benefits of GM crops, these neat categorizations cannot 
be uphold. As the sociology of science literature shows, the choice of comparators and 
the considerations of uncertainties and benefits are themselves subject to normative 
beliefs (Levidow et al. 1997). They represent preferred models of social order with specific 
views about the distribution of power and responsibility in society. Such a proclaimed 
pure "science discourse" in risk regulation is thus equally informed by values and ideas. 
Thus in the hegemonic debate about agro-biotechnology these issues are being 
discursively compartmentalized, thus reifying taken-for-granted understandings about 
science and politics as two discrete realms. Whether this happens on the grounds of 
denial, ignorance or political tactics cannot be ultimately judged.25 Scientific and 
25 The sociology of science literature has shown that 'risk' has become the organizing principle in conflicts 
over environmental regulation. A risk discourse has become hegemonic and to be taken seriously in the 
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political/ethical arguments are constantly intermingled and separated, this being done on 
both sides of the political divide, as for instance in the "Standort" debate or the "sound 
science" discourse. The fact of the matter is, that it happens, and that it has decisive 
consequences for the policy process of how actions are framed, by whom, and at what 
particular instances in space and time. What is considered a 'legitimate argument' in 
biotech regulation has important implications, and these insights are not at all trivial - as 
Sabatier's handling of language suggests. A focus on beliefs may explain the motivation 
for such behavior but cannot fully take account of these dynamics. 
Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the time period from the beginning of the 1990s up to 1998. In 
summing up, what can be said about the policy dynamic in this period and the use of the 
theories? 
Dominance of technical-scientific framing 
During the 1990s a scientific risk framing, and practices based on such a framing 
prevailed. DCF can explain, by way of such framings, how the hegemonic policy 
community - a discourse coalition made up of powerful institutions like research, 
regulatory bodies and industrialists - managed to insulate itself from the demands that 
were brought forth by biotech critics. That is, claims were being rejected as unscientific, 
provisions in the GenTG interpreted in a narrow 'scientific' manner, and political debate 
was kept to a minimum. This way, socio-cultural frames could be silenced and 'non-
experts' excluded. 
Sabatier recognizes the importance of science in the environmental policy process. 
However, in its positivist treatment of science, the ACF shows little awareness of the 
power-related practices and effects of framing in the science-politics interface. 
Nevertheless, the idea of belief systems and the idea of strategic behaviour can add 
debate, actors have to reproduce the risk, meaning, the science discourse: "The decision to frame 
environmental problems in terms of risks, for example, rules out other possible ways of talking about harms to 
humans and the environment" (Jasanoff 1999). 
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something useful to an understanding of the policy process. The ACF suggests that it is 
due to specific belief systems that accounts of science and uncertainty differ between the 
coalitions. In order to realize or defend core beliefs, coalitions adopt strategies. One 
strategy could be framing issues such that they promote coalition's political agendas. 
Strategic use of categories, such as "science" and "politics" can then be understood as a 
result of critical interactions between discourses and beliefs. 
"Deregulation" of the GenTG in 1993 
DCF can offer an explanation for the success of the deregulation efforts. Through a DCF 
analysis one can show that framing, for example the "Standort" discourse, changed the 
nature of the biotech issue by linking it to broader symbolic structures, in this case neo-
liberal paradigms of growth and competition. At the time (reunification, high 
unemployment), the issue rose in importance and thus gained political support. The critics 
lacked such a powerful (non-scientific!) counter frame. Efforts in trying to frame biotech 
critical activities, such as labeling, in terms of a "Standort" advantage remained 
unsuccessful - an example that framing as such does not exert power, unless it falls on 
'fruitful' ground. Thus chances of creating a powerful counter discourse were slim. 
The ACF has two primary forces of change: a) the values of coalition members and b) 
exogenous shocks to the subsystem. It can be concluded that policy change toward 
"deregulation" was a mixture of both, external events and changed strategies of coalitions. 
However, with respect to 'external events' the approach is weak. Exogenous events do 
not have a direct, unmediated effect but can be manipulated and used for their own 
purpose. The "Standort" debate illustrates this process when coalitions use the 
opportunity to push their policy beliefs by framing issues so as to dramatize situations and 
to obligate specific policy decisions. 
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Consumer choice strategy and its success 
In analyzing the effect of discourse, the DCF can show how the "choice discourse" brings 
new dynamics into the policy process. The DCF points to larger discursive patterns, such 
as trends towards food quality, which explains its 'fit', and how it comes to drag new 
actors into the subsystem and opens new ways of opposition. Most importantly with 
"consumer choice" a powerful economic actor, the retail sector, came to change its 
interests and became part of the discourse coalition of biotech critics. For the DCF this is 
a powerful example of discursive effects. 
The ACF has difficulties in explaining the change in context, and the compelling nature of 
"consumer choice" and why this offered new opportunities and constraints. Yet using the 
belief lense for the analysis of "consumer choice" it could be shown that all actors drew on 
the concept but defined things very differently, again in terms of their own core beliefs. All 
actors used tactical, strategic behaviour to use the situation to its best advantage. From 
the ACF point of view the retail sector would not count as a coalition member (no shared 
beliefs, just interests). A more realist interpretation may attribute the success of consumer 
choice to economic interests, not discourse. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. Counter hegemonic frame enters government: the transition phase between 1998 
and 2000 
This chapter will continue the narrative putting the focus on the end of the 19905 - more 
precisely the period between 1998 and the BSE crisis in 2000. This phase merits separate 
consideration as it marks a departure from the earlier GM poliCies of the German 
government. There were some important events in the political system, such as the 
election of a new federal center-left ('red-green') government with the participation of the 
Green Party. This was also the time when the 'conflict surrounding GMOs became 
increasingly 'Europeanized' with repercussions for the German policy stance. Lastly there 
were material developments that brought pressure to bear on the hegemonic policy line. 
The objective of the chapter is to show the new tensions that arose in the German agro-
biotech regulatory system as a result of these developments and the way in which these 
were handled. Using the two analytical approaches, it can be shown that the 
developments within this phase cannot easily be characterized, as they show both 
continuity and change. Most importantly, however, the situation described marks the end 
of the hegemonic policy rationale of the 19905. 
5.1 Contested frames and antagonizing coalitions 
5.1.1 The new coalition government and Its ambiguous stance on biotechnology 
In October 1998, a major change came in the German political landscape. Following 
national elections, a coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green 
Party (B'90/GrOne) replaced sixteen years of conservativelliberal ruling, which many 
regarded as a coming of a new age in German politics. For the first time the Green Party 
constituted a governing party at the national level. The concept of "ecological 
modernization" put down in the coalition agreemene6 nurtured hopes in the environmental 
26 A "coalition agreement" is the result of negotiations between those parties that come together to form a new 
government in order to achieve a majority position in parliament. The coalition agreement basically states the 
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camp for a turnaround in approach towards hotly disputed technologies, such as atomic 
energ~P and biotechnology. Yet there were great differences in positions between the two 
coalition partners regarding these themes. With respect to biotechnology, the Green Party 
had by this point come to a more differentiated view in terms of judging medical 
applications, however it continued to fundamentally reject biotechnology in food and 
agriculture. Within the SPD Party, the larger partner in the coalition, there were two 
positions. On the one hand there was an influential and powerful faction of research and 
economic interests that held on to the "Standort" rhetoric (as introduced in Chapter four), 
while on the other hand, though much less prominent, there were the environmental and 
agricultural focused groups that pronounced a rather critical attitude towards the 
technology. 
Given this variety of interests within and between the parties, the coalition government's 
common coalition agreement was marked by vagueness and ambiguity. It stated that, "the 
new government will continue to responsibly develop the innovative potential of 
biotechnology and genetic engineering",28 The agreement thus stated a clear positive 
position towards the technology. The innovative potential seen to lie in the technology, 
however, was not linked to the "Standort" discourse, as was previously the case, rather to 
"new possibilities and changes for cleaning up the environment." It was furthermore stated 
that "alternative procedures and strategies must be granted an appropriate space" and 
that "risk and safety research should be strengthened". Yet given the overall framing of 
the agreement the 'new' biotechnology approach of the coalition did not seem to mark a 
significant departure from the pOlicies of the preceding liberal/conservative government. 
The fact that some themes of the popular critique were taken into account was mostly 
considered to be the result of a necessary compromise between the coalition parties 
policy objectives, which are to be pursued by the new government. The coalition agreement is not binding, 
however, it serves as a crucial political guide post as it 'nails down' often hard fought out compromises and 
policy objectives. It sets, so to speak, the "terms of trade" between the coalition partners. 
27 An "Atomausstleg", a decision towards terminating the usage of atomic energy was one of the fundamental 
demands that were brought into the coalition agreement by the Greens. This "Atomausstieg" was eventually 
followed up, however, the partners could not agree on an actual legal decision in this case. Instead the 
government made voluntary arrangements with industry to phase out atomic energy by 2020. This decision, 
however, could be up for revision by a different government. 
28 The coalition agreement can be found at: http://archiv.spd.de/politiklkoalition/vier.html#vier_2 
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(Kiper 1999). As one commentator noted, this stance put forth in the agreement did not 
actually amount to a common 'red-green' position on agro-biotechnology, because "there 
was none" (Grewer 1999: 31); the two frames were simply added together. 
However, more telling than the wording of the coalition agreement was the staffing of 
positions within the circle of ministries and institutions in the biotechnology regulatory 
network, and the practices that followed. The two leading institutions in biotech regulation 
were distributed between the parties in the following way. The Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF), the key institution of "Standort" based public biotechnology support, 
was given to the Social Democrats29, while the Ministry of Health (BMGS), the regulator 
for biotechnology, was given to a Green Party member, as was the Ministry of 
Environment. The Ministry of Agriculture (BML) was put under social democratic 
leadership. Confirming the pro-biotech SPD position, already by the end of the year 
Edelgard Bulmahn, the Minister of Education, had confirmed the research priorities in the 
field of biotechnology and promised an increase in public funding. To quote Bulmahn: "the 
stagnation in public research funding in genomic research seen in the last few years will 
be stopped." A plant genomic research project (GAB I) planned under the preceding 
government was finally given the go-ahead by the end of 1999 "in order to give a positive 
signal for agro-biotechnology" (both quoted in Kiper 1999: 48). However, with respect to 
research, the 'green' position was also followed up, albeit the scale of support was' 
different. As foreseen in the coalition agreement, biosafety research was given more 
attention and the budget was increased by 65 per cent (from 5 to 8 Mio EUR). 30 Research 
groups, in former times practically non-existent in BMBF research circles, were gradually 
given access to research budgets (for example the GenEERA project) and decision-
making structures.31 
29 The post was offered to the Green Party, but they could not come up with a candidate. In critical circles this 
was judged as a missed opportunity for changing research priorities (Kiper 1999). 
30 In the year 2000 a new biosafety research programme was launched which newly introduced a 
communication module to open up the research results to the wider public. For more information on the 
programmes see: www.biosafety.de 
31 In the area of agricultural research, the Greens achieved the installation of a "Research Institute on Organic 
farming" (FibL). 
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5.1.2 The revision of the Deliberate Release Directive and the non-existent 
"German" position 
With the participation of the Green Party in the new German government the challenges to 
biotech policies were now carried into the heart of the political system. However, even 
though the Ministry of Health, the main regulating body and hosting organization of the 
RKI, and the Ministry of Environment were under 'green' leadership, 'uncertainty-based' 
policy objectives were given a hard time in standing up against the more powerful social 
democratic "Standort" positions. The difficult relationship between the Greens and the 
SPD Party can be nicely illustrated by the case of the revision of the Deliberate Release 
Directive 90/220 at the European level in 1999.32 
The original EU Commission proposal from 1998 was written against the background of 
relaxing requirements for approval of GMOs, and Germany was amongst its most vocal 
proponents. Yet in June 1999 the Common Position from the Commission and the 
European Parliament had already included more stringent safety-based regulatory 
measures. At the time, the EU Council was under German presidency. At the beginning of 
the council negotiations, the 'red-green' government continued to hold on to a strict 
deregulation line, despite being already isolated with this stance within the new, rather 
GMO critical European mainstream. For instance, the German delegation to the meeting 
suggested the introduction of an integrated procedure to centralize authorization of GMOs 
in order to accelerate approval.33 Germany was furthermore criticizing the idea of phasing 
out antibiotic resistance marker genes used in GMOs, even though this was put down as 
one of the points to consider in the coalition agreement. Despite these initial attempts for 
'deregulation', a revised version of the Directive was finally adopted by the EU Council, 
32 All legislation can be found on the EU Commission website: http://europa.eu.intleur-Iexllex. 
33 Explaining why the Greens supported the SPD stance in the beginning, Riedel. State Secretary in the 
BMGS. gives insights into the negotiation skills and tactical maneuvers of the Greens: "In the media one could 
hear that the German delegation - and I want to stress this point we talk about the delegation and not the 
presidency (the Green Party member Minister Trittin chaired the meeting) - demanded the introduction of a 
centralized procedure. For this, we as Greens have, quite rightly, been criticized. The proposal was brought in 
under the pressure of the Social Democrats. This was the price to pay for getting the SPD Party to tolerate 
such things as the limiting of approval, the precautionary principle, the improvement In public participation and 
more stringent risk assessment criteria. That's why we quite happily brought in the proposal, especially 
because we knew that it wouldn't have a chance to get through anyway" (Riedel 1999: 35). 
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including even higher environmental and health standards than before. According to Ulrike 
Riedel, State Secretary (that is, number two) at the time in the Ministry of Health, this 
result was, amongst other things, understood as a product of Green Party pressures: 
"The common position in the Council of Ministers, which foresees more 
stringent measures to protect health and the environment can also be 
attributed to Green Party negotiation skills. We have managed to bring 
about an EU consensus on a high level of protection. This could be done 
in coalition with other European partners and against the will of our 
social democratic coalition partner, most of all against the Ministry of 
Economics and the Ministry of Education and Research. Just in passing: 
The SPD Ministers didn't miss a chance to prevent us from making this 
happening" (Riedel 1999: 34). 
Because of these differences in opinion on the subject of biotechnology regulation, the 
cooperation between the Greens and the Social Democrats proved to be extremely 
difficult. This is one of the main reasons why a common German position on policy was 
hardly ever reached.34 The different ministries and institutions involved in biotech 
regulation, embedded in different policy debates and client bases, held different opinions 
in the labeling debate or opted for different thresholds.35 Even though there were 
discussions led within the Green Party about a need for a move beyond the official Green 
Party line of total GMO rejection in agro-biotechnology, the differences in the positions of 
the Greens and the Social Democrats seemed irreconcilable at the time.36 
34 According to an Insider at the scene: "At the EU level, Germany has the problem that often there is no 
common position on a subject. That's why many things cannot be articulated. Divergent positions exist within 
the govemment and between the different agencies. We show up with the biggest delegation but do not speak 
with one voice, that's how many policy opportunities got losf (interview UBA, 06/02). 
35 For instance, The RKI considered labeling an unscientific measure, merely responding to political and 
market constrains, while the Ministry of Environment considered labeling as justified on the grounds of 
residual 'novel risks'. Likewise the BMU supported full process-based labeling, Including animals fed on 
GMOs. 
36 For instance, In the year 1999 there was an expert round organized by the Heinrich Btill Foundation, where 
such questions had been discussed. The Green Party programme was criticized for leading an exclusively 
negative discourse on agro-biolechnology, as for instance, agro-biolechnology was defined as "genetic 
pollution". Instead it was suggested that a positive discourse on sustainable food production and agriculture 
would be a more appropriate way of pOSitioning (Heinrich Ball Foundation 1999). 
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5.1.3 The decision on Bt maize 176 - differences in science-based policy 
As mentioned above, the Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), under the lead of 
the social democratic Minister Bulmahn, continued to play the role of the biotech 
proponent among the institutions involved in regulation. So hopes for change towards a 
different policy were placed upon the green-led Ministry of Health (BMGS). After all, the 
Ministry of Health held the political responsibility for biotech regulation and the RKI, the 
Competent Authority for GM crop approval, was under its authority. In the first year of 
being in office, the Minister of Health, Andrea Fischer, had not been particularly active on 
the subject of agro-biotechnology.37 Even though Fischer was playing an active and 
critical role in the negotiations of the Biosafety Protocol on the international level, she was 
criticized for neglecting the theme of biodiversity preservation at home. The new staffing 
of the ZKBS and the RKI in 1999, for instance, went through without any fuss. And this 
even though the assessment rationale and voting behaviour of these institutions regarding 
GM crop approval was not at all in line with the critical stance of the Minister.38 Thus 
Fischer did not seem to live up to the promises given in the coalition agreement - not to 
mention the party programme of the Greens - for which she was heavily criticized.39 
However, the Ministry of Health was not quite as passive as it seemed from the outside. 
For instance, in the coalition agreement it was stated that, "negative effects from antibiotic 
resistant marker genes have to be avoided". In order to implement this proposal the 
BMGS tried behind the scenes to convince industry to refrain from the use of antibiotic 
marker genes in future transgenic products. More importantly though, in private 
consultations with Novartis, the ministry tried to convince industry to exercise self-
limitation with respect to the commercialization of Bt maize 176, as this crop was in the 
process of getting commercial scale cultivation approval as the first GMO seed in 
37 At the time the subject of medical biotechnology and human cloning was taking up much of her attention 
(Hampel et al. 2001). 
36 It needs to be said, though that it is the RKI and not the BMGS, which acts in the respective institutions in 
Brussels. 
39 It was speculated that this was the case because Fischer had been sidelined by the more powerful BMBF 
and BMWi. According to one commentator: "Increasingly German biotech policy is decided in the Ministry of 
Education and this is where the old 'pro-biotechnology' course of the Kohl-government is upheld" (Ulhr 1999). 
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Germany. 8t maize 176 was given EU wide authorization earlier in 1997 under the old EU 
Directive 90/220, without imposing additional safety measures or post-release monitoring. 
With the possibility of large-scale cultivation - which a seed approval would authorize - 8t 
maize would be allowed to spread in an uncontrollable way. It was this that the ministry 
aimed to avoid, however, these private undertakings were not successful (Riedel 2001). 
In April 2000 the German government finally invoked article 16 of EU Directive 90/220 in 
order to suspend market approval of 8t maize 176. The application for commercial scale 
cultivation was subsequently put on hold. The Ministry of Health40 invoked the 
precautionary principle for its suspension and justified its decision on the grounds of new 
scientific evidence41 , which it claimed cast reasonable doubts upon the long-term safety of 
the GM maize plant. This decision caused a major uproar in Germany's GMO related 
political and scientific community. For the first time, the Competent Authority RKI was 
asked by the Ministry of Health to disregard the recommendations of the scientific 
advisory body ZK8S, which voted positively over the safety of 8t maize in 1999. 
Additionally, there was no consultation before the ban, even though this constitutes a 
usual practice in authority decision-making. This caused major trouble between the 
regulators and the scientists. The ZK8S claimed that the information did not present any 
new evidence and that some of the scientific studies provided were methodologically 
flawed (ZK8S 2000).42 This led the advisory body to the conclusion that the decision must 
have been 'political' rather than scientifically sound. After all, in the case that the seed 
approval had proceeded, GMOs would have been given the final go-ahead in Germany 
under the authority of a Green Party. 
40 In a discussion (LemkelWinter 2001) Riedel stressed that this decision was not unilaterally taken by the 
BMGS, but was carefully tuned with the other ministries. The leading argument was that BT maize 176 would 
not be approved with no conditions attached under the new EU Directive (Ibid.: 273). 
41 The following four points were put forward: Effects on non-target organisms, development of resistance to 
Bt, toxin releases to soil and antibiotic resistance. 
42 In September 2000 the Scientific Committee on Plants (SCP) of the EU basically upheld the reasoning of 
the ZKBS by stating in its opinion that "The SCP has examined the scientific information by the German 
Competent Authority and does not consider that this alters the original risk assessment carried out on the Bt 
maize 176 line ( ... )" (SCP 2000). However, the German CA has not pulled back its decision and Novartis did 
not file a lawsuit against the German CA. 
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With the invocation of article 16 in case of BT maize 176, the disputes between the pro-
GM and GM-critical fractions within the government were thus openly played out between 
the parties involved. Again the conflict was evolving around the question of science and its 
demarcations from non-scientific factors. The main argument between the opponents was 
therefore what constitutes legitimate and scientifically sound evidence? The following 
extract of an interview with Ulrike Riedel, State Secretary, BMGS and Gerd Hobom, 
Chairperson of the ZKBS, printed in the weekly paper DIE ZEIT in 2000 gives insights into 
the arguments used: 
DIE ZEIT: "Professor Hobom, why do you ask for the approval of GM maize?" 
Hobom, ZKBS: "For me GM maize constitutes an ideal ecological solution." ( ... ) 
Riedel, BMGS: "Whether Bt maize constitutes such an ideal solution needs to proven 
first. ( ... ) Whenever the ZKBS points towards the reduction of chemical pesticides it does 
not base its decision on scientific facts but takes into consideration economic factors, 
which is, however, not up to the ZKBS to decide." 
( ... ) 
Riedel: "We have looked at the scientific data and found that these provide reasonable 
grounds for the assumption that Bt maize could cause environmental damage. ( ... r 
Hobom: "( ... ) But the votes of the experts do not verify such an assumption. As you said 
before: 'All decisions on GMO releases have to be based on the current state of scientific 
knowledge, which cannot be politically decided.' This principle does not seem to apply in 
this case? 
DIE ZEIT: "Who defines the current state of scientific knowledge? The ZKBS alone?" 
Hobom: There is no such thing as definition power in science. However the selection 
process for members of the ZKBS, which is usually done by the Scientific Council 
(Wissenschaftsrat), brings together the reputable expertise in the field in Germany." ( ... ) 
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Riedel: "( ... )"As a basis of our decision-making we consider the whole spectrum of 
scientific opinion. ( ... ) In asking the Cko-Institut for advice we wanted to broaden the 
pluralistic basis of decision-making.'t43 
( ... ) 
Hobom: "( ... ) When disproportional weight is given to scientific minority opinions then this 
is a political decision. 
( ... ) 
Riedel: "Of course we trust our experts. The ZKBS does an important job, but it is an 
advising committee. ( ... ) In assessing the consequences of highly complex technologies 
there cannot be one true scientific opinion. These days, one researcher criticizes the 
other, especially in the field of biotechnology. There are cases where the authority has to 
disregard the vote of its experts. It is the state, which is held responsible in the end, not 
the ZKBS. 
An UBA official commented on the decision as follows: "The decision was a product of the 
'red-green' coalition government. It was not an idea born by the RKI. It is a science-based 
politically pushed decision. However, justified by precaution" (interview UBA, 06/02). 
5.1.4 The upgrading of environmental expertise 
UBAs position strengthened 
As could be shown, in the case of Bt maize the new forces within the government started 
to challenge the approval practices based on a scientific-technocratic model. The green-
led Ministry of Health introduced new sources of scientific evidence and the precautionary 
principle, thus countering the old framing of legitimate scientific expe'1ise in the regulatory 
process. This, however, was not the only case of challenges to the conventional practices 
and hegemonic forces under the new government. In the past the Federal Environmental 
Agency (UBA) had advocated a different, more precaution-based approach in risk 
assessment. However, within the bodies involved in the approval procedure the UBA was 
43 One of the main subjects of dispute was a study on antibiotic resistance submitted on demand of the 
Ministry by the Oko-Institut Freiburg - an institution well known for its critical stance on agro-biotechnology 
and its close links to the German Green Party. 
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only at the level of a subordinate body, thus not constituting an official part of the 
Competent Authority. In addition, the UBA's expertise was only considered in the case of 
field trials and not with respect to market approval, in which case it could only submit an 
opinion. For these reasons the UBA's more critical voice and expertise was marginalized 
in the approval procedure. 
Under the new coalition agreement this regulatory arrangement was due to be 
reconsidered. It stated that, "the regulatory competency for approval in deliberate release 
of GMOs shall be reviewed", again a point brought in by the small coalition partner. The 
strong position of the RKI - long regarded with great mistrust in critical circles - should in 
this way be broken, and approval decisions be based on a broader range of expertise. A 
change in competence, however, would have required a change of the Genetic 
Engineering Act (GenTG) but there was no parliamentary majority for such a move at the 
time. This is why the role of the UBA was upgraded by a ministerial enactment requiring 
its consent, as opposed to just opinion, on market approval, this way putting it on an equal 
footing with the RKI (Riedel 1999). According to an insider this measure meant a great 
deal for the work of the environmental agency: 
"In the past under the CDUlFDP government we were neither 
incorporated into the communication and information exchange 
channels between the different ministries nor were we asked to attend 
the meetings in Brussels. We thus did not know of the leading 
discussions in the field and our work surely suffered from this. ( ... ) This 
really changed when the 'red-green' government came in power. We 
demanded to be heard and all of a sudden most of the information 
channels opened up and we were able to work on a totally new, much 
more competent basis. Under the new government, what we say is 
considered to be important" (interview UBA, 06/02). 
In 1999 the UBA was furthermore entrusted with the role of heading a 
Governmental/L~nder working group44 to prepare a post-release monitoring concept as 
44 Members of the working group are: representatives from the Ministry of Environment (BMU) and the Federal 
Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN), Federal Environmental Agency (UBA). Federal Biological Research 
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envisaged in the new EU Directive. The discussion about the necessity of long-term 
environmental observation of GM plants had been taken up early on by the environmental 
agency. Since 1995 the UBA had been dealing with the subject of "Monitoring of 
genetically modified plants" and has, since that time, concluded various studies. In the 
coalition agreement of the 'red-green' government, great importance was attached to 
scientific observation accompanying the cultivation of GMOs. In a decision of the 
Conference of the Federal Environment Ministers in 1998, the UBA was finally chosen to 
be the leading agency in this area (Sauter/Meyer 2000). 
However, the UBA's leading role in questions concerning the monitoring of GMOs did not 
remain uncontested. In 1999, a second working group45 was established, under the 
leadership of the Federal Biological Research Center for Agriculture and Forestry (BBAt6• 
Also in the same year the RKI, as Competent Authority, had intervened in the discussion 
by arguing for the clearing center tasks to be established under its authority (ibid.). Once 
again, behind these 'institutional' quarrels stand conflicting ideas about the monitoring 
rationale. For the environmental agency monitoring is framed as an instrument of a 
"precautionary environmental policy" (Joint Working Group 2002). The UBA focuses on 
ecological effects and the broader environment, and stresses the importance of 
uncertainty and non-hypothesis led observation. The BBA group, in contrast, frames 
monitoring as "cultivation related monitoring", which is focusing on direct and indirect 
effects of GMO cultivation on the agricultural ecosystem stressing the practicability and 
cost-effectiveness of the measures (BBA 2000).47 
Center for Agriculture and Forestry (BBA), Robert-Koch Institute and experts from the' 12 out of the 16 Lander 
authorities. 
45 Members of the working group are: representatives from the Federal Ministry of Consumer Protection, 
Agriculture and Food (BMVEL), from various BBA Institutions, several plant health centers, RKI, USA, the 
Federal Plant Variety Office (BSA), the Plant Variety Control and Advice Office of the Lander Authorities, The 
Association of German Plant Breeders (BDP), Institute for Sugar Beet Research, (IFZ), from Universities, and 
from the European Academy for Environment and Economy. 
48 BBA has cooperated with seed companies and various agricultural Institutions, e.g. planUseed protection 
agencies, within the framework of a BMBF-sponsored programme on MBiosafety Research and Monitoring". 
This BMBF programme has as one of its aims the development of parameters and methods for a monitoring 
plan. This new programme was initiated despite the fact that UBA had already worked on these questions for 
years, This is, however, according to insicjers, constantly ignored. It seems that UBA must constantly defend 
its status and expertise against BBA and its associated networks. 
47 The wording in the coalition agreement between the Social Democratic and the Green Party from the year 
2002 concerning post-release monitoring reflects this controversy. One side demanded an Metticient 
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The consideration of nature conservation aspects and biodiversity 
Notwithstanding the contested nature of installing new practices in dealing with GMOs the 
new governing constellation did open up space for alternative accounts to be entering the 
policy debates. Due to this new heightened interest in questions of ecological 
uncertainties of GMOs, which was mainly brought in by the Green Party and its 
associated networks, nature conservation considerations have been gradually given a 
chance to enter the debate on environmental risks and biodiversity preservation in relation 
to agro-biotechnology. In 1998 the German Council of Environmental Advisors (SRU) had 
proposed to include nature conservation principles in the approval procedure in case of 
large-scale introductions of GM crops (SRU 1998). In 2000 at a national expert 
conference dedicated to the subject and organized by both UBA and the Federal Nature 
Conservation Agency (BfN), demands were formulated to consider nature conservation 
related requirements in the context of the risk assessment for GMO release 
(LemkelWinter 2001). Later in the year, in the course of the transposition of the European 
Habitat Directive into the Nature Conservation Act ("Bundesnaturschutzgesetz"), 
environmental NGOs, together with other GM critical institutions, had forcefully - but 
without any success ~ tried to lobby for the creation of a legal basis to prevent the influx of 
GMOs into certain protected areas. 
All of these new attempts suggested integration of nature conservation principles into the 
risk assessment practice of GMO release. By these accounts it was understood that the 
specific objective of biotope and species protection would broaden the scope of 
interpretation concerning "protection of the environment in its systemic integrity" of the 
Genetic Engineering Act or may even provide a basis for the establishment of GM-free 
areas. The focus on nature conservation related requirements would furthermore demand 
more thorough risk research into eco-systemic effects, such as research Into food chain 
and biodiversity effects and regionally varying habitat structures (ibid.). The Ministry of 
Health supported the inclusion of the expertise of the BfN into the GM crop approval 
monitoring" whereas the other side opted for a "comprehensive monitoring.· In the end the former version was 
eventually used in the agreement. 
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procedure, justifying this under the consideration of a more precautionary risk assessment 
practice (Riedel 2001). The RK/, however, did reject such an initiative. 
5.1.5 The issue of contamination, outcrossing and gene flow 
Pressure on the conventional risk framing has come from yet other GMO related issue 
areas. Over the course of the years the topic of outcrossing and gene flow has, for various 
reasons, become increasingly important in the German GM controversy. In a rising 
number of cases GM-contaminated seed had been detected by the German Lander 
authorities.48 These authorities have, due to a lack of legal requirements and a common 
Lander strategy, reacted differently to the issue. Some have ordered the destruction of 
GM contaminated fields or seed, or have demanded labeling while others did not consider 
this to be a problem - of whatever kind - and did not interfere. At the national level, the 
social democratic-led Ministry of Agriculture and the Green-led Ministry of Health held 
different opinions on the issue. This arbitrariness in handling caused major problems 
between the seed/biotech companies, the farmers and the authorities. 
Although the source of contamination could (in some cases) not be established, field tests 
have come under increasing scrutiny, not least because confinement measures in field 
trails were gradually reduced within the last few years (USA 2000). A highly disputed 
verdict by a court in Nordrhein Westfalen brought the issues to the fore. In the court case 
of the so-called "MOnster verdict", the neighboring farmer of a GM rape-seed field test site 
had been ordered by the Lander Ministry of Environment to refrain from selling his harvest 
due to outcrossing which occurred between the test field and his agricultural land. The 
ministry argued that the product was a genetically modified organism'and selling it illegal 
because it lacked an approval under part C of the EU Directive. The farmer went to court 
arguing that he did not deliberately use GMOs., This, however, was not the issue. The real 
issue was whether the field test approval included the possible consequence of 
outcrossing, or whether these for-sale-designated contaminated plants constituted as an 
48 In case of food and agricultural law Implementation, the L~nder governments are responsible. The federal 
structure of Germany with 15 different states (L~nder) has thus great potential for differences in 
implementation practices. 
89 
illegal bringing to the market. The court decided in favour of the latter stating the public 
interest and the precautionary nature of the GenTG.49 
The RKI criticized the verdict on the grounds that outcrossing was an accepted 
consequence of field trial approval and, as a result did not require market approval. It 
argued that since outcrossing was prevented in the case that a specific effect could not be 
adequately assessed, it could be followed that if outcrossing occurred, those genes 
crossing out did not pose a safety issue. In fact, for the RKI outcrossing as such is harmful 
only in case it causes an advantage in selection due to an increased fitness of the plant. 
Gene flow is considered a "biological principle" which in itself has nothing to do with 
genetic modification. Critics have frequently condemned this position arguing that this was 
an unjustifiable "normalization of risks" downplaying the potential uncertainties involved in 
an uncontrollable spread of GMOs (Brauner 2002). Out of precaution, the USA has 
followed the line of minimization of gene flow even when harm as such was not 
established. 
This situation of gene flow and contamination of seed, in the absence of clear regulation, 
or worse, a common understanding of its legal status and a lack of thresholds for 
adventitious presence in seed led to legal quarrels and insecurities. This situation was 
held responsible for the continuous decline in field trial proposals since the year 2000. 
Just as important, the question of contamination fueled the discourse on economic risks 
and liability. For instance, in a similar civil court case in Stuttgart, an organic farmer was 
required to tolerate the influx of genetically modified genetic information from a 
neighboring GM test site, even though the farmer was prohibited from selling his harvest 
as organic (Abel-Lorenz 2000). This situation was increasingly found to be inappropriate 
and intolerable. In terms of consequences for risk management measures, the Ministry of 
Health ordered the reintroduction of isolation distances. In the year 2000 the USA began a 
49 OVG MOnster NRW, 31.8.2000, NVwZ01, 110. Another German court, however, decided differently in a 
similar case. The legal committee on environment for the German L::Inder (LAG) is sharing the position of the 
MOnster court. See www.hamburg.de/behoerden/umweltbehoerden/gen/oeffentlich/index.htm. 
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research project on genetic engineering and organic farming in which the questions of 
damage prevention and damage compensation were to be central. 
5.1.6 The "Chancellor initiative" on large-scale GM field-testing 
In spite of mounting difficulties on the German and European political landscape with 
regard to the cultivation and commercialization of GM crops, and the bleak economic 
prospects for biotech companies, the SPD Party continued to frame biotechnology in 
economic terms and kept on speaking out in favour of the "key technology" and its 
supposed innovative potential. It was Chancellor Gerhard Schroder himself who, in June 
2000, took the lead in an initiative on a large-scale GM testing programme. To industry 
Schroder put forth the idea of an extensive experimental GM cultivation program of three-
year duration when industry in turn conceded to a temporary stop on commercial release. 
In the meantime, according to the plan, a consensus should be negotiated within society 
on how to proceed further in terms of GMO release. The initiative was welcomed 
throughout the political spectrum, albeit with different undertones. Industry took this as a 
sign of political support for the introduction of new traits, whereas biotech critics 
interpreted this step as indirect support for the moratorium.50 
The Green Party, the minor coalition partner, did not object in principle. However, against 
the initial plans which resulted from bilateral talks between the Chancellor and industry it 
was the Greens, together with GM critical institutions, that demanded that the programme 
would have to entail research into ecological aspects of GMO release and that the 
cultivation process be accompanied by a public debate (interview BMVEL, 06/03). For 
more than six months difficult negotiations took place between all of the political 
institutions involved, covering the concrete design of the programme in terms of size of 
the area under cultivation, the choice of traits, the safety research, and the extent of 
involvement with the public. In particular arguments arose about the use of the harvested 
products. As originally proposed by industry, the cultivation programme was to test both 
50 www.transgen.de/aktueli/kanzler/kanzler_chronik.html[1 0.0 1.2002J. 
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cUltivation and commercialization, that is, to include the sale of the product.51 This, 
however, was strongly contested by GM critical groups. After all, at the European level 
plans on a wider traceability and labeling scheme were already being worked upon. 
Putting GM products into the food chain without taking account of these developments did 
not seem to be appropriate. Another problem, this time arising from industry, was the 
provision of seeds. At the time there were hardly any approved GMOs, other than maize, 
and industry itself did not want to offer any oilseed rape for cultivation purposes due to 
outcrossing and liability problems (interview SMVEL, 06/03).52 Due to these problems, by 
the end of the year 2000, even intense discussions had not brought about a final 
consensus on the matter. The SSE crisis, which broke out as negotiations on the 
programme were to be finalized, then put an end to the initiative. 
5.2 Evaluating the transition phase 
As this narrative describes an important, but not central transition phase, the following 
section will give a brief analytical account of the developments against Hajer and 
Sabatier's approaches. How would both analysts explain and judge the developments in 
this phase? 
5.2.1 Discourses and story-lines as in Hajer 
For the DCF, this phase between 1998 and the year 2000 could be treated as an example 
of the struggle between the two leading discourse coalitions that were identified in 
Chapter four. As the opposition to biotechnology had until 1998 been largely confined to 
the realms outside of parliament and government, with the election of the Green Party to 
the government this situation had changed. Through this (rather non-discursive!) event 
critical forces were now in a more authoritative position to push their story-lines into the 
regulatory arena and to inform some of the practices of the government. As shown in the 
51 According to press sources, SchrOder was not so much interested in the science part of the programme as 
in the testing of public acceptance (Berliner Zeitung 2001). 
52 There had been cases whereby on the basis of contaminated seed the complete harvest had to be 
destroyed. In order to overcome those uncertainties, industry demanded thresholds for contamination in seed. 
As long as these thresholds did not exist industry would not offer any seed for cultivation. 
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decision on 8t maize 176, a different "precaution-based" model of science-based policy, 
pushed by the green-led Ministry of Health, had superceded the sound science based 
framing of the scientific advisory body ZKBS. The upgrading of the environmental agency, 
the UBA, the tentative consideration of nature conservation perspectives or the different 
conceptualization of monitoring designs all are given proof of a counter discourse starting 
to get a foothold in the regulatory arena. More important from a discourse perspective 
may be the fact that by the end of the 1990s, the German critics community could 
increasingly join in European discourse coalitions (or even global ones with respect to the 
biodiversity discourse), thereby substantiating their claims for more rigorous regulation 
and a change in practices. 
Even though one of the leading opponents to agro-biotechnology, the Green Party, was 
now integrated into the regulatory system, this seemed to intensify conflict rather than 
create space for mediation. Direct exchange (deliberation) between the discourse 
coalitions and the need to come up with a 'common policy' has not brought about a 
perspective of closure to the conflict. As Hajer would say, there was no common 
discursive ground between the coalitions. The different discourses had increasingly 
distanced themselves from one another and were being led in separate circles. Yet the 
'reality' of the biotech conflict had moved on. The problem of outcrossing and seed 
contamination had brought different story-lines, such as liability, to the fore, challenging 
approval practices and judicial judgements alike. More importantly, this development 
started to shift the attention to different issues, arenas and stakeholders, the users of 
biotechnological products. This way previously independent practices, biotech policy and 
agricultural policy, are in the process of being related. For Hajer such developments can 
have a potential for transformation since they change the subject and the situation for 
pOlicy-making. However, at the time it was impossible to predict what the future situation 
would be. 
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5.2.2 Belief systems and learning in Sabatier 
As already introduced, the ACF puts its focus on belief systems and external events in the 
process of policy change. The ACF assumes that changes in the systemic governing 
coalition brought about by elections can lead to major policy change. In fact, as a result of 
this 'external event' we see quite novel developments taking place in the time period we 
described above, however it does not amount to substantial changes within the overall 
government programme. 
The minority coalition - the Green Party, a representative of belief system two, "risks 
therefore alternatives" - increased its importance in the subsystem with its entrance into 
the government, which the ACF predicts: By becoming part of the ruling governing 
coalition, different "uncertainty-based" policy core beliefs gained entry into the regulatory 
arena and became to some degree institutionalized in the coalition agreement and in the 
division (and staffing) of agencies. The ACF assumes that the advocacy coalitions 
identified in Chapter four seek to alter the behaviour of governmental institutions in order 
to achieve the policy objectives of their respective policy core (Sabatier 1998: 117). In this 
way different administrative agencies represent different interests and values and become 
caught up in the struggles between the antagonistic forces. Rather than convincing its 
coalition partner of different policy ideas, the minority coalition was more successful in 
using its 'allied' institutions and by resorting to different strategies in order to achieve its 
policy goals. As such it used strategies to undermine the coalition partner's position, as in 
the case of the decisions on the EU Deliberate Release Directive, or to by-pass the 
institutions that were not deciding in one's interests, as in the case of the ZKBS in the Bt 
maize 176 decision, or to mobilize and strengthen belief affiliates, such as in the case of 
the UBA or the BFN. 
Using the ACF, one can show that policy change was possible on the basis of an 'external 
event', that is, national elections. The change in government did change the power 
balance between the coalitions, however, this did not amount to major changes to the 
policy core attributes of the governmental programme. Learning could be understood as 
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having taken place, but only on the level of concessions on secondary aspects of belief 
systems. In the phase described above the policy conflicts were far from being resolved. 
In their hearts and minds the Greens continued to focus on keeping biotech out of the 
country and the Social Democrats largely continued to believe in its economic potential. 
Minimal changes have occurred but with Sabatier we could say that at the end of 2000 the 
situation was basically deadlocked. 
Conclusion 
What can be concluded about the transition phase? 
The transition phase shows both continuity and change. From the DCF point of view one 
could see that a new uncertainty discourse was able to make some inroads into 
government programmes and institutional settings, yet words remained more ambitious 
than policy practices. The critics' community could join in European and global discourse 
coalitions substantiating their demands for more rigorous risk assessment. However, 
direct deliberation between the governing coalition partners did not bring about space for 
conflict mediation in terms of finding common discursive grounds. Instead, discourses had 
increasingly distanced themselves from one another and were being led in separate 
circles or thrown against each other. It was neither the space nor the time for a settlement 
of the conflict. 
Sabatier's ACF draws our attention to belief system interaction, power and institutional 
dynamics. A non-discursive event, national elections, triggered a change in government 
and affected the power balance between the coalitions. Hence, the minority coalition 
increased its importance in the subsystem and used its newly gained position to change 
the staffing of agencies or the wording of policy objectives, however, only on the level of 
secondary aspects of belief systems. Conflicting belief systems learned to make some 
minor concessions in governmental programmes but would rather use different strategies 
to undermine the position of the adversary and to further their own policy objectives. By 
the end of 2000, the two advocacies remained as antagonistic as ever. With respect to 
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agro-biotech, there was largely policy continuity, except now with more internal dissent 
within government. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. SSE, the "Agrarwende" and the consumer choice discourse of the BMVEL 
The following chapter will look at the 'trigger' for the policy shift in agro-biotechnology in 
Germany at the beginning of the new decade. The first SSE case in Germany at the end 
of 2000 had a radical impact on agricultural and food policies. It also changed the 
parameters of discussion in agro-biotechnology and influenced coalition building and 
power relationships. How can one understand the fact that an animal disease could have 
such a dramatic effect, causing a major economic and political crisis and even affecting 
other regulatory sectors, such as agro-biotechnology? The cognitive-normative 
frameworks from Hajer and Sabatier can help in illuminating these dynamics. The chapter 
wi" thus look at the framing of the SSE debate, present the events that took place and 
focus on the consequences of the debate for agricultural policies in general and for agro-
biotechnology in particular. The two theoretical frameworks, using discourses and beliefs 
respectively, will be used as explanatory devices in order to gain a mor~ thorough 
understanding of the changes described. This section will focus on the developments in 
the year 2001, from the SSE crisis to the first official statements concerning biotech 
regulation. 
6.1 The SSE crisis and the change In agricultural policies 
6.1.1 The SSE crisis In 2000 and the myth of a "SSE-free Germany" 
The first mad-cow disease case in Germany in November 2000 and the following Food-
and-Mouth-Disease crisis across the EU had a radical impact on the debate concerning 
agricultural practices and food production. The discovery of the first SSE infected cow and 
the subsequent rising number of new cases led to a massive drop in consumer 
confidence, and plunged the German agricultural and food system into its biggest crisis in 
post war history. Already before November 2000, the issue of SSE had been a hot topic in 
a country where meat constitutes an important part of people's diets, and whose beef 
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industry is the second biggest in Europe. Over the years, but especially during the critical 
phase in the middle of the 1990s, the "SSE-horror" in other European countries was 
widely and intensively covered in the national media and consumer worries caused beef 
sales to be slashed by around twenty percent. 53 
Yet although consumer concerns were running high, German government policy was not 
characterized by an overly active approach towards consumer protection and best 
possible efforts to stemming the disease, neither on the European nor on the national 
level. 54 Officially "German cattle were free from SSE" and over the years this rhetoric was 
widely used to appease public concerns and to oppose demands for more stringent 
regulatory safety measures {Wolters 1998).55 For many years, Germany had blocked any 
common actions towards more restrictive regulation at the EU level and refrained from 
taking deliberate safety measures in the German market.56 Continuing the policy of the 
former government towards the risk of SSE, the new Minister of Agriculture of the 'red-
green' coalition government, the social democrat Karl-Heinz Funke, opposed key 
European propositions concerning the removal of special SSE risk material from the food 
chain. In addition, just weeks before the crisis hit Germany, Funke voted against a general 
EU wide prohibition for the use of bone meal as animal feed - against the advice of the 
Minister of Health. Comprehensive testing, as another example, was never an issue 
pushed by the German government either. Additional measures to combat SSE and to 
prevent the spread of the disease - so the message throughout the time - were not 
deemed to be necessary from a German point of view (Hoffmann 2000). "Germany is 
BSE-free" thus became the mantra of the food and agricultural sector in Germany over the 
years, and precautionary regulatory propositions, e.g. from the side of the European 
53 As Wolters (1998) describes: "Abroad people got the perception that BSE was more widespread In 
Germany than in the UK. ( ... ) In both, France and the Netherlands people wondered about the -hysterical 
Germans· (Ibid.: 153). 
54 Wolters (1998) describes the German policy as being tom between consumer protection and the 
safeguarding of the German beef industry. In fact, Germany played an important role In the EU when BSE first 
emerged asking for more EU measures to safeguard public health, for example with trade restrictions against 
British beef (Dressel 2002). However, it seems that Germany only insisted on higher standards as long as 
these measures were geared towards other countries and their own country was not affected. 
55 Germany did have six cases of infected cattle. However, the cows in questions could always be identified as 
imports from Switzerland and the UK. This fact was, inter alia, used to underscore the idea that BSE was 
other countries problem and not a German one. 
56 Labeling etc. 
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Commission, were met with reactions ranging from astonishment to self-righteous 
indignation (Jasper 2001). 
But suggestions claiming otherwise and concerns about the truthfulness of the "SSE-free" 
rhetoric were mounting. In July the EU Scientific Steering Committee concluded in a 
report about the SSE risk in the individual member states that Germany needed to be 
classified as a high-risk country. (A spokesperson from the Ministry of Agriculture 
commenting on the EU suggestions: "This is incomprehensible. This categorization from 
EU experts must rest on speculation and outdated data" (quoted in Hoffmann 2000). In 
the context of heightened concerns, by the end of the 1990s some companies started 
considering testing for SSE on a deliberate basis, in anticipation of more restrictive public 
legislation. In the media and in expert circles it was speculated that the appearance of 
SSE in Germany was only a matter of time, since testing for the disease was on the rise. 
And so it eventually happened in a voluntary testing on 20th of November 2000. Four days 
later it was official: Germany had its first homegrown SSE cow. 
What followed afterwards was nothing less than dramatic. Fears of infection led to a fall in 
beef consumption of up to fifty percent threatening to ruin farmers and the agricultural 
industry within a short period of time. To rule out the danger to humans contracting the 
disease by eating contaminated meat, thousands of cattle were killed in Germany and 
across Europe. In order to protect the German beef market from collapse, thousands of 
healthy cows were killed in a "market stabilizing measure".57 However, it was not just the 
beef market alone that was in decline. Anxious consumers began to boycott any number 
of products that might contain infected cow material. from milk products to products 
containing gelatine, such as gummibears or medication. In this way more and more 
branches of the food processing industry and other branches of the economy, such as 
transport or retail. were drawn into the crisis. Despite the relatively low number of detected 
57 The European programme, which foresaw the slaughtering of 400.000 cows to prop up beef prices, caused 
a huge outcry from the German public. For instance, animal rights groups wanted to sue KOnast for being an 
accessory to cruelty of animals. KOnast herself did not support the plan, however finally gave In under the 
condition that the tested meat cold be used for humanitarian purposes. The German government finally 
agreed to donate the superfluous meat (18,000 tons equivalent to 45.000 cows) to North Korea, which had a 
severe shortage of food and no beef market of its own, which could be affected by the donation. 
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cases following the initial case, the public reaction to SSE, in both emotional and 
economic terms, was much stronger in Germany than in any other European country.58 
The political system was thus under great pressure to act. Soon after the crisis had 
started the political elite indicated that "business as usual" could not be leading the 
agenda any longer. As a consequence, almost overnight, Germany became one of the 
strongest proponents of immediate and restrictive actions concerning SSE. Sut this was 
not enough, the country decided to put itself to the forefront of what the foreign press 
called a "green revolution" (SSC 2001). 
6.1.2 Mad cows and "Agrarfabriken": the birth ofthe "Agrarwende" 
After the 24th of November 2000 Germany faced a full-fledged economic and political 
crisis. As a result "protecting consumers against SSE and restoring public confidence in 
agriculture has [become] top priority for the German government" (Federal Government 
2001). Yet emergency plans were not available and the initial risk management of the 
government did not seem to be up to the job. A strategy worked out by Minister Funke, 
supported by the National Farmer's Organization (DSV), which was based on changing 
production systems so as to allow more transparent production and control, was rejected. 
The 'severity' of the situation, as was increasingly felt in governing circles, called for 
fundamental changes and a new and entirely different policy approach.59 SSE had 
become the "Chernobyl of German agriculture" after which things could no longer be the 
same (Der Spiegel 2001: 25). Sy early January, both the Minister of Health and the 
Minister of Agriculture were finally forced to resign as the dimensions of the crisis unfolded 
and a clear, concerted political response from the government was still lacking. In her 
58 An Impressive elite account of the SSE-shock is given by Angela Merkel, leader of the COUlCSU opposition 
in a speech in parliament: -I don't know how you feel about this, but I am being honest: I belong to those 
people - and there are many of them - who believed and trusted the old and the new govemment that 
Germany was SSE-free. I did that as politician and as a consumer alike. That's why for me and for many 
others the 24th of November came as a day of shock. It was a shock because the first detected SSE case has 
hit us suddenly and unprepared. The 24th of November has brought us back to reality" (Merkel 2001). 
59 Media coverage was extremely high and many commentators conclude that this played a pivotal role in 
policy change (Btischen et al. 2003). Also the foreign press picked up some of the German newspaper 
headlines, for Instance, the BBC: "( ... ) Newspapers have devoted pages to the possible dangers lurking under 
the skin of Germany's myriad varieties of sausages. On Wednesday, the tabloid BZ carried a front-page 
picture of Chancellor SchrMer biting into a large hot-dog with the caption 'BSE-Horror - does it still taste 
good, Chancellor?' or 'Helpless dismay at the sausage counter' read a headline of the Slid newspaper. 
'Nobody knows for certain if German sausage Is safe' said the Berliner Zeitung daily newspaper'· (BBC 2000). 
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resignation speech Fischer stated that beyond consumer concerns "the confidence of 
German citizens in the government's ability to solve the crisis has been shaken" (Hooper 
2001 ). 
Against the background of chaotic, at times contradictory, messages from the respective 
government institutions and mounting consumer anxiety Chancellor Gerhard Schroder 
himself finally intervened - BSE had become what is called a "Chefsache" (meaning 
"something the boss has to deal with") in German. Just seven days after the crisis had 
started, Schroder formulated in a speech to the German Parliament the necessity for "a 
new type of agrarian policies" which should lead away from the "Agrarfabriken" (factory 
farms). He stated that BSE required nothing less than a radical turn in agri-food pOlicies in 
which "consumer interests will take priority over economic interests". The Chancellor 
himself thus framed BSE as the necessary consequence of an agricultural and food 
system that was deeply flawed and in need of radical reforms. The animal disease was 
made to stand for intensive agricultural methods, mass production in food, damage to the 
environment and the maltreatment of farm animals. In Schroder's speech it was 
unequivocally made clear that BSE was not just an incidence of a lack of control which 
fostered an epidemic, rather that it was the systemic outcome of productivist, lobby-driven 
and consumer oblivious practices in agriculture and food production. 
The first and immediate political 'action of the new kind' was the reorganization and 
renaming of the Ministry of Agriculture into the Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and 
Agriculture {BMVEL).60 Through the reorganization of the administration, agricultural 
production, food safety and consumer issues where now brought together in one 
institution. In addition two new agencies were created: the Federal Institute on Risk 
Assessment (BfR) and the Federal Agency on Consumer Protection and Food Safety 
(BVL) {both institutions will be engaged in the authorization of GM crops and food).61 As a 
60 A major drawback of the institutional reforms was that hardly any personnel were changed, except for the 
very top ranks. On the working level KOnast experienced major opposition within her Ministry (TAl 2001). 
61 80th Institutions were developed out of the 'old' Food Safety Agency, the 8gW. Schroder appointed the 
Federal Auditor General to deal with the crisis and to Identify weak points and measures to improve the food 
safety system. These were part of her suggestions. As a consequ~nce of the so-called ·von Wedel Report" 
(von Wedel 2001), the former food safety agency (8gW) of the Ministry of Health was dissolved and replaced 
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surprise move, Schroder appointed Renate KOnast, a lawyer and Green Party member, to 
be the new Minister of Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture. In radical contrast to 
all her predecessors in office, KOnast being female, environmentalist and without any ties 
to the farmer's world and agri-business possibly symbolized more than any other decision 
that a complete break with conventional German farming and policy practices was 
planned.52 
Ms Renate Kiinast - a portrait of "Frau Ministerin" 
" ... the surprise couldn't be bigger: The new Minister would be a 
'Ministerin' and for the first time a member of the Green Party. Moreover 
'the new one' is not a farmer - like all the other predecessors - but a 
lawyer. A 'green', female lawyer - for many, particularly for the old-
established agro-Iobbyists, this was hard to swallow" (KOnast 2002: 25). 
These are the words of Renate KOnast when commenting on her new post as Minister of 
Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture which she took over in January 2001. In her 
book "Class instead of Mass" KOnast describes the situation of her sudden appointment 
as agricultural minister in the midst of the BSE crisis and the challenges this entailed for 
the established policy circles. Not only was Germany planning to embark on a more 
organic future, thereby curtailing and disrupting conventional agrarian social relations, but 
even more shockingly, this change was going to be led by a woman who was lacking any 
kind of "Stallgeruch,,63. This way the mad cow crisis not only put into question conventional 
perceptions and routines in food production and consumption but on top of it challenged 
culturally entrenched ideas about an agricultural minister's supposed worldviews, interests 
and gender. 
by two new agencies, the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) and the Federal Agency on Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety (BVL). This reorganization is supposed to take account of a functional separation 
between risk assessment and risk management institutions (B6schen et al. 2002). 
62 Originally B~rbel Ht5hn, Green Party Agricultural Minister of Nordrhein Westfalen (NRW) was proposed for 
the job, yet she rejected the position. H6hn introduced consumer-oriented reforms of agricultural policies 
under the 'red-green' government. She was asked to provide a master plan for changing policies on the 
federal level. 
63 In German there is a double sense of the word. "Stallgeruch" literally translated means stable smell. Thus 
lacking any "Stallgeruch" refers to the fact that KUnast does not have a farmer's background. In a second, 
more figurative sense of the wording, lacking "Stallgeruch" means not having a supporting (old-boys) network 
in the baCkground. 
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"Ms KOnast is a lean faced city dweller with a punk-style hair cut and a passion for 
rollerblading", so stated the British Guardian newspaper in 2001 (Hooper 2001 a). Born 
near Wuppertal, a city belonging to the former steelmaking area of Western Germany, 
KOnast was one of four children of a mechanic and a nurse. Already as a teenager she 
proved to be hard-headed and unconventional when she decided, against the will of her 
parents, to attend university and to become a social worker.64 In the 1970s KOnast moved 
to Berlin to work as a social worker in a male prison, dealing with drug addicts. Alongside 
her work she started to attend law school and finally became a lawyer. KOnast entered 
green politics as a protester against nuclear energy at the end of the 1970s. In 1985, 
already well established in Green Party politics, she was elected to become a member of 
the Berlin parliament. Within the green movement she is regarded as moderate, 
pragmatist and independent. In the year 2000 KOnast was elected, together with Fritz 
Kuhn, to be the party's overall leader. 
"A lawyer by training, the 45 year old has a reputation for humour, hard work and quotable 
repartee" (ibid.). For her crisis management during the BSE crisis, KOnast quickly got the 
reputation of a determinate, tough and highly professional politician, even within farmer's 
circles. For many commentators the question of how the "Stadtgore,,65 would manage the 
stubborn and mostly conservative farmers was paramount. The following quotes give an 
idea of the difficult relationship between the minister and the farmers and the way KOnast 
handles the conflict: 
KOnast: "I remember a speech on the 24th of January, when one of the 
conservative party members of parliament interrupted me and said that I 
had never seen a farm from inside. I countered immediately, saying: 
"Could you then explain to me why those who know the farms from 
inside were not able to prevent the problems that we face today?" He did 
64 KOnast: "When college was over in the beginning of the 1970s my mother wanted me to become a bank 
clerk. In my wildest fantasies I tried to Imagine how I would walk Into the bank dressed In a pleated skirt, with 
curly hair and on high heals. An Image which was so not what I wanted.(oo.) I could have never imagined 
playing a classic female role (KOnast 2002: 26). 
65 The expressian "Stadtg5re" could be translated as 'saucy city girl' and is thus used In order to describe the 
great difference between the live world of KOnast and the farmers. This or similar expressions were quite often 
used in the news in the beginning of her post as the 'farmer's minister'. Depending on the context it was used 
in a derogatory/negative sense or an empowering/positive sense. 
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not answer the question (KOnast 2002: 65). When asked about how she 
would manage to get the farmers on her side in the reform process, she 
is quoted a saying "as a social worker in the jail of Tegel I even 
managed to get the respect of jailbirds and screws" (Der Spiegel 2001 a: 
24). 
KOnast shows no illusions about the magnitude of changes that the new policies are 
asking for. She understands her minister position as a big challenge - and so certainly do 
most of the farmers. With KOnast, the powerful farming lobby lost its most important ally in 
the political arena. But, as equally important, for a great many of her ministry's clientele, 
KOnast - an unmarried, Green Party member, female professional- is the embodiment of 
both a particular, almost alien culture and a problematic normative vision of the human 
and the social.66 Thus with the appointment of KOnast as the new 'farmer's minister', for 
some the "Agrarwende" became a challenge not only on a structural basis but also on a 
personal (identity) one.67 
It is interesting to see how even 
the foreign press played with her 
unconventional image, showing 
her smoking dope, respectively 
GM maize. This cartoon was 
published in the French AGRA 
press, a weekly agricultural 
newspaper. It is a response to 
the presentation of the genetic 
engineering draft bill of the 
Kunast Ministry In January 2004. 
The French press portrayed this 
German legislative initiative as a 
push towards legalizing GMOs, 
which would force other 
countries (like France - the man 
is her French counterpart, Herve 
Gaymard) to follow suit (AGRA 
Presse 2004: 5). 
66 This can also be nicely shown in the use of language. In the supposed male world of farming Kunast was 
always addressing "Sauern und Saurinnen" meaning farmers and women farmers. 
67 Pongratz (1991) describes the difficulties between the farmers and the ecology movement as mostly lying in 
cultural cleavages, he even speaks of "counter-cultures" (ibid.: 121). The ecology movement Is grounded in an 
urban, academic environment while farmers are more conservative, traditional and non-academic. Yet, in case 
of Kunast, the cultural cleavages are even more complex, as a Gender dimension is Introduced. The typology 
introduced by Gill (2003) is also useful in understanding the divisions between the environmental movement, 
organic farmer's movements and the more conventional farmers. The former could be understood as being 
based on a more post-modern or romantic notion of (back-to-nature) farming within a natural environment 
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6.1.3 "Agrarwende" • turn in agricultural and consumer protection policies 
In KOnast's first governing speech to parliament in February 2001, the new Consumer 
Protection Minister followed up on Schroder's framing of the BSE problE~matique and 
outlined the new agrarian policies of the coalition government: The phrases highlighted in 
bold-type were soon to become the leading catchwords of the reform. 
"The BSE scandal marks the end of the old type agricultural policies. 
( ... ) From now on 'Precautionary Consumer Protection' will be the 
leading principle. ( ... ) Like never before we are forced to acknowledge 
the side effects of a policy driven by mass production in agriculture. ( ... ) 
I put my hopes on the "Agrarwende". Our motto is: 'Class instead of 
Mass' [meaning quality instead of quantity]. ( ... ) Six actors will be 
decisive in whether or not the new policies will be successful: the 
consumers, the farmers, the feed industry, the food processing industry, 
the retailers, and finally the policy-makers. They together built the 
'Magic Hexagon' of the "Agrarwende". ( ... ) Now it's your choice! ( ... ) 
Do you remember the passionate arguments surrounding beer purity 
regulation (Reinheitsgebot) when consumers, farmers and breweries 
stood together as one? We need such a 'Reinheitsgebot' [purity 
regulation] when dealing with farming animals: cows need water, beats, 
grass and cereal - nothing else" (KOnast 2001). 
In this speech for the first time the concept of "Agrarwende,,68 entered the agricultural 
policy debate of a German federal government.69 Although never clearly defined, it stands 
for a variety of different measures, which together outline - albeit vaguely - the new 
approach towards agri-food policies under the "red-green" government. 70 The cornerstone 
(alterity), the latter as being more based in traditions and conventions (identity) or utilitarian Ideas about 
efficient farming (utility). 
68 The 'WendeN metaphor is commonly used In German policies to Indicate fundamental transformations, that 
is, beyond reform. For Instance, German reunification Is popularly referred to as "Die Wende". The "Wende" 
rhetoric is also used in other cases of 'red-green' reform policy, e.g. energy policy "Energiewende" or forest 
policy 'Waldwende". 
89 The term "Agrarwende" was used in farming-critical circles before. The reform farming policies of the federal 
state Nordrheln Westfalen under B~rbel HCihn probably came, so far, closest to these demands. 
70 In a speech given by KOnast in July 2001 in London at the occasion of the international conference: 'Where 
next for European agriculture?" KOnast outlines her vision of the future for agriculture: "Let us visualize the 
year 2010. I don't know what your perspective is. I see myself relaxing on a farm holiday. What a lUXUry after 
ali these years of hard work as a minister for consumer protection, food and agriculture. I see myself visiting 
farms, which produce high-quality food and renewable raw materials. Farms which need a lot less chemical 
plant protection, less fertiiizer and less energy than today to produce wheat, barley or maize. Instead they 
apply Integrated or biological plant protection and modem agricultural engineering. I see bright friendly animal 
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of the "Agrarwende" reform pOlicies is the new orientation on consumer protection, 
something strongly indicated in the renaming of the ministry. As a novel approach, 
agricultural policy should be formulated from "the standpoint of the food counter" (Federal 
Government 2001:1). To quote KOnast: "consumer protection, full information about 
production methods and improved product quality are now the priorities" (KOnast 2002a). 
The minister's reasoning was that consumers had, after all, shown during the SSE crisis 
that they largely distrusted and disapproved of the practices under the conventional agri-
food policies. The focus on mass production and low food prices had become a problem-
causing policy approach and should, therefore, be replaced by quality production, which 
entails subjective and ethical criteria, such as animal welfare or environmental protection. 
The new "Agrarwende" policies should this way encourage sustainable land cultivation 
and food production and promote consumer choices towards quality products. 
Most importantly, the new ministry identifies organic farming as the most sustainable way 
of doing agriculture. In this sense the key element of reform is the support of organic 
farming and the increase in sales of organic products. As a policy goal it is aimed that 
within ten years the share of organic farming in land cultivation is to be increased by 20 
percent. 71 Another important element in the new farming strategy is switching the EU farm 
subsidies Germany receives towards less intensive farming (so-called modulation), this 
way directing public money to those who comply with the new agenda. Finally to give the 
policy goal of precautionary consumer protection some more teeth, a new Consumer 
houses, with pigs on straw and calves with their herd mates in spacious boxes, with hens In coops providing a 
lot of space or ranging freely outside. I visit farms producing energy from manure, straw and wood. I then walk 
through a countryside where fields and meadows alternate with trees, hedges and ponds, countryside with 
animal grazing. I am accompanied by a woman farmer, acting as a tourist guide, who explains to me the 
particular features of her village and region and who later invites me to her farmyard cafe. A farmyard cafe 
with home-baked cake and flour produced on the farm. During my walkabout with her I particularly enjoy 
seeing so many young people. Young and cheerful people who enjoy being in a village and getting to know 
how and where carrots grow, how milk is produced and that you can produce many tasty products like yogurt, 
cream or ice cream from milk. Before my departure I will provide myself with fresh vegetables, delectable fruits 
and tasty cheese from the farmer's farm shop, at best produced on the farm. This sounds like a sweet dream 
romantiCizing country life - with small farms everywhere and happy families and animals. Yes, but this is also 
what it could be like in the future, the nearer future if you want. And I am sure; many of us are ready to fight for 
landscapes and a society with agriculture playing a vital and healthy role" (Kunast 2001 b). 
71 Measures taken are, for instance, a new organic labeling scheme to enable consumers to make Informed 
choices, etc. 
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information law72 was to be introduced in order to strengthen the rights of the demand side 
in the food chain. 
The "Agrarwende" has become the most important result of the handling of the SSE crisis. 
For the new Minister .KOnast it was understood that only a fundamental reorientation of 
farm and food policies would be able to bring back trust and confidence in the safety and 
quality of the food people buy and eat. Yet "trust through change" (SMVEL 2001) aimed at 
nothing less than a quite radical restructuring of German agriculture. In a fundamental 
change in production philosophy, mass production should be geared towards 
environmentally sustainable and animal friendly quality production. The decision-making 
structure in agri-food policies, hitherto consisting of a small circle of lobbyists and 
administrators, should be opened up and made accessible to more affected groups. And 
finally market relations, hitherto mainly geared towards the interests of the big producers, 
should give priority to alternative production relations and consumer choices. 
KOnast made clear that there were a number of reasons for reorienting agricultural 
policies, not least because European and global agricultural policy shifts demanded a 
reinforced market orientation. For KOnast the new consumer oriented policies were far 
from "green romanticism" of which she had been frequently accused. Instead the minister 
stressed that these policies created the space for "quality competition" and provided 
opportunities for a development of new sources of income for farmers and regions 
(multifunctionality in farming) (KOnast 2002a). In this sense, as KOnast more and more 
stressed, consumer-oriented policies would be in the economic interests of farmers. 
"Class instead of mass" was to become a "competitive advantage in the struggle for 
market shares" (KOnast 2003). Thus in the wake of the "Agrarwende", consumer 
72 The new consumer information law Is aimed at improving the information rights of the consumer and the 
intervention rights of the authorities. For instance, to date only acute danger justifies the publication of names 
of products and producers violating food safety regulation. The law is to create the legal grounds for 
publication of names in all cases of non-compliance with food safety law. 
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protection - hitherto more considered to be a charitable factor in the hard reality of 
economics - became framed as a "Standort" advantage (KOnast 2002b, 2003).73 
6.1.4 "What are 'Agrarfabriken' anyway? There is no need for an Agrarwende" 
Although the shock of the BSE crisis was massive and spread throughout the political 
spectrum, not everyone agreed on the problem definition and the remedies to take in 
order to solve the crisis. For instance, Angela Merkel, opposition leader of the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) said in a response to the 'red-green' crisis interpretation: "Mr. 
Chancellor,' we have tried to find out what 'Agrarfabriken' really means, but we did not get 
an answer" (Merkel 2001). There was consensus to the point that the emergence of the 
animal disease had to be countered by radical measures, but to exploit this opportunity for 
fundamental reforms of the type proposed by the government was not found by all to be 
appropriate. However at the height of the crisis critics of the KOnast line were rather 
restrained. After all, in public polls 93 percent of Germans had spoken out in favour of a 
different, more ecologically oriented agriculture (S2 2001). Against this public and 
'published' mood, to speak out loudly against the "Agrarwende" would have come close to 
political suicide. 
In particular the National Farmer's Organization (DBV) had come under political attack. In 
his speech to the parliament, Schr5der explicitly singled out the farmer's representative 
body and its policies as one of the main crisis causing factors. For the farming lobby the 
SSE crisis, and the Food-and-Mouth Disease crisis that came shortly afterwards, became 
a traumatic event in many respects. The DBV not only had to deal with the economic 
hardship of its members, but also faced a full-fledged legitimacy crisis and was publicly 
pilloried.74 Yet, when the crisis slowly abated and beef consumption numbers returned to 
normal levels, critics of the "Agrarwende" started to line up more aggressively. In a speech 
73 In this respect KOnast quoted liberal economists, such as Adam Smith, to underscore the importance of 
consumer policies in capitalist markets: "Der Verbrauch ist das einzige Ziei und der einzige Zweck einer jeden 
Produktlon und das Interesse des Produzenten so lite nur soweit beachtet werden, wie es notwendig sein 
mag, das Verbraucherinteresse zu fordern" (Adam Smith 1776 quoted in Kunast 2003). 
74 indeed, the DBV talked of the BSE crisis as a "political breach in the dyke" and showed understanding for 
the new demands. As the DBV monthly publication put it: " ... we farmers need to be very cautious not to over-
stretch the societal consensus on production methods (Born 2000: 7). 
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at the national farmer's annual general meeting in July 2001 Gerd Sonnleitner, the 
president of the DBV, confidently claimed that German agriculture was not industrialized 
and Germany was in no need of an "Agrarwende" (Sonnleitner 2001 }.75 Instead, he 
accused Kunast of making the farmers scapegoats for the problems caused by BSE, of 
splitting the farmers into good ones ('class') and bad ones ('mass'), and in privileging a 
tiny minority of three percent of organic farmers while discriminating against the rest. Last 
but not least, in the farmer's community there was a wide-spread sense that with the new 
policies farmer's interests were being played off against consumer's interests (Matthiesen 
2002). 
In particular the plan to give organic agriculture such a prominent role in the change 
process prompted heated opposition. Many critics, including the agricultural academic 
elite76, denounced the new agricultural policy line as being based on a "lack of 
understanding of agricultural processes" and an "ignorance of economic parameters" 
while playing on unrealistic put popular ideas about an ideal agricultural world (FAZ 2001). 
If Germany was to follow such a precipitate policy line, so the tone, German farming would 
no longer be able to stand up in the "global competition for agricultural markets". Given 
this understanding, the DBV, and many of its supporters, concluded that the "Agrarwende" 
plans of the 'red-green' coalition government were not based on facts and realistic 
planning, but on a sentimental ideology (TAZ 2002}.77 
The agricultural elites were thus strongly outspoken against this propagated policy 
change. In the past these hegemonic social forces had successfully blocked off social 
demands on changing German agriculture (Schmidt/Jasper 2001). Only in 1999 at 
"Agenda 2000" negotiations on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Germany-
75 Kunast describes the hostile situation of the farmer's reunion in her book. Upon arrival she was greeted with 
boos and catcalls and there were posters with lines like: 'We farmers have survived wars and ransacking, we 
will survive the Green Party! Or others: "Green craziness will break the farmer's spine" (Kunast 2002: 96). 
76 In January 2001 33 professors of agronomy started an appeal against the policies of the Agrarwende (F AZ. 
2001). 
77 It is interesting to note that in this presentation the organic sector continues to be associated with the image 
of small-scale, backwards, green Ideology-driven farming. This is astonishing insofar as many of the former 
socialis! agricultural cooperatives (LPGs) in Eastern Germany had been turned into large-scale organic farms, 
clearly proving wrong such an unprofessional image. This critique can thus partly be understood as a 
discursive strategy. 
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represented by the social democratic Minister Funke - had delayed or prevented 
European activities that pointed toward more far reaching reforms.78 In addition, the 
possibilities and opportunities provided by the "Agenda" towards agricultural change (Le. 
towards the development of the organic sector) were hardly used, while in France or 
Great Britain they were (Ribbe 2001). In the same vein, in Germany considerations of 
consumer interests were delegated to the status of mere policy appendices (Barlosius 
1999: 218). More restrictive demands in terms of nature conservation friendlier agricultural 
practices failed because of resistance from agricultural interests (Tkalec 2001). All in all, 
while at the European level the BSE food safety crisis had long ago triggered a 
"democratization process", in Germany agricultural policy continued to remain the product 
of a narrow coalition of agro-economic interests (Grafe zu Baringdorf 2001: 27). 
And yet although there was no fundamental dispute over agricultural policy at the 
regulatory level, these ideas were not unchallenged in the past. Against the widespread 
claims of the DBV - as speaking for the German farmers79 - the farmer's scene and 
interests are far more heterogeneous than its representative body is willing to openly 
concede (Unabhangige Bauernstimme 2002). Support for the reform pOlicies is thus not 
only coming from the green/organic corners of the political spectrum but also from small 
family farming communities who are tired of the singular "grow or vanish" ("wachse oder 
weiche") dictum of agricultural growth policies of the past (Der Spiegef 2001: 26). These 
various opposition forces have in the" Agrarwende" policy come together in a new 
78 Franz Fischler, EU Commissioner on Agriculture. commenting on the German reform plans: "Ms Kanast Is 
very welcome. I welcome with open arms her plans to provide better and safer food for consumers (quoted in 
Der Spiegel 2001: 30). 
79 In fact, ninety percent of German farmers are members of the DBV. The DBV also represents organic 
farmers. The fact that almost all German farmers are members of the DBV has many practical reasons (e.g. 
membership Is quasi hereditary). This does not, however, mean that the association speaks for the Interests 
of all of them. In contrast, SchmldVJasper describe the DBV as a highly undemocratic, almost feudal 
institution. They assert that Interest congruence is rather existing between the farmer's elite, agri-business and 
civil servants, building a so-called "green front". The oppositional forces, however, have never managed to 
organize themselves (SchmidVJasper 2001). 
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coalition80, and, more importantly, they find in KOnast an agricultural minister who is 
pushing these hitherto marginalized interests to the fore.81 
6.2 The new GMO discourse 
·6.2.1 Cultivation program stopped; instead new rounds of talks 
Coincidentally, just at the time when the first SSE cases plunged the German agricultural 
and food system into chaos, negotiations on the GM cultivation programme - the 
"Schroder' initiative" - were due to be finalized (see Chapter five). After months of 
negotiations in the year 2000, the programme. was finally planned to start in spring 2001.82 
Ironically, the same Chancellor who had just passionately spoken out in favour of 
respecting consumer preferences in agricultural production was about to give an official 
go-ahead for a technological application to which the majority of German consumers 
strongly objected - the contradictions could not be more obvious. At the end of January, at 
the height of the SSE crisis, Chancellor Schroder cancelled his support for the 
programme. In a letter to industry, the Chancellor's Office justified the move as follows: 
"In society a rethinking about the foundations and conditions of food 
production has started to take hold. Only through a consumer-oriented 
reorientation in agricultural policies are we able to regain consumer 
confidence in food production. ( ... ) The government needs to reflect on 
whether and in what way the common initiative on agro-biotechnology 
could be brought to fit into the new policies" (quoted in DPA 2001). 
In the charged atmosphere of the SSE crisis, it was obviously considered not to be an 
opportune moment for a decision on such a highly controversial food ,issue. With the 
breakdown of the GM cultivation initiative, the task of politically handling GM food was 
passed from the Chancellor's Office to the Ministry of Consumer Protection because, as 
SchrOder declared, "agro-biotechnology has a lot to do with consumer protection" (quoted 
80 In October 2001 a new coalition formed consisting of environmental and nature conservation groups, 
agricultural groups, consumer protection and animal protection groups (Gemeinsame Plattform 2001) 
81 This does not mean that there Is no criticism from anti-mainstream/Green groups. For instance, Third World/ 
Developmental NGOs have warned of new forms of "Bio-protectionism" through the "Agrarwende" due to its 
emphasis on regional and high quality production (Vorholz 2001). 
82 For a protocol of the events, see: www.transgen.de 
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in Riewenherm 2001: 3). The new Minister KOnast was now in charge and promised to 
take up the issues. However, under KOnast, the whole programme received an entirely 
different spin. Instead of cultivation, KOnast initiated the "Diskurs grDne GentechniJ<', a 
public debate on agro-biotechnology to start in December 2001.83 Much to the 
disappointment and open critique of industry, the Diskurs was structured around open-
ended, wide-ranging expert/stakeholder talks on GM crops and the appropriate agro-
environmental and consumer choice criteria for their commercialisation. The cultivation 
plans were entirely abandoned. As further opposed to the previous "Chancellor-initiative", 
the new Green Party minister decided to widen participation, including basically all the 
stakeholders in the food chain, as well as various NGOs. To take account of the great 
concern among the public the Diskurs was widely documented on the Internet.84 
6.2.2 The case of GM maize "Artuis": an indication for GM policy change? 
Between the cancellation of the "Chancellor initiative" in January and the start of the 
Diskurs in December 2001, the direction that GM policy would eventually take was a 
matter of speculation. GM critical forces in particular were concerned that the cancellation 
of the "Chancellor initiative" was nothing but a clever PR campaign playing on the acute 
sentiments of anxious consumers, and no indication of a different policy approach 
(Riewenherm 2001). In the same vein, the fact that KOnast was endowed with political 
responsibility for GM food was regarded with great skepticism since the more politically 
sensitive area - GM crop approval - did not fall into her ministry's portfolio. Instead the 
approval procedure stayed with the RKI, which continued to belong to the Ministry of 
Health. This was, however, due to the resignation of Green Party Minister Fischer during 
the BSE crisis now under social democratic leadership. In the meantime, the Ministry of 
Health had started drafting a new GM law with the aim of transposing the EU Directive 
2001/18 on deliberate release into national law. According to insiders, this draft bill did not 
take account of any of the changes proclaimed by the government. It seemed that at the 
83 In German "green biotechnology" refers to GM technology In the area of plants and food. That is, the 
adjective "green" does not have anything to do with sustainability or environmental protection. 
84 www.transgen.de/diskurs 
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time the issue of agro-biotechnology was not an official priorit/5 and KOnast was too busy 
dealing with other subjects of the "Agrarwende".86 
However, in June 2001 the new Ministry of Consumer Protection (BMVEL) intervened in a 
seed approval procedure in the case of GM maize "Artuis" (T25) (in the case of seed, 
responsibility lies with the BMVEL). As a result of the intervention the approval decision 
was postponed on the basis of pending safety testing. Although there were no concrete 
health dangers brought forth, the ministry stated that, "out of precautionary consumer 
protection, approval should not be precipitated" (quoted in Transgen 2001). GM maize 
"Artius" had been granted full market approval as a GM plant in 1998 shortly before the 
European quasi-Moratorium. Austria, Italy and the UK subsequently stopped market 
approval out of safety concerns. "Artius" maize is mainly used as feed maize and not 
approved for food uses (only notified under Novel Food legislation in processed form). 
According to press sources the ministry intervened because it wanted to base approval on 
a novel food authorization in order to take account of unintended uses of the product 
(ibid.) This action, albeit criticized by many, inter alia the RKI (Michel 2001), was widely 
considered to take account of heightened consumer awareness in food safety questions 
as a result of the BSE and food-and-mouth-disease-phase in Germany. The seed 
company eventually pulled back its application in order to avoid legal and political 
quarrels. Instead it declared its readiness to "participate in an open and constructive 
dialogue for assessing the questions of agro-biotechnology" (quoted in TransGen 2001). 
85 Yet internal negotiations about a stakeholder conference on agro-blotech or some such were already going 
on. 
86 in fact in the first year (2001) of her post as a minister, KOnast brought about c'onslderable changes: Apart 
from measures dealing with SSE (banning meat and bone meal, introduction of broad-based SSE testing, and 
tightening of controls and sanctions In case of non-compliance) and later the food and mouth disease crisis, 
KOnast put much of her efforts into improving animal welfare. She introduced a new animal friendly hen 
legislation, which went far beyond the European Directive. She brought in legislation that introduced higher 
standards in pig farming, animal transport or environmental criteria for farm buildings. As a way of supporting 
organic products KOnast introduced a new organic labeling scheme and promotion programmes for organic 
agriculture and regional development. Another labeling quality scheme for conventional farm produce was 
planned. At the European level she spoke out In favour of strengthening the second pillar of the common 
agricultural policy and the introduction of modulation on the national level (cut direct payment to farms and 
channel It into rural areas) (Jasper 2001). 
113 
6.2.3 The framing of the new consumer protection biotech policy 
In critical circles expectations were running high that the changes in agricultural policy 
would also impact on the question of agro-biotechnology (Hofstetterrrhen 2001). The 
decision on GM maize "Artius", a case in which Greenpeace had forcefully lobbied against 
approval because of supposed risks for humans, was identified as being in the "right", new 
direction. In the case of "Artius" even the National Farmer's Organization - not known for 
being overly supportive of KOnast's new policy line - accepted the intervention, saying 
that the "SSE crisis has shown that we cannot produce without taking into account 
consumer's doubts" (quoted in Michel 2001). Likewise GM proponents feared that this 
could be the foretaste of a new "Agrarwende"-inspired GM policy line. 
And in fact, as further result of the SSE crisis a new way of conceiving of agro-
biotechnology applications was put forward by the Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food 
and Agriculture. The new biotech policy was framed around "Agrarwende" and 
"precautionary consumer protection", thus linking agro-biotechnology to the broader 
problematique of agriculture and food production. In the "Working plan on sustainable 
agriculture", a SMVEL position paper from September 2001, agro-biotechnology was 
mentioned as one of the leading factors - next to agro-chemicals, antibiotics and the lack 
of ethical criteria in animal use - in creating consumer anxiety and a potential loss in 
consumer confidence in agricultural products (SMVEL 2001). Drawing on the analogy 
between the problems of industrialized agriculture and GM crops, agro-biotechnology was 
thus portrayed as yet another paradigmatic example of agricultural and food production 
which was primarily directed towards serving the interests of producers rather than the 
consumers. 
Instead, in the new biotech discourse of the SMVEL and Minister KOnast "consumer trust" 
and the "freedom to choose" lay at the center of agro-biotechnology regulation. This new 
consumer protection/rights debate was set against the context of an advanced stage of 
GMO production worldwide and the necessity to react to these developments if a society 
was to safeguard the democratic right to choose. In principle, safeguarding the freedom to 
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choose meant to continue to be able to decide in favour of or against the consumption of 
GM products. In this sense, the debate drew on the rhetoric used in the Agricultural 
Ministry in the late 1990s.87 However, it was characteristic of this new" precautionary 
consumer protection" discourse that it meant something more fundamental than the 
freedom to consume or not to consume GM products - it was about future models of 
agriculture in general. Minister KOnast framed the question of agro-biotechnology as one 
of social preferences about what we eat, how we live and what structures (community 
farming or industrialized agriculture) we support, at a local or global level. The new 
"freedom of choice" discourse thus stressed options for agricultural systems and new 
market relations and the necessary societal decisions that needed to be taken in favour of 
one or the other. 
The novelty of this new "consumer choice" discourse is the role it affords to consumers. 
The "consumer as chooser" (Gabriel/Lang 1995) takes on responsibility in shaping 
production agendas and the transition to more sustainable development paths.88 To quote 
KOnast, "If we give consumers free choice, they can use their shopping basket as a vote 
for production methods that guarantee high quality, sustainability and animal welfare, if 
. they want to" (KOnast 2001 b). Yet in this new "consumer as citizen,,89 discourse the 
market place does not become a surrogate for public policies, stressed the Minister, 
because in order to make an 'informed' choice, there needs to be something to choose 
from and consumers need to be able to assess the quality of the foods on offer (KQnast 
2001a). This is where the state comes in, establishing the legal framework and 
information requirements and giving incentives for more sustainable production. 
Thus under KOnast agro-biotechnology became part of a consumer protection policy, 
which understood itself as a politically pushed strategy for sustainability (Reisch 2003). 
KOnast made no secret of the fact that agro-biotechnology did not fit into her new 
87 See, for instance, a BML publication from 1997 (BML 1997). 
88 The positive, almost Idealized picture of the consumer has often been criticized in the MAgrarwende" 
approach. The contradictory nature of consumer behaviour, which In most cases puts price ahead of quality 
even while arguing otherwise, would necessarily impinge upon the success of the AAgrarwende" (Vorholz 
2001a). 
89 That is, consumers as stewards for social and environmental aims. 
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preferred scenario of sustainable food production (KOnast 2002). She propagated 
alternatives, most of all organic agriculture as a role model for more sustainable forms of 
farming and quality food production. In her view, and given the problems in conventional 
agricultural production, new technologies needed to prove their contribution toward the 
goal of sustainable agricultural change. More importantly, new technological applications 
needed to stand the test with consumers and producers and their food/feed/seed choices. 
This way the market could decide if there was a future for GM crops and food. This 
"consumer choice" strategy allows then, in turn, support of mechanisms that empower the 
consumer so that his or her purchasing choices translate into the according market 
situation for GMO products. The complementary strategy was thus to support more 
pluralistic ways of farming and food production, some of which are GMO-free. This was 
the new "consumer choice" direction the KOnast line pushed for by the end of 2001, 
nationally, Europe-wide and globally. 
6.3 Explaining the 'trigger' for change 
In the following section, Hajer and Sabatier's approaches will again be used to look more 
analytically at the changes resulting from the SSE crisis. Key concepts of both authors will 
help in illuminating why SSE caused so much trouble and how the animal/food crisis could 
spread across subsystems to affect biotech policies. 
6.3.1 Discourse and story-lines as In Hajer 
To recall, for Hajer understanding policy processes means focusing our attention on the 
discursive practices that guide the perceptions of reality and that shape the construction of 
the policy problem. In particular, with his approach he claims to offer a new conceptual 
tool to grasp political transformations and to illuminate the time and space specific 
dynamics of change. One of the most important conceptual tools Hajer offers for change 
analysis is the story-line. Story-lines serve crucial functions in the process of change, such 
as the positioning of actors, the selection of knowledge and the creation of coalitions. 
These story-lines, however, are not looked at in Isolation but are set in a social and 
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historical context. Thus analyzing the reason and dynamic of change requires a detailed 
. contextual examination of the circumstances at play in a specific case. What are the 
discursive dynamics surrounding BSE? What do mad cows have to do with agro- . 
biotechnology? What are the mechanisms at play that produced the new particular reality? 
Using Hajer's analytical tools will provide deeper insights into the above narrative. 
The discursive interpretation of mad cows in Germany - the power of positioning 
How to understand the fact that an animal disease could have such a dramatic effect, 
causing a major economic and political crisis even affecting other regulatory sectors, such 
as agro-biotechnology? The narrative suggests that one of the main reasons for 
explaining the "SSE shock" was to be found in the discourses lead by government 
institutions and societal actors before the event and after. With the first homegrown case 
of a mad cow the myth o~ "SSE-free Germany" was recognized for what it was - a myth! 
SSE-infected cows were a reality in the German agricultural and food system. Yet what 
this meant, who to blame and what to do about it was not clear. It is this principal 
openness of 'the problem' that Hajer brings us to focus our attention. As mentioned earlier 
there were many interpretations of the event offered (e.g. the Chernobyl metaphor), and 
the government response was contradictory and hesitant. Within such a situation of 
radical consumer reactions, lack of orientation and need for explanation Chancellor 
Schroder took the lead in crisis management and interpretation. He put forth an 
interpretation of the event that combined many components of the public debate into a 
single pervasive metaphor: "Agrarfabriken,:9o 
The "Agrarfabriken" metaphor functioned as an important element in 'making sense' of the 
events. This way BSE was identified as a crisis in agricultural production for which the 
animal disease was an exemplary case of the normal, yet perverted logic of mass 
production and profit maximization. Speaking with the authority of the chancellor, 
90 The magazine Der Spiegel (2001a: 22) suggests as one possible factor In Schroeder reacting the way he 
did: "Finally, over Christmas, family man SchrOder began to realize why SSE would upset people's stomachs: 
in times of Christmas feasting nobody could sit at the tables without any worries. Everywhere they talked 
about the possible dangers lurking In their Christmas roast and sausages." 
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Schroder thus pushed an alternative reading of the event that was clearly positioning, 
assigning blame, trust and responsibilities. But more importantly, Schroder's framing 
struck a responsive chord in that it rang true with certain popular discourses in sOciety 
about 'the way things work' in food production and politics in general. The BSE framing 
picked up on such popular story-lines as "interest capturing in the agricultural and food 
industry", the "lack of trust in public institutions", or the "lack of control", all in all adding to 
the perception of continuous scandals and disturbing practices in the food sector and a 
political leadership that was complacent, or worse, full of lies about this. 91 With Hajer we 
could thus say that the way in which the political elite had discursively interpreted the 
event it confirmed and even reinforced public concerns. The almost daily increasing 
number of infected cows and the simultaneous appearance of the Food-and Mouth 
Disease only seemed to confirm the unpleasant diagnostic claims of Schroder's account. 
BSE was made into a big legitimacy crisis for the food and the political system, and the 
reading the political elite offered maximized demands for a policy response. The 
"Agrarwende", as a fundamental turn in agricultural and food policies, seemed to be a 
radical but coherent answer to the problem. 
The "Agrarwende" discourse and its impact on coalition-building 
The novelty of the "Agrarwende" is not so much its innovative elements per se as the 
manner in which it challenged the (cultural) practices of the German agro-food system. As 
the narrative showed, the German system seemed to be one of the most resistant ones in 
terms of 'greening agricultural production' and opening it up to interests other than the 
agro-industrial. Productionist practices in combination with narratives of a "social contract" 
between the agricultural system and the rest of SOCiety had in the past successfully 
managed to insulate agrarian polices from social demands (Hagedorn 1996).92 For these 
91 For a study giving an account of the numerous food scandals that happened in Germany during the 1990s, 
see (IFAV 2000). 
92 Hagedorn (1996: 429-449) describes this "social contracf as being built on the following elements: the 
agricultural system guarantees food provision, food safety, the maintenance of the agricultural land, 
environmental protection, broad spread of property rights, maintenance of small-and-medium sized 
companies, social stability and peace, and protection from communism. In exchange, society guarantees the 
equal social partiCipation of farmers In society. On the basis of such an agro-fundamentallst ideology, 
insulated political circuits could be built relatively independent from the political system. 
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forces the "Agrarwende" - and "Stadtgore" KOnast - was a dangerous counter-discourse 
and with its emphasis on consumer choice, new governance structures and the support of 
organic agriculture it was said to be coming close to a "cultural rupture" (Der Spiegel 
2001: 25) and a "revolution from above" (Ehrke 2001). As mentioned in the narrative, the 
"Agrarwende" plans resonated very strongly with the German public. The discourse of 
"Agrarwende" was thus empowering to the forces that had hitherto been marginalized, 
respectively non-present in German agricultural policy circles. Using the momentum of 
debate, the "Agrarwende" gave a new, legitimate focus to protest and on its broad 
linguistic basis - environmental protection, 9uality competition, consumer choice etc. - new 
coalitions of actors from various backgrounds (farmers, consumers, animal rights people, 
environmentalists) could be formed. 
Proof of the power and legitimacy of the discourse is also given when considering the 
highly emotional and hostile responses to it. As shown above, reputable agricultural 
research institutions were starting to campaign against it criticizing the "Agrarwende" 
rhetoric. They mis-represented the class/mass dichotomy - which KOnast introduced to 
seek support from conventional farmers interested in quality production - as separating 
conventional and organic farming, and they built up a discursive scenario of "green 
romanticism", In fact, some forces supporting the "Agrarwende" made a similar sounding 
criticism. They claimed that reforming the agro/food system was not primarily a question 
of organic and non-organic but of dismantling power relations within the food chain 
(AgrarbOndnis 2002).93 Given this multi-interpretability of terms and the specific use of 
interpretations favourable to ones political ends, the "Agrarwende" discourse reified a 
culturally and ideologically tainted clash between organic and conventional farming. The 
"Agrarwende" was thus not only creating space for new coalitions, but was equally 
unintentionally reproducing previous cleavages thus hindering broad-based support for 
93 Thus the AgrarbOndnls (2002) also criticizes KUnast for building up false oppositions. After all, the role 
model (LeitbiJd) of "bauerliche Landwlrtschaft" (meaning non-industrial, rather small-scale farming) to which 
they adhere Is not an exclusive organic affair (in fact this has been official policy of the DBV as well). 
Therefore, their critique focuses on the question of the power relations within the food chain and they criticize 
the "Agrarwendeft for not addressing these problems. The DBV has also shown elements of such a critique by 
blaming the retail sector for Its price dumping policies. 
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the reform efforts.94 As a result the "Agrarwende" discourse has politically strengthened 
the organic farming community at the same time as a polarization between organic and 
conventional farming has gained momentum (Dirscherl 2003).95 These effects are crucial 
for understanding the dynamic and the frictions in the new "consumer choice" and 
"coexistence" debate in biotech regulation. 
The revision of agro-biotechnology policy as a product of the "Agrarwende" 
discourse 
Using Hajer: BSE is a physical problem, but it is the story-lines that relate the animal 
disease to human action and present people with an understanding of the phenomena. 
Given the timely coincidence, and against the background of the BSE-Agrarfabriken-
producer-interests-Iinkage, the official GM discourse was put in an entirely different light. 
These specific linkages drawn by the political elite discredited the aims and means of 
conventional agricultural practices and policies. Yet more importantly, this rhetoric 
confirmed and legitimized public perception, where agro-biotechnology was framed in 
exactly these terms, within the context of high-tech, chemical-intensive farming associated 
with BSE, "turbo cows", "hormone veal", profit making interests and lax regulation (Renn 
2003).96 The connections drawn between BSE and the structural problems in agricultural 
production thus created a new discursive dynamic for GM policies. The new rhetoric 
confirmed the linking of agro-biotechnology, food production and farm practices; this very 
linking which proponents of agro-biotechnology have discredited and termed as irrelevant 
in biotech regulation for years. 
94 In her book KOnast takes up on this criticism saying that her communication strategy was unfortunate 
(KOnast 2002). In order to counter the critics, coming from both conventional farmers as well as from the small 
farms association (AbL), KOnast launched a "support programme for family farming ("Sauerliche 
Landwirtschaft") in January 2002. 
95 Pongratz (1992) emphasizes In his study on "Farmers and the ecological discourse" that farmers have 
shown not to have a dogmatic stance against organic farming as such. While environmentally inspired critics 
of conventional agriculture are viewed with skepticism and rejections, the alternatively producing colleagues 
are generally treated with respect. It is thus more in the public that the image of a clash between "organics' 
and conventional farmers is being upheld. 
96After all, the language German consumers heard from officials trying to quell public fears about SSE 
sounded identical to what was being said about agro-biotechnology: "there is no evidence of risks" or 
"concerns are based on speculation". 
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This new way of looking at the issue thus clearly undermined the official techno-scientific 
framing that was upheld in the past. The power of the "Agrarwende" discourse was such 
that the cancellation, respectively revision of the GM cUltivation programme became a 
credibility issue. Proclaiming consumer interests while pushing for biotech cultivation and 
commercialization was not a policy option given the timing and political climate. In the 
same vein propagating organic farming and aiming at increasing its percentage of the 
industry to unprecedented levels could hardly be reconciled with biotech development. 
The "Agrarwende" implied a need for a policy revision if the new policy goals were to be 
more than just hot air. In this particular situation, the handing over of the GM food issue to 
Minister KOnast, who at the time scored highest in popularity surveys, was a highly 
symbolic act. Being the sheer embodiment of change in every possible aspect, she was a 
very credible figure for revising agricultural biotechnology in the sense of consumer 
protection. 
The "Agrarwende" discourse and the power of "multi-Interpretability" 
According to Hajer the framing of a problem predefines the direction in which solutions are 
to be sought. In this sense, the discursive frame of the "Agrarwende" largely changed the 
strategy for action in GM policies in that it broadened the frame of reference of how to talk 
and think about agro-biotechnology in the official regulatory arena. As shown in the 
narrative the "Agrarwende" discourse was made up of many different story-lines, which 
according to Hajer makes it especially powerful, "the political power of a text does not 
derive from its consistency but comes from its multi-interpretability" (Hajer 1995: 61). In 
this sense the "Agrarwende" discourse was much more than just an ecological discourse. 
Rather it combined elements from a "green consumerism,,97 discourse, anti-industrial, 
, community-centered and gender critique, state interventionism, just as well as it used the 
liberal language of competition, consumer choice, "Standort advantage", or market 
orientation. In fact, KOnast's rhetoric was to be located somewhere in-between Jose 
97 In this discourse the transformatlve potential of consumption is predicted on changing and reorienting 
consumer values and habits towards quality products and quality production (process quality). 
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Bove98 ("global uniformity of taste") and Adam Smith ("the only aim of production is 
consumption"), and she quotes both authors equally in her texts. Against this background 
of framing, "consumer trust" and "the freedom of choice" is posed as the ultimate 
benchmark in GM policies, as a means to reconcile all these different interests at stake. 
This way this new multi-interpretable GM policy discourse signals concessions to every 
side of the political sphere. It approves of biotechnological 'innovations', if they are wished 
for by the consumer. But it equally shares the skepticism, if not rejection of biotechnology 
by conceding a GMO-free sphere. Minister KOnast, as a symbol, stood for both, not letting 
pro-GMO interests get off easily and not letting anti-GMO interests down. 
"Consumer choice" within precautionary consumer protection policies 
As shown in the narrative, the "consumer choice" debate framed within the "Agrarwende" 
discourse is very different from the one of the late 1 990s. Within this former framing 
consumer protection was to stand for the right to consume or not to consume GM 
products. Safeguarding the freedom of choice was a means to enhance consumer 
acceptance. The new "freedom of choice" debate, in contrast, is located within a new 
"precautionary consumer protection" policy. Within this policy, consumer choice goes 
beyond the narrow question of GMO or non-GMO. The new discourse aims at 
empowering consumers so that their choices are used to block or encourage specific 
paths' of agricultural or food innovations. Not to restrict people's choices through the 
introduction of biotechnology becomes a political risk issue because fundamental 
consumer rights (equals democratic rights) are at stake.99 Contrary to the 1990s, the new 
consumer choice debate is not just an adjunct to the environmental risk debate but is 
superceding it. Organic agriculture becomes not just a means to avoid GM food but turns 
into an overall vision for future sustainable farming. 
98 Jose Bove Is a French farmer, anti-globalization activist and founding member of the Confederation 
Paysanne, a French socialist-leaning family farmer's organization. It was an anti McDonalds action that 
brought him into the intemational spotlight in 1999. Bove has become a leading figure in the struggle against 
"mafbouffe" (junkfood) and globalization (Bove/Dufour 2001). 
99 It Is, for instance, very Interesting to see how the topic of GM-free food was considered in 1997 by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. In a FAQ section In a Ministry publication the question whether there would be GM-free 
food available in the future was bluntly answered with "Of course" (BML 1997), 
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Thus while the consumer choice rhetoric of KOnast was seemingly in line with a market 
based liberal approach, the strategy also alluded to non-market-liberal, broader 
considerations opening the debate for explicit disputes about the scientific/cultural 
meaning of "freedom of choice" or the desirability of certain developments. In this sense 
the "Agrarwende"-triggered choice discourse could not longer be contained within the 
conventional scientific/technocratic framing of biotechnology in Germany but it re-
politicized the debate. KOnast's specific account of "freedom of choice" could therefore be 
understood as a kind of "incremental radicalism" (Torgerson 1995) - it accepts the 
confines of the established liberal debates ~hile trying to reclaim societal space over the 
market sphere. 
6.3.2 Beliefs systems and policy change in Sabatier 
The narrative will now be subjected to Sabatier's approach. How can one understand the 
change in developments from an ACF point of view? Can Sabatier's theory help in better 
understanding the process of change? For Sabatier policy change and developmental 
dynamics are explained by either belief system change or through external factors. As 
seen in the narrative policy change has occurred, in fact, according to Sabatier's 
distinction, major policy change has occurred as there is change in the policy core aspects 
of a governmental programme. Recalling the belief system tables introduced in Chapter 
four, it was stated that beliefs of belief system one "innovation and Standort" dominated 
the regulatory approach and practices to biotechnology in the 1990s. Even taking into 
account the tensions that existed within the different ministries (BMBF, BML, BMU) 
concerning biotechnology, one could say that the official policy approach brought forth by 
the BMVEL in 2001 stands in considerable contrast to the policy core beliefs which were 
dominant in the prior policy approach. The beliefs "biotechnology is useful and will help 
solving problems and addressing needs" or "excessive state regulation is inhibiting market 
forces" both are clearly not underlying the newly proposed regulatory approach of the 'red-
green' government. This approach is rather inspired by belief system two "Risks therefore 
alternatives", where beliefs such as "biotech does not serve societal needs" and "state 
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regulation is needed and alternative markets need to be created" are leading the policy 
rationale. Therefore change has occurred, but how can it be explained? 
SSE· "external shocks" and the role of belief systems 
According to Sabatier, governmental programmes are unlikely to be significantly revised 
as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the programme remains in 
power (Sabatier 1998). Indeed it has been seen that a major external event, such as a 
change in the governing coalition, occurred, however this change was in the year 1998. 
As shown in the transition narrative in Chapter five, there were developments within the 
two year 'red-green' governing period that were challenging conventional practices and 
beliefs in biotech regulation, however, the overall programme as such was not revised. 
The change in the governing coalition, even though importing conflicting policy core 
beliefs, was not a sufficient cause of major change. 
According to Sabatier, the only way to bring about changes in the policy core aspects of a 
governmental programme is through some shock originating outside the subsystem (ibid.). 
In the narrative it was argued that the decisive 'trigger' for change is seen in the SSE 
crisis in the year 2000. It could be reasonably argued that the SSE crisis qualifies as such 
an external shock because SSE had led to an unprecedented consumer crisis with 
significant repercussions in the political and economic system. However, we could see 
that the 'necessary' measures to be taken were subject to different interpretations. Using 
Sabatier's idea of belief systems as interpreting lenses (thereby again relativizing the 
'external shock' hypothesis), we could say that these 'facts', i.e. SSE infected cows or 
falling beef consumption, were being interpreted against the background of specific 
beliefs. If SSE is interpreted against the background of the beliefs held by the dominant 
agro-industrial coalition, it appears to be an anomaly, a severe problem that arose but 
which can be fixed when implementing changes to the structures - but not the principles -
of the system (change in secondary aspects). Thus SSE had shaken the industry but it 
had not really triggered a change in beliefs, hence an "Agrarwende" was not necessary. 
However, against belief systems that question the rationale of productivist agriculture, the 
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BSE crisis confirms and reinforces specific anti-industrial worldviews and policy core 
beliefs. Seen from this latter belief perspective, the "Agrarwende" was a logical 
consequence of the SSE crisis. 
But whose beliefs were to count as a basis for action? After all, the decision to radically 
change policies and to have an "Agrarwende" marks a huge difference to former food 
safety scandals. More importantly, the decision was taken by a coalition government that 
had obviously largely continued the agrarian policies of the former liberal conservative 
government.100 How can this change be explained? When considering the effects to the 
system it may first be necessary to include the public reaction in the subsystem analysis 
(according to Sabatier the public plays no active part in a policy subsystem but is rather 
an 'external event'). The consumer boycott could be more than a fickle response to a 
perceived health risk, instead revealing deeply held - or at least publicly expressed -
beliefs of public distrust in both the food system and political leadership. The SPD Minister 
Funke, and the belief systems that he represented, had been politically cornered and their 
ability to solve the crisis strongly questioned. Consumer and environmental factions within 
the SPD party were in turn strengthened (interview green parliamentary party 06/03). 
Facing a major political crisis, the SPD Party's "will to stay in power" made them ready for 
concessions, for example by installing a Green Party member as minister. The Green 
Party strongly supported the "Agrarwende" and had, with its Green Party Agricultural 
Minister Hahn in the state of Nordrhein Westfalen, credible reform expertise at its 
disposal.101 As a clear advocate for sustainability in agriculture, the BSE crisis and its 
public interpretation provided a unique opportunity to promote green policy preferences, to 
'show profile' and to greatly increase the power of the junior partner in the coalition 
government. Thus, in Sabatier's terms we could say the SSE crisis provided a "window of 
opportunity" for major policy change and that this opportunity was skillfully exploited by 
proponents of such change. 
100 As the narrative showed the 'red-green' government had supported the old agrarian policy line up until the 
BSE crisis. In staying with the tradition of the farmer's ministry the minister chosen (Funke) was a farmer and 
member of the DBV. 
101 See footnote 10. 
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BSE-agro-biotech linkage and the role of beliefs 
With the "Agrarwende" the practices in the agricultural system, based on beliefs such as 
economies of scale, production subsidies, cost-efficiency etc. were replaced by policy 
core beliefs in sustainable production, animal protection and consumer protection. Yet the 
SSE crisis occurred in the food and agricultural subsystem, or more precisely in animal 
production. This policy subsystem is not identical to the biotechnology/innovation 
subsystem but they overlap with each other. According to Sabatier, subsystems are only 
partially autonomous and decisions in one subsystem can affect dynamics in another. 
BSE has problematized and reinforced this connection, but the ACF would not understand 
these linkages as being discursively created. More important for the ACF analysis may be 
that the German BSE crisis coincided 'physically' with the promotion of biotechnology (in 
the "Chancellor Initiative") and that actors that are part of both subsystems, such as 
farmers, politicians, consumers, environmentalists were concerned. 
Chancellor SchrOder, as a supporter of the "Standort" rhetoric and a representative of 
belief system one, obviously felt compelled to step back and open the biotech policies to 
the changes required by the "Agrarwende". Why was that the case? It could be asked 
whether SchrOder actually reexamined his policy core beliefs and acknowledged 
erroneous assumptions about agro-biotech? Or one could speculate that what was seen 
was a mere change in strategy, giving in to popular demands ('pull back now to come 
back later') under the current difficult circumstances. The cancellation of the programme, 
or the shifting of GM food responsibility to the KOnast Ministry would then be nothing but a 
"strategic retreat" (Sabatier 1993: 43); The newly framed GM poliCies a mere side-effect, 
born in the exceptional circumstances in times of crisis. 
In any case, the new, if only by necessity, rhetoric confirmed the linking of specific ideas 
and issue areas, that is, of agro-biotech and the question of food production and farm 
practices. SchrOder's move was thus (in)directly (unintentionally) weakening the 
"innovation and Standort" advocacy coalition while simultaneously strengthening the 
"alternatives" coalition. The playing field for biotech pOlicies had been inevitably widened. 
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Or, with the language of Sabatier, we could say that the "basic attributes of the problem 
area" had changed. The focus shifted from technology to agriculture and food. Thus, 
contrary to Sabatier, who considers the basic attribute of the policy problem to be a 
relatively stable external parameter, this attribute had changed in the wake of the BSE 
crisis, with significant consequences for further policy developments. 
Minister Kunast and the BMVEL: an example of a policy broker? 
According to the ACF, coalitions confronted with opportunities will take advantage of new 
situations of power. KOnast, as a definite representative of belief system two 
"alternatives", is interested in pushing the issue of agro-biotechnology away from the 
narrow considerations of biophysical effects to an area of broader concerns in the food 
and agricultural system. In this sense KOnast can be taken as acting as a clear advocate 
for GM restrictive regulation and the development of alternatives. However, as described 
in the narrative, KOnast's aim was also to find a working compromise between the 
antagonistic camps - a role, which, according to the ACF, is rather played by the "policy 
broker" (to recall, the broker mediates between conflicting strategies from various 
coalitions to find a compromise and to reduce conflict). As a political pragmatist, knowing 
that "GMOs are reality" she, and parts of the BMVEL, sized the opportunity to introduce 
and promote a new policy frame which could be sensitive to the beliefs and interests of 
both opposing coalitions. But could she and her ministry be both broker and advocate at 
the same time? For the ACF, this dual role seems difficult to accommodate.102 
In the narrative there was a description of the (unintended) polarizing effects that the 
"Agrarwende" triggered, however, if we focus on the brokering role of the new frame one 
could argue the following. Taking once again the coalition partners themselves as an 
exemplary case of the belief conflict in the subsystem, we saw in Chapter five that the 
coalition partners had no ground for a common policy. The Green Party continued to 
reject biotechnology on the grounds of "uncertainty" and "genetic pollution" and the SPD 
Party supported the development of biotechnology as a means to modernize the country 
102 This Is also one of the major criticisms from Hajer on the ACF (HaJer 1995: 69-70). 
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and to keep the "Standort". In Chapter five it was mentioned that by the end of the 1990s, 
there were doubts raised within the Green Party as to the feasibility of continued 
fundamental opposition to biotech. As members of government they needed a more 
'constructive' biotech policy approach.103 The SPD largely supported the "Standort" 
rhetoric, but there were other, more critical voices in the party, who gained considerably in 
standing due to the SSE crisis. Hence in 2001 for both parties the continuation of their 
original policy stance had become unacceptable, albeit for different reasons. In this sense, 
KGnast, as policy broker, could be understood as launching a compromise programme, 
which offered a "win-win solution" (Sabatier 1998: 119) to the involved antagonistic 
advocacy coalitions. 
Conclusion 
Why did GM policy change as a result of the BSE crisis? 
The DCF placed the analytical focus on the structure of the discursive field, which is 
understood as being determinative in the interpretation of the 'event' and the appropriate 
solutions. In this sense, the denial of the problem ("SSE-free Germany"), the deep 
mistrust in the agri-food system and the specific reading of the event (SSE = 
'Agrarfabriken') positioned actors and assigned blame, trust and responsibility. The 
emergence of SSE in Germany, understood through a discourse of "Agrarfabriken", 
caused a fundamental shift in meaning of what the food safety scandal was all about - not 
just an animal disease, but a crisis of the productivist model and the political system. 
Against this background, changing policy became a credibility issue, and trust could only 
be restored by resorting to radical measures, such as the new "Agrarwende" policies, and 
by placing people perceived as having honesty and integrity in key positions, for example 
KGnast. 
103 For instance, in the wake of the BSE crisis the council of the Green Party had Issued a statement 
supporting the "Agrarwende". In the statement biotechnology was rejected, but not primarily on environmental 
grounds but for protecting consumer and agricultural options (B'90/GrOne 2000). 
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This interpretation of the event and the remedies proposed created compelling discursive 
dynamics for GM policies and forcefully undermined the techno-scientific framing of its 
protagonists. New precautionary consumer policies had broadened the confines of the 
debate as the GM discourse became enmeshed in discussions on consumer interests, 
food production and farm practices. Lastly, the new "Agrarwende" and consumer choice 
discourse showed the power of multi-interpretability, that is, of a discourse based on a 
variety of different story-lines able to potentially reconcile various interests and beliefs and 
to foster a newly emerging coalition. To sum up from the DCF pOint of view, the initial 
effects of the SSE crisis can be explained with the structure of the discursive field. 
"Agrarwende" as a response was so powerful because it "fit" the situation, was multi-
interpretable and created new situations of trust. Most importantly for the biotech 
subsystem, "Agrarwende" radically restructured the field of arguments and thus opened 
the way for policy change. 
According to Sabatier major policy change, that is, change to the core aspect of a 
governing programme, can occur only as a result of an 'external event', The SSE crisis 
was identified as one such major event outside the subsystem, which triggered major 
policy change, Yet "Agrarwende" or just reforms - the crisis obviously resonated differently 
with different belief systems in the agricultural subsystem. Thus countervailing 
interpretations of what were the correct lessons to draw from SSE once again put into 
question the proclaimed determinate character of exogenous factors and pointed to other 
dimensions to be taken into account in the subsystem. In order to explain the impetus for 
major policy change, publicly held beliefs about food production needed to be drawn into 
the analysis. SSE was a major public crisis of confidence and as such required drastic 
measures. It is in this way that it undermined political support for the majority coalition and 
provided a "window of opportunity" to promote alternative green policy preferences and 
beliefs within the government. 
The narrative also points to the strategic dimension in the advocacy policy process. SSE 
has reinforced the linkages between the overlapping subsystems, innovation and 
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agriculture, because of its collision with the "Chancellor Initiative" and 
relationships/interests of actors that are part of both subsystems. Canceling the cultivation 
programme and installing KOnast was a strategic act, yet with the unintended 
consequence of weakening the political influence of those belief systems, which had an 
interest in the development of the technology. This new power balance between the 
coalitions allows the new advocacies in power to launch new strategies in order to 
promote their goals, albeit now framed in a more encompassing, flexible way. To sum up 
for the ACF, policy change is mostly regarded as a result of 'external events', strategic 
behaviour and unintended consequences. SSE triggered major policy change not 
because of altered policy core beliefs but because the majority coalition was discredited 
and the minority advocacy coalition could augment its importance in the policy subsystem. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7. The year 2002: Biotech or "Agrarwende"? The "Diskurs griine Gentechnik" 
This chapter will continue the narrative and trace the developments that followed the SSE 
crisis. We have seen that the SSE crisis had a radical impact on both the way in which the 
GM issue was framed, and the conflict solution proposed by the new SMVEL. In 2001 one 
is faced with a new official direction in GM policies, underlain by different values and 
beliefs. This chapter will look at how the story evolves from that point. It will focus on the 
period between the end of 2001 and the end of 2002. The most important event in the 
subsystem is the "Diskurs grDne Gentechnik", an expert/stakeholder debate on agro-
biotechnology organized by the new Ministry of Consumer Protection, Food and 
Agriculture (SMVEL). In analyzing the Diskurs the following questions will be addressed: 
What is the impact of the new framing of biotechnology in terms of "consumer choice" and 
"Agrarwende" on the policy subsystem? How does this new policy language affect the 
scene, the actors, coalitions and their story-lines? After all, the new policy line has at that 
point not yet become institutionalized. How does the new policy line relate to the old 
(hegemonic) frames and how do these respective coalitions behave? Finally, in 
anticipation of one of the results, how did coexistence emerge as a major topic in biotech 
regulation in Germany? Using Hajer's and Saba tier's frameworks, the chapter will show 
how the dynamic of the developments could be explained and illuminated by the 
respective approaches. 
7.1 Policy narratives during the "Diskurs griine Gentechnik", 
7 .1.1 The Diskurs: "Coalitions in action" 
A change of direction in agricultural policies and a change in the political approach 
towards GM crop regulation characterize the post-SSE phase in Germany. As mentioned 
earlier, instead of the proposed three-year cultivation programme, Minister KOnast initiated 
the Diskurs grDne Gentechnik in December 2001. The Diskurs was the first federal forum 
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on agro-biotechnology of its kind in Germany and brought together over 53 experts and 
the whole range of stakeholders (over 30 groups) involved in GM crop politics. 104 The 
declared aim of the Diskurs was to bring together national and international expertise in 
order to assess the developments in research and application in the field of agro-
biotechnology and to provide the basis for the government to transpose EU legislature into 
a new national law (KOnast 2001c). As opposed to the previous "Chancellor-initiative", the 
new Minister decided to widen participation to include basically all members of the food 
chain and various NGOs (Annex 3). 
Against the background of new agricultural policies, it was the political intention of the 
BMVEL to strengthen the areas of consumer protection and organic agriculture in biotech 
regulation, resulting in a slight over-representation of these groups (Hammerbacher 
2003). This way new groups were entering the field of discourse, groups that had 
previously not been part of, or were latent actors, in the biotechnology subsystem. Yet not 
only was the spectrum of stakeholders different to any official debate held on the subject 
in former years, but also with respect to the themes discussed, the Diskurs was quite a 
novelty. The Diskurs debates were structured around general and fundamental issues 
regarding GM crops, yet newly including the question of alternative non-GM options. The 
context of a growing application of the technology and European regulatory demands 
notwithstanding, the Diskurs was strongly thematically linked to the public controversy 
about new agricultural policies and consumer choice. As KOnast stated in her opening 
speech: 
"The two things are clear: 
1. Consumers need to be protected. For regulators this implies to 
guarantee the freedom to choose between GM and non-GM food. This is 
a fundamental tenet with which we have to deal. 
104 The BMVEL also considered the participation of medical doctors and school teachers as "multiplicators of 
social life" contributing to public opinion formation. However, according to the moderation report, participation 
failed because of a lack organization and representation on the parts of these groups (Hammerbacher 2003: 
14). 
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2. At the same time we need to have regulation which can be upheld in 
the European and global context. Of course, the German economy and 
agricultural production need to be seen against the background of global 
agrarian markets" (KOnast 2001 c). 
In the extremely polarized political landscape of the German biotech scene the various 
stakeholders perceived the initiative of the Diskurs in different ways. A commonly held 
opinion amongst participants was that the government was using the Diskurs to put off 
taking decisions before national elections in September 2002. However, a more general 
divide between the participants was reflected in the hopes and expectations concerning 
the Diskurs' rationale and results. The new agricultural Minister KOnast, as Green Party 
member and advocate of green issues, sent out ambivalent signals regarding her stance 
on the GMO issues: 
On the one hand KOnast openly considered GMOs as a "fait accompli" meaning 
something that had to be dealt with and possibly contained but which could no longer be 
ignored. In her opening speech she said: 
"I know for sure that a lot of food items already contain GMOs or are 
produced with the use of GMOs. There are estimates that 60 to 70% of 
our food is affected in one way or another by biotechnological 
applications" (ibid.). 
A brokering around the issues of separating distances, thresholds, labeling and post. 
release monitoring suggested that she had basically accepted the status quo of post· 
Moratorium releases. Industry, although disappointed about the halting of the cultivation 
programme and suspicious of the new political leadership, took the initiative as a sign of 
opening and "acceptance of realities" and hoped for a "fact·based consensus" on 
biotechnology development. The environmental NGOs saw therein a possible risk of the 
debate, in that it contributed to an acceptance and normalization of GMOs. 
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On the other hand, KOnast initiated a debate that dealt with issues that were so 
fundamental, the safety question, the question of benefits and agricultural options, that it 
conveyed the impression that "opting out" might still be an issue. KOnast went on to say: 
"The Diskurs is about a societal assessment of the norms and values in 
food production ... [ ... ]. Of central importance to me is the assessment of 
benefits and the possibility of control of technological developments" 
(ibid.). 
This way the Minister nurtured the hopes in the critic's camp for, if not a definite ban, then 
an at least precaution-and consumer based restrictive practice for GMOs, a scenario 
which was off-putting for industry. 
From the outset, the Diskurs was fundamentally divided between those that discussed the 
question of whether GM crop technology should be allowed to proceed and those for 
whom this was no longer a question and who were more interested in the question of how 
and under what circumstances to proceed. Yet the fact that the Diskurs was organized by 
the new BMVEL rather than an independent institution, and was thus closely connected to 
the pivotal decision-makers, made the event strategically important and participation of 
interest to both sides of the debate.105 
Unsurprisingly the procedures and themes to be discussed were highly controversial. This 
was reflected in the themes put forth for discussion. In order to provide equal opportunity 
for placing subjects, experts and themes, a Steering Committee, staffed on the basis of 
proportional representation, was put in place. 
Box 2: Five Diskurs Rounds: Start May 2002, final results In September 2002. 
First Round: The preservation of biodiversity. Agro-biotechnology and its effects on 
biodiversity. 
Second Round: Innovation potentials and future perspectives of agro-biotechnology. 
Varying opinions. 
105 The fine-tuning and organizational work was done by an external moderation team, called 
"Hammerbacher'. 
134 
Third Round: Benefits and risks for consumers and producers. Health, safety and food 
security -with or without agro-biotechnology? 
Fourth Round: Preconditions, chances and consequences in opting out of agro-
biotechnology. Is opting-out a possibility? 
Fifth Round: Information, public participation and consumer choice. Creating transparency 
and public participation. 
The dynamics and results of the Diskurs substantially influenced the interaction between 
stakeholders and the development of the public debate. The following narrative will focus 
on the main themes, the interactive process and the development of the coalition 
landscape during the Diskurs. 106 
7.1.2 "Recognizing science and facts" versus asking for more and different science 
The aim of the Diskurs was to bring together national and international expertise in order 
to assess the developments in research and application in the field of agro-biotechnology. 
However, this fundamental question of "the status of knowledge" proved to be highly 
controversial. This issue came up right at the beginning, in the selection of experts to 
report on the various issues. The opponents of biotechnology demanded that all expert 
positions should be staffed on the basis of pro-contra proportional representation. The 
biotech proponents, however, were against this proposition on the grounds that they 
considered that there was no longer any question on the technology's safety 
(Hammerbacher 2003).107 In order to prevent a stalemate an agreement was eventually 
reached on the pro-contra proportional approach towards selecting experts. Throughout 
the Diskurs, biotech proponents claimed that agricultural biotechnology had for many 
years been subject to continuous scientific testing worldwide and that GM crops had been 
successfully cultivated in many parts of the world. "It is important to recognize that 
agricultural biotechnology is a global fact" was thus the leading line in the proponent's 
106 The Diskurs will not be analyzed In all Its details as this would be beyond the scope and Intention of this 
thesis. For instance, the thesis will not look at the Diskurs subject of participation and conflict resolution, which 
was discussed in the last session. 
107 This was also a big issue with respect to the "Diskurs Reader". This 128 page publication containing "basic 
Information" about the subject was cross-read by a representative of each of the opposing camps 
(Hammerbacher 2002). 
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camp (Warenkette 2003). The state of the technology's safety and its increasing 
acceptance (suggesting the latter as being an indicator for the former) needed to be 
recognized. This however was, in their understanding, not the case during the Diskurs. 
Hence they criticized the debate for not being "sufficiently based on science and facts" but 
instead undermined by partisan interests (for example, DFG/DAF 2002). 
In contrast to the reasoning of the biotech proponents stands the debate of the biotech 
critics. They claimed that the state of knowledge about the technology was insufficient and 
that there was a fundamental uncertainty about systemic - ecological and social- effects. 
Moreover biotech opponents did not accept that there was any "compelling, self-evident 
reality" with respect to the usage and spread of the technology. lOB Against the sense of 
ubiquity it was, for instance, argued that ninety percent of GMO cultivation was 
concentrated in just three countries. Thus while the GMO proponents introduced expertise 
that verified their "science-based" claims with respect to the technology's safety, the 
status of its application (Jacobsen 2001; Jany 2002) or the innovative potential 
(Sonnewald 2002; Friedt 2002) the opponents did likewise and introduced evidence that 
showed a different, more "uncertainty-based" picture of the situation (Tappeser 2001; 
Steinbrecher 2002; van Aken 2002). During the course of the debate the question of 
science/facts versus values and judgements and their relevance was a constant paint of 
friction between the protagonists. Both sides equally accused the other of being biased 
and there was no agreement on the methods, the use of the precautionary principle, let 
alone the value priorities (Hammerbacher 2003). The debate thus dealt with classic topics 
and well-known arguments about risks and opportunities of biotech but was soon to move 
to new thematic grounds implying new linkages of old and new topics. 
108 These arguments between "GMOs are everywhere" versus "GMOs are hardly anywhere" are therefore 
subject to strategic argumentation. Depending on how one classifies and defines the presence of GMOs or 
the involvement of the technology, be it based on old labeling laws, new labeling laws or even beyond that (for 
Instance, Including meat, eggs etc. produced with GM feed or contamination thresholds beyond official ones) 
there are wholly different but legitimate judgements possible. Of course, these, at times highly specific, legal 
expert differentiations and selective representations are hardly publicly communicable thus contributing to 
ever more public confusion on the state of the subject. 
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7.1.3 Biodiversity, the question of plant breeding and natural areas 
One of the classic topics to be discussed in the Diskurs - and the theme that started the 
sessions - was the question of environmental hazard and danger. Newly labeled as 
"preservation of biodiversity", the 'old question' of what counts as ecological damage, was 
placed on the Diskurs agenda by biotech critics. Does biotechnology have a negative 
impact on biodiversity and how to measure and judge the impact in the first place, so the 
questions asked. Alongside the problematique on wild-flora and fauna biodiversity, the 
subject of in-farm biodiversity was discussed. Here the issue was whether agro-
biotechnology would lead to a reduction in seed variety or in-field biodiversity . 
. , 
Unsurprisingly the Diskurs offered the whole spectrum of answers. The proponents of 
agro-biotechnology argued that the reduction of biodiversity was a natural process, which 
started when humans began to practice agriculture and animal husbandry (von Brook 
2002). They argued that there was no indication for concerns that biotechnological 
methods would lead to a greater reduction of biodiversity and, if anything, modern plant 
breeding, and as such biotechnology, increased the diversity in agricultural crops and had 
a positive effect on in-field biodiversity (ibid.). In stark contrast to this assessment, biotech 
critics pointed to the complexity of eco-systemic relationships, irreversibility and scientific 
uncertainty in judging the effects of GM crops on biodiversity (Gaugitsch 2002; Klopffer 
2002). As they feared negative effects in terms of increased genetic homogeneity in farm 
crops and a reduction in wildlife fauna and flora, they argued instead for a precautionary 
approach, in terms of more rigorous risk assessments, including the possibility to reject 
certain applications of GMOs. 
During the Diskurs these fundamental differences between the respective coalitions could 
not be settled. Interestingly, the debate on biodiversity led to a more basic discussion on 
whether natural and cultural spaces could exist and develop side-by-side and, more 
concretely, whether different forms of land cultivation could be practiced alongside one 
another. By the end it had been agreed that the preservation of biodiversity was an 
important element to be considered in risk judgement. The decision on the accepted level 
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of interference in biodiversity, both in the field and in natural areas, was declared to be a 
societal one (BMVEL 2003). 
7.1.4 Promoting biotech versus "reclaiming innovations" 
The aim of the Diskurs was to broadly discuss the potentials and pitfalls of biotechnology 
and its alternatives. One big theme of the Diskurs was the question of "innovation 
potentials and future perspectives in agro-biotechnology" - a topic placed by biotech 
proponents and used to promote the well-established discourse on the "Standort" and 
'innovation'. The arguments that biotechnology represented a "key technology" and that 
biotechnology could contribute to Germany's attractiveness as a business location were 
resurfacing. The respective experts brought forth evidence that agro-biotech did indeed 
create employment (Frauen 2002) and that the technology had a lot of future potential, 
especially with respect to second generation crops 109, as these would quickly produce 
consumer benefits and offered options in the field of renewable energy sources or 
pharmaceutical products (Sonnewald 2002). At the same time, experts brought in by 
biotech opponents were countering the evidence put forward by GMO proponents, 
questioning the hypothetical nature of job creation, future benefits or the safety of 
pharmaceutical crops (van Aken 2002; Dolata 2001). 
Up to this pOint, the arguments were rather well known and frequently exchanged. 
However, when it came to the question of crop innovation and agriculture, where there 
was a direct confrontation between biotech plant breeding and organic breeding, the 
question on innovation was brought into a different discourse. The organic farming expert 
claimed that "the discussion on jobs and innovation was too closely linked to big industry" 
(Fried/Niggli 2002: 2) and that what had so far been neglected was the "innovative 
potential of organic farming and research" (Niggli 2002) thus bringing a long-standing 
claim of biotech critics into the official debate. Against the background of the 
"Agrarwende" environmental groups, together with the organic movement, demanded a 
109 The term ·second generation crops" refers to transgenic crops that are not geared towards Improving the 
agronomic properties (e.g. herbicide resistance) but rather the nutritional or health value of the crop (e.g. 
"Golden Rice"). 
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change in research priorities, a "Forschungswende", as a logical result of new agricultural 
policies and a promotion of organic farming (Cko-Institut 2002). Moreover, the discussion 
on innovation was turned into a debate on different approaches towards developing 
solutions to agricultural problems, rather than a debate on agro-biotech per se. As a result 
of this discussion - and so stated as a result of the Diskurs - participants agreed that 
conventional plant breeding had a lot to offer and that its potentials needed to be 
developed. Likewise, it was agreed that knowledge about molecular genetics was equally 
useful for both approaches, however, where to draw the line between 'good' and 'bad' 
biotechnology was now under dispute (SMVEL 2003). 
7.1.5 Sustainable agriculture and food production -with or without biotech? 
As shown above, with the SSE-crisis a new light had been cast on the question of 
sustainability in agricultural and food practices in Germany. The discussion over 
alternatives to intensive farming in relation to biotechnology is not new to the German GM-
controversy. Already in 1993, in the framework of the "wzs technology assessment 
procedure on herbicide-resistant crops", the dispute over which form of agriculture should 
be developed was identified as "the real core of political disagreement over transgenic 
herbicide-resistant crops" (van den Daele et al. 1997: 80). However, at the time the 
demand for broadening the frame of reference to include the debate on alternatives was 
dismissed. In the meantime these discussions had been mostly confined to the margins of 
the controversy. As the Diskurs posed the question of biotech regulation against the 
background of new agricultural policies and consumer choice, and given the special 
attention toward organic farmers and consumer groups, the theme of sustainable 
agriculture and biotechnology thus featured prominently in the Diskurs. 
In the past the discussion on the subject of sustainability and biotechnology had been 
multifaceted. On the critic's side, the discussion ranged from demands such as that GM 
crops should be measured against higher environmental standards than their conventional 
counterparts, to more radical claims, such as that sustainability and biotechnology were 
intrinsically incompatible. The other side covered a similar spectrum, from arguments such 
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as demanding higher standards for GM crops was discriminatory, to claims that 
biotechnology was the key to sustainability in agriculture. Post-SSE, these accounts have 
found increasing use in the German debate, but with new twists. 
During the Diskurs, the problE~matique of sustainability and biotechnological agricultural 
methods was pushed with great effort by biotech proponents. Promotion of biotechnology 
was turned into a questioning of both the approach taken in the "Agrarwende", whereby 
organic agriculture was to be promoted, and the fundamental principle of organic farming, 
that it should be GMO-free. While in the "Agrarwende", organic farming was put forward 
as the most sustainable approach to agriculture, biotech proponents strongly contested 
the view that organic farming represented the superior model in terms of environmental 
impacts or quality food production (Jacobsen 2001, DFG/DAF 2002). Instead they claimed 
that agro-biotechnology was at least equally viable if not a superior alternative. 110 More 
specifically, it was claimed that a false distinction had been built up between 
biotechnology and sustainable farming practices, as there was no scientific reason to 
exclude GM from organic agriculture.111 Accordingly, biotech proponents brought in 
expertise supporting their views: 
"biotechnological methods could be supportive of the aims in organic 
farming and help in solving specific problems" (Schon 2002). Or 
"biotechnology enables the sustaining of agricultural land and nature 
protection areas in the face of rising demands for food and land" and 
that in this respect "the precautionary principle even demanded the use 
of biotechnological applications" (Maxeiner 2002).112 
Unsurprisingly biotech opponents did not support these views. They claimed that 
biotechnology and the principles in organic farming were not compatible as both 
110 A common reference to illuminate this point is made with respect to the use of copper spraying against 
fungal disease in potatoes in organic farming. It is argued that this problem could be solved in a more 
environmentally friendly way if genetically modified varieties were available (Warenkette 2003). 
111 This view was also stressed in personal interviews RKI 06/03, BBA 06/03. 
112 In the third discourse round on health, safety and food security, the question of agro-blotechnology and its 
potentials for improving food security in developing countries took up a great deal of attention (2 presentations 
on the subject). In one presentation agro-biotech was rejected on the grounds that it did not solve malnutrition 
and could instead further worsen food security (Spangenberg 2002). In the second presentation it was argued 
that the world food problem could only be solved if new technologies were introduced (Virchow 2002). In the 
end it was agreed that agro-biotechnology was just one possible contribution to a solution of the problem of 
hunger and malnutrition. 
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technologies had very different approaches towards the subject and were pursuing 
different agronomic goals (Leopold 2002).113 More importantly though, the subject of 
sustainable food production and biotechnology brought forth the question of whether and 
to what extent the use of biotechnology would impinge on organic farming - still 
considered to be the most sustainable form of farming by many participants of the Diskurs 
- as mass cultivation of GM crops and an extension of the organic sector would 
necessarily come into conflict. 
7.1.6 Contamination, outcrossing and gene flow - new aspects of old facts 
As mentioned before, by the end of the 1990s the topic of outcrossing, gene flow and 
contamination had become an increasingly important subject in the German biotech 
debate. In a rising number of cases transgenics had been detected in seeds or in 
supposed non-GM or organic plants. Traces of GMOs had also found their way into 
organic feed stuff, and studies presented by consumer organizations revealed high levels 
of contamination of food products containing GM maize and soya (Transgen 2000). In 
early 2000 the issue of outcrossing also caused trouble with respect to nature 
conservation, when an approval of a herbicide resistant oilseed rape test sight came 
under attack because of fear of gene influx into "ecologically sensitive areas". Up to the 
end of the 1990s the question of outcrossing was primarily discussed as an environmental 
risk issue. After it had been scientifically established that gene flow did indeed occur, the 
disagreement between the protagonists moved on to the question of its ecological 
relevance. Biotech critics claimed that gene transfer qualified as environmental harm 
because of its unknown effects, uncontrolled spread and persistence in the environment 
(Brauner 2002). Biotech proponents kept rejecting this opinion based on the argument 
that gene-flOW was a "biological principle" ~ having nothing to do with genetic modification 
113 In one of the presentations it was argued that next to a commitment to a moral ecology organic farming 
was based on "vital quality" (Lebenskrafte). Vital quality refers to an extended quality concept in organic, more 
specifically, In biological-dynamic farming (based on Rudolf Steiner) which Includes non-material criteria 
(Leopold 2002). Unsurprisingly some stakeholders had reservations about the concept as they considered it 
"ideological" and highly questionable from a scientific point of view. Whether these Ideas are compatible with 
other, more "minlmalisf approaches to organic farming Is also questionable. Conceding that the concept of 
"vital quality" was indeed based on a different understanding of science, the presenter nevertheless argued 
that it stili represented a legitimate Interest and therefore needed to be respected (SchOn/Leopold 2002). 
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- and was hence acceptable and safe as long as there was no advantage in selection. 
This difference in opinion was generally confirmed during the Diskurs, and remains 
unchanged today. 
However, the problem of unintended gene-flow from GM crops to non-GM crops takes on 
a new quality in relation to the question of consumer choice. How can those who want to 
guarantee consumer choice prevent crop-to-crop gene flow? How can contamination be 
prevented along the food chain? The discourse on choice presupposes two production 
systems, GM and non-GM, that can be run independently and simultaneously. However, 
since it has been proven that crop-to-crop gene flow in the field and admixtures in the 
market occur, the widespread release of GMOs ultimately jeopardizes consumer choice. A 
more far reaching consequence is that the unintended spread of GMOs in the field and 
the food chain would also mean the end of the organic sector. This potential scenario was 
especially precarious against the background of the newly propagated agricultural policy, 
which aimed at increasing the percentage of organic farmers to 20 percent. Given the 
basic premises of the Diskurs as "guaranteeing the freedom of choice" as one of the 
leading principles in biotech regulation, and the stress on consumer protection and 
organic farming the most salient issue discussed between the protagonists became the 
question of "coexistence" between GM and non-GM crops.114 
7.1.7 From consumer choice to coexistence 
Coexistence became the catchword of the Diskurs as the possible ultimate compromise 
between the opposing parties. Yet major arguments arose as to the basis on which such a 
compromise could be reached. The subject of managing coexistence under 
circumstances of gene transfer and global agricultural sourcing markets was most of all 
114 The problem of coexistence of different production systems, of separation and control thereof, became 
very plastic when, during the Diskurs, in June 2002 a contamination scandal broke out in the organic food 
sector. During regular routine testing organic wheat, passed down the food chain as animal feed In poultry, 
was found to be contaminated with the pesticide Nitroten (long ago banned in conventional farming). This 
contaminated organic wheat was stored in a warehouse in the former East Germany, which had previously 
been used for storage of pesticides. The scandal triggered a major crisis in public confidence in the organic 
sector and threatened the core of the "Agrarwende". The organic industry was shaken to the bones, facing EU 
wide product bans and a major backlash in puf>flc opinion. As a result of this scandal, the organic farming and 
food sector underwent major restructuring processes, leading, amongst other things, to the founding of a new 
political representational body, the Organic farming and processing association, the SOLW. 
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disputed in the question of labeling, thresholds and responsibilities. With respect to 
traceability and labeling, the environmental and consumer groups and the retail sector 
favoured full process-based labeling schemes, while an alliance of the biotech industry, 
research and the food sector argued that such a scheme would be unwarranted and 
unworkable (Gesprachskreis GrOne Gentechnik 2002; Bergmann 2002). In the same vein, 
GMO proponents defined coexistence on the basis of 'practical'. meaning high, 
contamination thresholds (up to 5% in food, up to 1 % in seed), whereas environmental 
and consumer groups initially understood coexistence and choice as clear-cut 
alternatives, that is, GMO-free meaning 100% free, not tolerating any contamination ("zero 
tolerance").115 Accordingly proponents declared that 'zero tolerance' would mean the end 
of field trials and commercial options for agro-biotechnology (Schiemann 2002) while 
opponents claimed the same fate for GMO-free agricultural and food options in case a 
'zero tolerance' policy was dismissed (MOiler 2002).116 
This posed the question of who should be responsible for preventing or minimizing the 
presence of GMOs in the food chain or in the field. On the side of biotech critics, including 
environmental NGOs, organic farming and retail and consumer groups it was argued that 
the costs of the separation of markets should be borne by those who introduce GMOs. Yet 
the groups of biotech proponents mentioned above but in this case including the retail 
sector, argued against this proposition (Moldenhauer 2003a). Another point related to the 
subject and directly connected to the issue of coexistence was the question of liability. 
This was a subject brought forth by biotech critics as it dealt with the issue of 
environmental and economic damage (Wollenteit 2002). There, one of the main critical 
points of discussion turned out to be - again - the problem of outcrossing and 
contamination. Would unintentional introgression into non-GM plants be considered as 
115 Originally the 'red-green' government entered the debate with a proposal on threshold for adventitious 
presence in food of 1 %. With respect to seed thresholds, the language used was "below 1%". This position 
was strongly criticized by GM opponents. After the European Parliament had positioned itself In summer 2002, 
Minister KOnast finally also opted for the "below 1 %" line. The "as low as possible line" with respect to 
thresholds In general was laid down In the coalition agreement. 
1160uring the Diskurs, there was disagreement on thresholds within the critic's camp. I.e. consumer NGOs and 
organic farmers were leaning towards higher thresholds out of fear that otherwise there would be practically 
nothing left labeled GMO-free. They urged the environmental NGOs to drop their reluctance and start 
negotiating about separation distances, costs and other practical steps to be taken to make coexistence and 
"pseudo-choice" possible (interview vzvb, 06/02). 
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(property) damage and thus trigger liability claims, as, for instance, suggested by a study 
commissioned by the Environmental Agency (UBA 2003). The parties could not reach an 
agreement. 
However, as the discussion - and the persistent picking up of this theme during the 
Diskurs - increasingly revealed, these issues of separation and conflicting interests 
between organic (non-GM) farmers and conventional farmers using transgenic varieties 
would be a central problem to be solved in future regulation. The freedom to choose, as it 
turns out, was not only an issue for consumers but also for producers. In the end the 
Diskurs clarified that coexistence on the basis of 'zero tolerance' was impossible to reach 
in the fields, or too expensive to be realized in the market. The preservation of an entirely 
GMO-free agricultural and food production was therefore dropped, against resistance from 
environmental groups. Nevertheless to guarantee consumer and producer choice was 
identified as one of the main common concerns in agro-biotechnology as a result of the 
Diskurs grane Gentechnik in Germany (BMVEL 2003). However, in the end no consensus 
could be found as to whether regulation needed to be in place before cultivation was 
resumed, or whether regulation could be introduced gradually alongside cultivation. 
7.2 Explaining discursive formations and developments during the Diskurs 
In the following section, Hajer and Sabatier's key concepts of discourse and beliefs will be 
used to illuminate the developments and trajectories during the Diskurs grane Gentechnik. 
In particular, their different ideas of policy learning in relation with expert deliberation will 
be more closely examined. 
7.2.1 Discourse and story-lines as In Hajer 
How can one use Hajer's analytical categories to illuminate distinct features of the 
Diskurs? When one looks at the narrative one can see that in the Diskurs the variety of 
different framings of the GMO issue that had dominated the discursive landscape in the 
past were resurfacing. Many of the discourses and story-lines, such as "Standort", "sound 
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science" or "uncertainty" were familiar and were again being used to sustain the agendas 
of the respective coalitions. Yet there were new discursive formations arising, linking 
these old framings to new issues (and groups) in a particular way. Using Hajer's analytical 
lens one can clearly see how the new "consumer choice" and "Agrarwende" discourse had 
a big impact not only on the set up of the Diskurs, but also on the argumentative structure 
of the protagonists. Moreover, against the background of new agricultural policies, the 
topic of outcrossing and the prospect of mass cultivation brought to the fore issues that 
had not been part of the earlier official debates. Through the dynamics described below, 
the choice discourse turned into a more fundamental discussion about the different 
spheres of consumption and production, finally merging into the coexistence debate. 
Discursive mechanisms at work, some examples: 
The "Agrarwende" discourse: changing actors and themes 
The framing of biotechnology as a fundamental matter of agricultural and consumer policy 
has increased the number of affected and hence relevant actors in the field. More 
importantly, the "Agrarwende" and "consumer choice" discourse has positioned organic 
and consumer organizations as central actors in the subsystem. Their special concerns 
and newly gained importance in the course of the SSE debate made their 
overrepresentation even acceptable to other groups (Hammerbacher 2002). This in turn 
led to preferred terms and issues of the environmental, consumer and organic farming 
organizations, for example on questions of legal arrangements between GM and organic 
farming, finding increased entry into the debate (ibid.). In fact, as could be seen when 
analyzing the documents, these critical issues were introduced in multiple ways and were 
basically being incorporated in all the discussion protocols of any Diskurs round.117 
117 All discussion protocols can be downloaded at www.transgen.deIDlskurs. 
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Appropriating the same language for different discourses 
As the narrative shows, during the Diskurs the "Agrarwende" had become the important 
discourse in which actors could credibly express their concerns and interests. The 
"Agrarwende" and new food policy rhetoric was linked to every statement in the field, yet 
defending entirely contrary positions: Biotech was promoted on the grounds of new 
agricultural policies and rejected with the same arguments. During the course of debate 
terms hitherto exclusively confined to specific coalitions became part of the framing of 
counter coalitions. The terms "innovation" and "Standort" were appropriated in the 
communicative strategy of biotech opponents when propagating alternatives (thus 
characteristics attributed by biotech proponents come to be wielded as sources of 
reSistance). Likewise biotech proponents came to deploy the "precautionary principle" and 
the concept of "sustainability" when propagating a biotech offensive. Therefore, on the 
basis of language we could observe a convergence in the terms used by each coalition, 
with the effect of diluting the meanings and associations with specific groups (who is 
progressive/anti-progressive, who is pro-science/anti-science, whose methods/aims are 
valid?). According to Hajer, this is part of the "argumentative game" between discursive 
coalitions, which may intensify conflict and re-polarise along new lines but could just as 
well help in overcoming constructed borderlines between coalitions. 
Redefining and broadening expertise 
As shown, the Diskurs went well beyond the question of biophysical safety of 
biotechnology to include "norms and values in food production" and the issue of choice 
and control. In articulation with these broader discourses, a redefinition of key issues has 
taken place. Risks and uncertainty, formerly confined to environmental and health 
aspects, have come to be expanded to include such things as the loss of consumer and 
producer choice, the question of agricultural and food options and food security in 
developing countries. The concept of risks and expertise in agro-biotechnology has been 
extended and new knowledge (on organic farming, nature conservation, crop separation, 
insurance questions) has found its way into the debate and was given legitimate meaning. 
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For Hajer, this is not only a matter of introducing new labels but it constitutes a material 
practice of transformation as the confines of the former 'risk and opportunity' debate have 
been greatly expanded and more/different things can be discussed. 
Bringing politics back in ..• 
The dynamic of the new Diskurs and the constellation of actors has triggered a situation in 
which experts have come to be officially and directly confronted with counter-expertise of 
the sort previously confined only to niche discussions (for example the question on 
alternatives). This had the effect of conferring meaning and legitimacy to these marginal 
accounts, which would otherwise have been perceived as 'unscientific' or not belonging to 
the subject matter in decision-making in biotech policy. The principle of proportionate 
representation, according to which expert positions became classified as pro-contra 
stances, additionally questioned the popular idea that science could be some sort of 
neutral judge for the solution of policy problems. Instead, the use of science became part 
of the discursive process, while the debate shifted away from scientific arguments. 
Protagonists were forced to articulate and negotiate the political issues that were at stake 
in biotech regulation and to make them contestable instead of denying them and vilifying 
certain groups and their positions (as, for instance, happened during the WZB procedure 
in 1993). This way the Diskurs became a site for the deliberation of the social 
confrontation inherent in agro-biotechnology. For Hajer, opening the science-politics 
border means dismantling one of the crucial practices on which discursive dominance is 
built. 
From technology to agriculture: 'learning' as redefining Issues 
Under conditions of GMO cultivation, the "Agrarwende" discourse and the demand for 
"freedom of choice" and GMO-free spheres, a new policy discourse on coexistence 
emerged. This new discourse shifted the focus from the regulation of approval procedures 
and consumption to the sphere of production and the creation of regulatory demands that 
safeguard non-GM options. In the wake of this shift an issue for technical innovation policy 
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becomes one for agricultural policy. This also puts the focus of attention on another set of 
actors, those responsible in the fields and in production, and on their practices. This 
fundamental shift in the 'nature of the policy problem' within the biotech subsystem may 
be one of the most important results of the Diskurs grOne Gentechnik. In the process of 
deliberation actors have come to learn a different way of looking at the problem. The 
Diskurs as such did not resolve the policy conflict between the antagonizing coalitions yet, 
in Hajer's sense, it could be understood as having acted as the "clarifying force" (Hajer 
1995: 283), the platform for debate as part of a reflexive practice which was oriented 
towards the construction of the policy problem. 
Minister Kunast - an agent of discursive change and coalition catalyst 
In Chapter six the way in which KOnast radically changed the terms of the biotechnology 
debate in Germany was analyzed. The new policy discourse that she initiated set the 
frame for the Diskurs and, as shown above, this was well reflected and transformed in the 
negotiations between the stakeholders. Moreover, because of the Minister's distinct 
personal commitment and mediating role, the Diskurs took place the way it did and 
protagonists stayed involved till the end, despite major arguments that arose between the 
groups (Hammerbacher 2003).118 Given KOnast's important political and personal role in 
the process of change it is not only interesting, but also analytically important to see how 
she perceives and reproduces the argumentative exchange of the Diskurs. Drawing on 
KOnast's speeches relating to the Diskurs one can give an illustrative account of 
discursive change. To this end, the opening speech to the Diskurs grOne Gentechnik and 
the closing statement of the Minister held one year later will be compared. By analyzing 
the argumentative structure of these two texts one can identify some interesting changes 
in story-lines. This way KOnast's speeches can serve as important examples of how story-
lines are reproducing and transforming discursive orders by creating new discursive 
coalitions. 
118 In case of the WZB technology assessment procedure In 1993 the environmental groups walked out of the 
process due to irresolvable conflict. 
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The texts are compared in Tables 6 and 7. When looking at the tables one can see how 
the original discourse on "consumer choice" and "consumer trust" expands to include the 
protection of producer's rights, bringing coexistence to the fore of policy goals in 
agrobiotech regulation. More importantly, this way of reasoning is opening up ways to 
expand the discursive coalition of biotech critics to include al/ producers - not just the 
organic ones. One can furthermore see how a discourse on technological skepticism turns 
into a discourse on technological pluralism thereby moving away from a principal 
questioning of biotechnology to a more differentiated, negotiable view of technology 
assessment and the comparison between different problem solving approaches 
("sustainability check"). KOnast launches arguments of cost-benefit considerations to 
counter biotech proponent's often only implicit cost-benefit calculations while at the same 
time this offers an opportunity to prominently place the use of alternatives. With 
problematizing violations of the rights and free choices of consumers and producers 
through contamination, KOnast introduces new story-lines of "uncertainty"(thus increasing 
uncertainty on top of the already existing risks). This allows her to supply biotech critics 
with a rationalized set of arguments to argue for rigid regulation and to dispel accusations 
of "anti-biotech fundamentalism". Using Hajer's analytical lens one can see how KOnast is 
providing the language to attract old and new actors in order to build a grand discursive 
coalition that argues for strong regulation - whatever their motives (beliefs, interests) may 
be. 
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Table 6: KLinast opening statement, Diskurs griine Gentechnik, December 2001 
"Consumers no longer trust agriculture and food industry" 
"New technologies cannot be introduced against the will of 
consumers" 
"Consumers have a right to choose" 
"Consumers have a right to a high level of protection" 
"Developments need to be transparent and participatory" 
"Products need to be labeled to be clearly identifiable" 
"There is a need to check benefits for society" 
"Technical developments need to be controlled" 
"We need to create the conditions for responsible use" 
"We need to clarify the risk potential" 
"We need to consider alternatives" 
"We need to be responsible with regard to field trials" 
(outcrossing) 
'We need to decide how to produce our food" 
"We are responsible in a global context" 
"There is a need to check whether agro-biotechnology 
contributes to better food security or whether it worsens 
dependencies" 
"We need to consider alternatives" 
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. Discourse 
Consumer trust 
Consumer protection 
Consumer rights 
Technological 
skepticism 
Food security/Food 
safety 
Table 7: Kunast closing statement, Diskurs griine Gentechnik, September 2002 
"Right to choose maybe most important issue with respect to 
agrobiotech", that is: 
"Labeling and traceability need to work" 
"Thresholds need to be as low as possible" 
"Coexistence needs to be assured" 
"Conventional plant breeding offers great developmental 
potential" 
"Molecular knowledge should be used in conventional 
breeding and organic agriculture" 
'There is a need to strengthen research in sustainable 
agriculture and farming" 
"New technologies offer opportunities and risks - sustainability 
check should clarify which path to follow and which 
developments to stop" 
"Healthy nutrition is guaranteed without biotech" 
"Hunger is more a question of distribution" 
"Biotech might possibly worsen problems of food security" 
"We support other approaches towards plant breeding" 
"Everybody worldwide has a right to choose (GM food aid)" 
"What are the effects on biodiversity?" 
'We need to clarify the question of ecological damage" 
"We need to start considering the effects (social, ecological 
and economical) of our actions onto the future" 
7.2.2 Belief systems and policy learning in Sabatier 
Consumer 
and 
producer's rights 
Technological 
Pluralism 
Food security/Food 
safety 
Risks and ethics 
How can one understand the dynamic during the Diskurs from an ACF point of view? How 
can the developments be somewhat illuminated by focusing on the belief systems that 
were introduced in Chapter four and on policy learning, another important category in the 
ACF? To answer the questions this section will look at what Sabatier has to say about 
professional expert debates in the policy process, the role of (new) beliefs therein and the 
process of learning. 
151 
The Diskurs: a professional forum to facilitate policy learning? 
Within the general process of policy change the ACF has a particular interest in policy 
learning. To recall, policy oriented learning refers to a "relatively enduring alteration of 
thought. .. which results from experience and/or new information (Sabatier 1998: 1 04). 
Policy oriented learning involves increased knowledge of problem parameters and it is 
instrumental since it is used to further policy objectives. Policy learning can affect policy 
core beliefs, but most policy learning manifests itself only in the secondary aspects of a 
belief system or a governmental programme. As belief systems are quite resistant to 
change, Sabatier specifies the conditions under which policy learning processes, both 
. within a coalition's belief system and across belief systems of different coalitions are likely 
to occur. According to the ACF (Jenkins-Smith/Sabatier 1993), a "productive analytical 
debate" (ibid.: 48) which is conducive to learning depends upon three things: A) The level 
of conflict, which is dependent upon the degree of incompatibility of basic beliefs. When 
deep core beliefs are in conflict learning, in terms of changing core beliefs, is unlikely. B) 
The analytical traceability of the issue, meaning learning is more likely when there are 
commonly accepted analytical theories, concepts and sources of data. Finally, learning is 
facilitated in c) the presence of a prestigious professional forum, requiring the participation 
of experts from various coalitions. 
Applying the above given learning conditions to the Diskurs grDne Gentechnik allows 
illumination of some of the dynamics presented in the narrative. The biotech conflict has 
already been classified as being one between deep core beliefs of different coalitions. 
This basic characteristic of high-level conflict was also reflected in the whole process of 
the setting up of the Diskurs and during the discussion rounds. The intention of the 
BMVEL was to provide an open forum for the expression of a wide range of issues and 
the collection of knowledge, with the aim of preparing the ground for political decision-
making in the area. The Diskurs was thus to provide a platform for a debate between 
stakeholders in which all of the arguments and interests inherent in the conflict were 
openly discussed. However, as laid out in the narrative the high level of disagreement 
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between the stakeholders resulted in expert positions being staffed according to interest 
positions. 119 This way the Diskurs became a pro-contra expert forum in which the blurred 
lines between experts and stakeholders and science and politics became a constant point 
of friction. For the ACF, such a politicized forum - in which analysis and the provision of 
facts and expertise was used to back up competing belief claims and in which there were 
no common criteria for methods and norms - is not conducive to the conditions for deep 
core policy learning. Instead, in such a situation the exchange of information between the 
coalitions results in a "dialogue of the deaf' (Jenkins-Smith/Sabatier1993: 55). 
Policy learning on secondary aspects and strategies 
However, one could argue that learning has taken place, but not so much on the level of 
deep core beliefs but on the level of secondary aspects. As a result of the reform 
exigencies of the" Agrarwende", every coalition had reacted and changed their 
argumentative strategy in order to either protect or to push their core beliefs. As could be 
seen in the narrative, the new KOnast line especially put pressure on the communication 
strategies of biotech proponents. As a reaction to new agricultural policies they had 
argued their case with "sustainability", yet without this being an indication of a rethinking of 
their basic policy approaches - which were unchanged - but rather in an effort to 
incorporate new information, and to adapt their belief system to new pressures. Likewise 
when the biotech critics talk of "innovation" they do this not because they have a" of a 
sudden turned into liberal advocates or technophiles, but because it self-consciously 
pushes their cause as progressive (that is, not anti-modernist), this way qualifying the 
exclusive claims of their opponents. In both cases pressures to modify beliefs systems 
have resulted in learning processes, but only on the level of changes to argumentative 
and instrumental strategies, there was no convergence on the basis of policy core beliefs. 
119 In fact, in the report of the moderation team this 'expertise in proportion' was classified as an important 
trust building measure between the protagonists (Hammerbacher 2003). 
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Policy beliefs, new issues and new actors 
However, this does not mean that nothing has happened. Sabatier holds that subsystems 
can change because of "concerns with a relatively new issue" (Sabatier 1998:114). In 
simplified terms one could say that the focus on freedom of choice and the "Agrarwende" 
has brought new concerns and new actors into the policy arena (Sabatier very much 
blackboxes this process). The ACF would assume that beliefs are extended to new 
issues. One could argue, as was done above, that the "Agrarwende" demands were made 
to fit into the belief structure of both advocacy coalitions. However, what about those new 
actors; those, which are relatively fresh to the scene and are not (necessarily) part of an 
advocacy coalition and which are unfamiliar with the debates? These new actors may 
have their worldviews and interests but do not (necessarily) have established or strong 
policy core beliefs concerning agro-biotechnology. Instead, as the Moderation report 
confirmed, some of these actors, especially the conventional farmers, adopted a wait-and-
see strategy making their policy position dependent upon the clarification of risk and 
acceptance issues (Hammerbacher 2003). 
Sabatier does not claim that everybody who belongs to the policy subsystem is part of a 
coalition, but he certainly holds that the politically important actors do have established 
and stable policy core beliefs. However, who and what is important in the policy field has 
changed over the course of debate, as shown in the narrative. This means that policy core 
beliefs and their relevance can be contingent. For instance, whether gene-flow is 
portrayed as a 'natural' process or potentially dangerous, or whether gene-flow is 
classified as normally occurring "admixtures" or business damaging "contamination" 
depends upon the belief system and the argumentative power of its beholders. As GMO 
protagonists have lost discursive dominance in the wake of the new debates gene-flaw 
has become a definite problem. Especially those who in the past expressed uncertainty 
with respect to the judgement of, or the vulnerability towards the issue all of a sudden find 
themselves and their daily practices in jeopardy. 
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During the Diskurs, the question of gene-flow and admixtures/contamination has become 
one of the most salient political issues with respect to biotech regulation. The 
argumentative developments during the Diskurs were not independent of beliefs as these 
framed accounts of "Agrarwende" or "innovation". However, against the focus on 
consumer choice and new agricultural policies those arguments began to resonate 
differently with new actor's worldviews with hitherto unspecific policy core beliefs. These 
arguments changed the perceptions of the problem and thus created specific policy core 
beliefs. It is in this sense that new issues create "fluid situations" (Sabatier 1998: 114) 
because they change the composition of ~he subsystem and stir up established advocacy 
relations with a potential to tip the balance of the status quo. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to answer the following questions: What is the impact of the 
new "consumer choice" and "Agrarwende" debate on the policy subsystem? How does 
this new policy situation affect the scene, the actors, coalitions and their story-lines? 
Finally, how did coexistence emerge as a major topic in biotech regulation in Germany? 
Using Hajer's toolbox we could illuminate the Diskurs grane Gentechnik by understanding 
it through discursive mechanisms being at work. It could be demonstrated that the new 
framing of biotechnology increased the number of affected and relevant actors in the field 
and that it positioned organic and consumer organizations as central players in the 
subsystem. The strength and symbolism of the" Agrarwende" discourse had an impact on 
the biotech framing of all the actors, also with the effect of diluting meanings of terms and 
associations with specific groups. Given this new emphasis, new meaning and legitimacy 
was conferred to counter-expertise formerly confined to the margins of the debate, 
concepts of risk and uncertainty were broadened and the political nature of the problem 
was openly brought forth (this being a condition for open deliberation in the DCF). Most 
importantly, the discursive shifts could explain the fact that the former focus from the 
regulation of approval procedures and consumption was newly moved to the sphere of 
production, creating regulatory demands that safeguard non-GM options. For the DCF, 
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the resulting coexistence problematique means a fundamental shift in the 'nature of the 
policy problem' and thus offers new ways of approaching the issues. This, in turn, creates 
new possibilities for incorporating and attracting old and new actors and for building 
discursive coalitions that argue for strong regulation - whatever their motives may be. 
From the DCF point of view, the Diskurs was thus a very important vehicle for policy 
change. 
The Diskurs grDne Gentechnik provided a good opportunity to apply central tenets of the 
ACF. How do advocacy coalitions behave and policy learning possibly occur in the 
circumstances of direct interaction? As belief systems are quite resistant to change, 
Sabatier specifies the conditions under which learning processes are likely to occur and 
singles out three features. However, it could be demonstrated that the Diskurs did not 
fulfill any of these conditions as it was featuring a high-level conflict, a very politicized 
forum and was overall not committed to common criteria for methods and norms. 
Accordingly, in such a situation, Sabatier's approach would suggest that policy change on 
the level of core beliefs across belief systems is unlikely and coalition interaction is similar 
to a "dialogue of the deaf. However, the idea of cognitive change and strategic action can 
explain how pressures to modify belief systems have resulted in learning processes on 
the level of changes to argumentative and instrumental strategies. The fact that they all 
talk about the "Agrarwende" and the severity of contamination, in turn, triggers a different 
perception of the issues at hand. New actors, unfamiliar with the policy subsystem and 
with unstable policy preferences become central in the debate, with a potential to shift the 
balance of the status quo. From the ACF point of view the Diskurs' relevance as a feature 
in policy making is under-acknowledged, as there seems to be no great effect in terms of 
major belief system revisions caused by scientific information. However, it could be 
argued that it is belief systems that explain the action that advocacies take in light of 
external pressures and that it is due to these deliberate interactions that issues can 
change and external actors get drawn into the debate. This way actors and issues can go 
beyond the "dialogue of the deaf' even though policy core beliefs of major coalitions 
remain the same. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. The year 2003/early 2004: Institutional innovations and the regulation of 
coexistence 
This final empirical chapter will trace the developments that ran parallel to and followed 
the Diskurs grOne Gentechnik up to the point of the decision on the new Genetic 
Engineering Act (GenTG) in parliament. As was seen, the "Agrarwende" and the new 
"consumer choice" discourse have had a substantial impact on the biotech debate in 
Germany. The Diskurs offered a platform. for new themes, and new groups entered the 
debate on agro-biotechnology. This narrative will mainly focus on the developments in the 
years 2003 and early 2004, and in particular on coalition formation around coexistence 
and institutional and regulatory reforms. As the new political line of biotech regulation, to 
safeguard consumer choice and coexistence, had been tentatively agreed upon between 
stakeholders, this phase will show how the new policy line has been translated into 
institutional set ups and regulation. It will ask, how do new institutions and new regulation 
take account of these new issues? How does the new coexistence debate develop 
between the coalitions? What are the relationships between different accounts? Finally 
what does coexistence and new expertise mean for the developments in policy and the 
possibility of conflict solution? Again using Hajer and Sabatier the dynamics will be 
illuminated more analytically in the second part of the chapter. 
8.1 "Peasant wars" and "blocking policies": new institutional features and 
coexistence regulation 
8.1.1 The reorganization of the Competent Authority 
From the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Consumer Protection 
In national elections at the end of 2002, the 'red-green' coalition government was voted to 
a second term in office. The elections had an impact on the Diskurs, with the campaigning 
heating up the discussion climate (Hammerbacher 2002). If a change in government took 
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place, GM proponents hoped to regain some standing, because the conservativelliberal 
opposition was a declared supporter of agro-biotechnology (Agrar-Europe 2002). The re-
election of the 'red-green' coalition was something of a surprise result; public opinion polls 
had suggested it would be otherwise. In fact, the margin of victory was very narrow. The 
coalition held on to power mainly due to the good electoral performance of the Green 
Party, with the effect of further increasing the leverage of the minor partner in the coalition. 
This in turn had a considerable impact on the agro-biotech orientation of the government. 
In the new coalition agreement of 2002, Green Party issue framings were almost entirely 
taken up (interview green parliamentary party, 06/03). Safeguarding the freedom to 
choose and "updating and transposing the new EU Directive from a consumer protection 
point of view" were the central demands in the agreement (SPO/B'gO/GrOne 2002: 47).120 
More importantly though, the re-election of the 'red-green' government created space for 
the reconsideration of regulatory competencies.121 To recall, following the BSE crisis the 
Ministry of Consumer Protection (BMVEL) had been endowed with political responsibility 
for GM food. However, the major administrative player in the regulation of agro-
biotechnology continued to be the Ministry of Health, which presided over the RKI, the 
Competent Authority. Shortly after reelection in October 2002, with a Chancellor's 
organization directive, this political responsibility for GM crops was shifted from the 
Ministry of Health (BMGS) to the Ministry of Consumer Protection, Agriculture and Food 
(BMVEL). This meant that the KOnast Ministry was now endowed with the full 
competence, not only in matters of GM food but also in GM crop regulation, including the 
authority to write new legislation. The decision in favour of the BMVEL implied that the 
respective regulatory tasks of subordinate agencies involved in GM crop regulation had to 
120 In the new coalition agreement it Is interesting to see how the issue Is put. Under the section "Research, 
innovation and sustainablllty", biotechnology Is still referred to as a 'key technology'. However, with respect to 
agro-blotechnology - subsumed under the section "Consumer policy, healthy food and modern agrarian 
policies" - there Is no such rhetoric left (SPO/B'90/GrOne 2002). This stands in considerable contrast to the 
SPO Party programme from 2002, wherein biotechnology is embedded in ·Standort" rhetoric. The programme 
states that, ·the potentials In agro-biotechnology need to be researched. Together with industry, we will 
organize a carefully planned GM cultivation programme" (SPO 2002: 33). 
121 This has also provided space with regard to staffing policies. In 2003 Oan Leskln, former adviser on 
Genetic Engineering for the Greensl EFA in the European Parliament, was taken on board of Minister 
KOnast's team at the BMVEL. In early 2004 Beatrix Tappeser, a leading figure In the biotech critical expert 
scene became head of the biotech department at the BfN. 
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be adjusted accordingly. The Competent Authorit~ was thus to be changed from the 
Robert-Koch Institute to the Federal Agency for Consumer Protection and Food Safety 
(BVL), a newly created subordinate agency of the BMVEL (Bundestag 2003).122 
The decision to shift the overall authority in GM crop regulation away from the Ministry of 
Health and the RKI had been a long-standing demand of the critic community. Because of 
the predominantly environmental relevance of crop regulation - as was argued in the past 
- the Ministry of Environment would be more credibly entrusted with this role. However, 
the political shifts triggered by the BSE-crisis made a move to the Ministry of Consumer 
Protection more opportune (interview green parliamentary party, 06/03). Even though a 
Green Party member was now the head of the new ministry, GMO critical groups did not 
overly welcome this decision. There were fears that this move favoured the trend away 
from environmental questions in biotech regulation towards economic/agronomic 
considerations.123 
From the UBA to the Nature Conservation Agency 
There was yet another decision concerning changes to the institutional set-up of 
regulatory competencies - a shift in environmental expertise from the UBA to the Nature 
Conservation Agency (BfN). With the BfN, a more outspokenly GMO critical institution was 
going to take part in approval decisions. This meant that GM crop approval for release 
and commercialization would henceforth be given by consultation with the newly created 
Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR), BfN and RKJ. Furthermore, the BBA and 
respective Lander agencies would now be asked for their opinions in the process (see 
Table 8). As already mentioned in earlier chapters, nature conservation related questions 
were getting ever more attention in the assessment of risks in biotechnology under the 
122 In practical terms this means that parts of the former Center for Genetic Engineering of the RKI will be 
placed in this two new agencies. However, the RKI continues to playa role. With respect to the personnel, it 
looks as if the same people will basically take care of the approval procedure. 
123 The changes In the Competent Authority are critically perceived on both sides, albeit for different reasons. 
Common is the critique that too much power is allocated to the new agency and too few checks and balances 
are left to counterweight its decision-making power. The GMO critic's side fears that the kind of arrangement 
is too short-sightedly knitted in favour of the current political constellation and could hence fly back In their 
faces as soon as the government changes and the agriculture ministry falls back into more GMO-friendly 
hands. GMO proponents fear that there could be a "politicization of the approval procedure". 
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'red-green' government. The BMVEL explained the shift in environmental competence 
from the UBA to the BfN as being necessary due to the change in the nature of the 
subject. The assessment of environmental effects, stated the official justification for the 
bill, was better lying with an institution that focuses on living organisms and their 
interaction with nature, i.e. the BfN, than with the UBA, which focuses on harmful products 
(Bundestag 2003). Countering or complementing this official version is the following 
narrative. In the wake of institutional brokering between the Ministry of Environment and 
the Ministry of Consumer Protection on the question of the leading department, and with 
the decision in favour of the latter, the environmental Minister Trittin had decided to 
entrust the BfN with this role. According to insiders and as confirmed by press sources, in 
. the environmental community the UBA had frequently been criticized for being "too liberal" 
(meaning too lenient) in its approach to GMOs (Deichmann 2002). As the BfN is 
considered to follow a different, more precautionary approach, with this decision the 
environmental side in risk assessment should be strengthened.124 
124 However, against a superficial reading of competence enhancement on the environmental side of 
regulation there Is concern that environmental aspects could be further sidelined. The BfN is perceived as 
being too critical in approach - its president, Hartmut Vogtman, has been known to support a total ban on 
GMOs • and the agency Is not as well positioned In the reign of competent institutions in GM crop regulation 
as the UBA used to be. Furthermore, the BfN might lack a great deal of knowledge in matters of GMOs as a 
number of UBA officials will not move from Berlin to the Bonn agency. Overall from the environmental critic's 
side there Is the concern that this move from the UBA to the BfN and the likely consequences of major 
quarrels between the agencies over specific decisions could have a negative impact on the quality and weight 
of the environmental risk assessment. As one commentator contended, this may even have a negative 
Impact on the development of organiC agriculture in Germany as Vogtman- a well established figure in organic 
farming - could be squeezed between the two fronts (interview ZsL, 06/03). (Vogtman held the first 
professorship In organic farming at GOttingen University, Germany.) 
160 
Table 8: Institutional innovations: The change in Competent Authority 
Old: 
~~~-$ Political responsibility (Fachaufsicht) 
~«~x· II Competent Authority 
o Consultative body (opinion or consent - decision dependant) 
BBA: Federal Biological Research Center For Agriculture And Forestry 
BfN: Federal Agency for Nature Conservation 
BfR: Federal Institut for Risk assessment 
BgW:Food Safety Agency 
BMGS: Ministry of Health 
BML: Ministry of Agriculture 
BMU: Ministry of Environment 
BVL: Federal agency for Consumer Protection and Food Safety 
RKI: Robert-Koch Institut, Center for Genetic Engineering 
UBA: Federal Environmental Agency 
ZKBS: Scientific Advisory Committee on Biological Safety 
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8.1.2 The coexistence debate - spanning environmental, health and economic risks 
To guarantee consumer and producer choice was identified as one of the main common 
concerns in agro-biotechnology during the Diskurs grane Gentechnik in Germany (BMVEL 
2002). In the coalition agreement between the SPD Party and the Green Party these 
central demands were put forth as a policy task to be resolved in regulation in the up 
coming governing term. In the meantime, a range of reports had been published by 
different institutions on the subject of coexistence, so for instance, from the UBA, the Cko-
Institut or Friends of the Earth Germany.125 Coexistence had also come to playa pivotal 
role at the European level. In 2002 the European Joint Research Center had released a 
report on scenarios for coexistence, testing its feasibility.126 In 2003, contested views on 
the regulation of coexistence were put forward by the EU Commission (CEC 2003)127 and 
an NGO conference hosted by the European Parliament (Friends of the Earth et al. 2003). 
These reports, proposals and developments were also drawn upon in Germany. Despite 
different judgements on the feasibility of "true coexistence", in 2003 the subject had clearly 
come to dominate discussions and most of the societal groups had engaged themselves 
and given input to the controversy on how to understand and organize coexistence. 
Organic farmers and organic food Industry: "Nothing but survival." 
Spearheading the demand for coexistence regulation is the organic community. The 
organic farming and processing community (BOLW) is principally opposed to, and by law 
prohibited from, the use of agricultural biotechnology. "Genetic engineering does not fit an 
1251n December 2000 USA held a stakeholder conference on the subject of "Green genetiC engineering and 
organic farming", During this conference, possible approaches towards protecting organic production were 
discussed between the different groups. These talks resulted in a report, which was prepared by the two 
Research Centers for Organic Farming in Berlin and Frick (CH) together with the Oko-Institut. This was 
released In February 2003 (UBA 2003). In December 2002 another report was released from the Oko-Institut 
"Gene flow: so what?" addressing the subject of gene flow and its likely economic and ecological 
consequences (Brauner 2002). In 2002 another report was produced by the Oko-Institut and the Center for 
Organic Farming In Berlin (Fibl) on the Issue of coexistence. The report was commissioned by Friends of the 
Earth Germany (BUND) (BUND 2002b). It focused on the question of contamination sources within the food 
chain and worked out different future scenarios on the basis of varying political and regulatory frameworks. 
126 Report available at: www.jrc.cec.eu.intlGECrops/ 
127 According to the EU Commission, national authorities should specify rules and measures to deal with the 
subject. Farmers should also bear responsibility. The EU is involved only in coordination. 
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ecological agrarian and food culture" (LOnzer 2000), as has been stressed by the sector 
for years and a line of reasoning which can still be found in the sector's recent campaign: 
"The success of organic farming is based on a holistic understanding of 
natural relationships. The whole is more than the sum of its parts! 
Biotechnology follows the principle of technological feasibility and 
considers all life forms as principally manipulative material. Possible 
consequences for eco-systems are hardly considered. Biotechnology put 
its focus on quick-fix solutions to problems and accepts unpredictable 
ecological risks and other possible costs. Organic farmers know that it is 
economical to work with the forces of nature" (BCLW 2003: Flyer). 
However, even though biotechnology contradicts the principles in organic farming and 
respective worldviews, "safeguarding the alternatives in agriculture and food production" is 
made more central in their campaigns than speaking out against a risky technology 
(interview FiBL, 10/03). Against the background of new agricultural policies, arguments 
are put forth that "the credibility of the Agrarwende" is put at stake when biotechnology is 
given a go-ahead, thereby threatening the expansion of the organic sector. To quote the 
BOLW: 
"We need to make sure that we protect a promising growth sector whose 
expansion was, after all, one of the proclaimed aims of this government" 
(BCLW 2003a). 
In this sense coexistence regulation is not only posed as a question of political credibility 
and economic rationality but of business survival as the fate of organic producers hinges 
upon a strict and working separation of the two production systems. Organic farmers 
stress their special vulnerability with respect to contamination. With organic farming and 
its products slowly gaining acceptance and their market share rising, it is argued that apart 
. from individual material damage, which was certainly to be expected, "the real problem is 
that the reputation of the whole sector is put at stake" (interview FiBL, 10/03). Accordingly, 
in order to protect the organic sector from existential threats posed through GM 
cultivation, wide-ranging regulatory measures are asked for: 
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The organic sector demands protection against "contamination", whereby all the additional 
costs of separation should be borne by the introducer of GM crops. This is argued for on 
the basis of a strict application of the pOlluter-pays principle. In addition, the sector asks 
for strict regulation of good agricultural practices and clear regulation on liability (e.g. 
biotech industry fund), in case of damage. Furthermore organic farmers argue for a 0.1 % 
contamination threshold in seeds and a 'field-by-field' cultivation register (SOLW 2003b). 
These rules, it is argued, needed to be introduced because current legislation did not 
provide enough protection and provoked conflicts between neighboring farmers. Since 
conflict prevention rather than compensation is prioritized, SCLW demands regulation to 
be in place before the lifting of the moratorium.128 
In putting forth these requests, organic farmers claim not to be speaking just for 
themselves but for the majority of consumers and conventional farmers, as, according to a 
poll conducted by Greenpeace in 2002, 70 percent of German farmers reject agricultural 
biotechnology (Greenpeace 2002). In arguing for coexistence and liability regulation the 
organic farming community thus stresses that they have a great deal in common with 
many conventional farmers. In pushing non-GM options in the market place SOLW argues 
that: 
"it is incomprehensible that Europeans embark on biotech production 
curtailing a global market advantage at a time when they could provide 
consumers worldwide with GM-free food" (SCLW 2003a). 
On the basis of such a common food quality strategy, in a sense of "class in mass"l29, 
they suggest that GM-free spheres or even a GM-free Europe could be a common 
producer's interest. 
128 Within the Diskurs no consensus could be found on this question. Farmers demanded that regulation 
needed to be in place before the lifting of the moratorium, while others held that regulation could be introduced 
gradually. 
129 This language was, for instance, put forth by a debate organized by the Foundation for Future Farming 
(ZsL): ·Class in Mass - all organic or what?" Berlin, GrOner Salon der VolksbOhne, 24.01.2003. To recall, the 
"Agrarwende" policy turn had been propagated on the basis of ·class instead of mass". As this could be 
misunderstood in a sense of privileging organic farming or stigmatizing conventional farming it was 
Increasingly stressed that the issue in new agricultural policies was to support ·class In mass· production. 
Such a qualification of language also deemed necessary In light of the development of the organic sector as it 
moves towards larger scale production. 
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Conventional farmer's organizations: "Keep consumer's and farmer's trust." 
The National Farmers Organization (DBV)13o, representing 90 percent of German farmers, 
does not want to rule out any type of farming. Hence there is no fundamental opposition to 
agricultural biotechnology, quite the contrary: 
"Agro-biotechnology offers changes for the improvement of production 
techniques and products. These opportunities should not be overthrown 
by exaggerated discussions on risks. Scientists and researchers should 
be given the right to develop new knowledge and to put these to the test 
such as is the case with any other new technology ... 
Of course consumers and producers have the same right to freely 
decide whether they wish to use these products. In the case that the 
majority of the population rejects GMOs the agro-food industry will 
respect this decision and act accordingly" (Born 2002: 6). 
Hence, the DBV has argued in the past for keeping all of its options open and has this 
way proven to be a reliable supporter of the biotech industry. However, against the 
background of the SSE scandal, damaging consumer boycotts and increasing uncertainty 
about the ever-shrinking prospects of GM crop use, the DBV has increasingly found itself 
caught in a dilemma. So Sonnleitner, the president of the DSV: 
"Even though farmers know about the advantages of less herbicide and 
pesticide use, farmers fear that when using GMOs they could become 
once again victims of consumer boycotts" (Sonnleitner 2002). 
These worries for farmers about negative consumer reactions have now, due to the gene 
flow and field contamination problematique, been supplemented by the threat of possible 
legal liability disputes with neighbouring producers.131 The many conventional farmers 
who show a skeptical attitude towards GMOs are facing more and more pressures to use 
and tolerate agro-biotech products, if only because fodder and seed provision is 
130 The DBV Is a member of COPA, Committee of Agricultural Organizations of the EU, the main farming 
lobby organization at the European level. 
131 For instance, in a circular to the members of the regional DBV concerning agro-biotechnology It Is argued 
that there is no reason to cultivate GM crops because of /lability risks, the possible Image loss with consumers 
and the lack of positive Income prospects (Kreisbauernverband TOblngen/Zollernalb 2004: 7). 
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increasingly marked by GMO influx. In addition, the organic farmers, who form an 
increasing internal faction within the DBV as a consequence of the "Agrarwende", have 
stepped up pressure to get the farmer's organization to also represent their legitimate 
interests.132 Altogether the DBV-represented farming community is very heterogeneous 
with respect to their acceptance of agro-biotechnology, more so than the organization is 
officially representing. 133 
Thus, being caught up between potential GM cultivators and non-cultivators, the DBV has 
recently become much more hesitant in speaking out in favour of GMOs. Instead the 
organization stresses consumer and producer choice and the prevention of unpredictable 
risks for farmers. In this sense the DBV identifies strict coexistence regulation as the key 
issue for guaranteeing choice and for providing a reliable legal framework for farmers. In 
accordance with the organic farmers, the DBV holds that a privatized conflict solution, as 
current neighborhood regulation in the German Civil Code suggests, pits farmers against 
farmers ("the war in the village") and is thus unacceptable. l34 The DBV insists on clear EU 
wide responsibility and liability regulation before the ending of the Moratorium. In this 
respect the DBV criticizes the EU commission's coexistence proposal and holds that 
"subsidiarity is wrong". In addition the DBV supports a lower than 0.9 % threshold in seed 
and the idea of voluntary GM-free areas (DBV 2003). In the case that approval of GMOs 
was to proceed without binding coexistence rules "the DBV would advise its members to 
abstain from cultivating GM crops", as the DBV stated in October 2003 (Kienle 2003). 
The biggest, mainly conventional farmer's organization DBV has thus over time become 
one of the principle players in the demand for stricter regulation of GMOs. Even though 
132 Even though the DBV represents many organic farmers, It stresses that "it Is the farmer and not the 
specific production orientation that is put In the foreground" (interview DBV, 11/03). Yet the "Agrarwende" 
policies and the subsequent increase in organic farming· 50 per cent within the last three years - has not 
gone unnoticed in the farming sector. As a consequence the DBV seems now to have discovered Its organic 
clientele. In 2003 the DBV held its first "Forum on Organic Farming" in the history of the association in which 
the biotech Issue played a vital role (Sonnleitner 2003). 
133 Another family farming organization, the AbL, a kind of counter organization to the DBV, has also strongly 
spoken out against GMOs (AbL 2002). 
134 In contrast to organic farmers, the DBV rejects liability in case of compliance with CUltivation rules. The 
DBV also supports a fund-based solution as it would allow liability claims to be quickly resolved. In doing so it 
Is in favour of coexistence regulation similar to the Danish regulation (i.e. no liability In case of compliance, 
biotech fund financed by public/private sources (DBV 2004). This, however, is not going far enough for 
organic farmers. 
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the DBV underwrote a statement by a grand coalition of biotech supporters during the 
Diskurs, the so-called "Warenkette-Initiative", the DBV had recently become a difficult 
partner when it came to the initiatives of the biotech industry. For instance, whilst 
demanding coexistence regulation it supported the initiative on voluntary GMO-free zones. 
It argued, in a rather surprising alliance with the Nature Conservation Agency (BfN), in 
favour of large-scale field trials (agrar.de Aktuell 2003). Most importantly, though, in 
October 2003 the DBV cancelled its support of large-scale industry/Lander government-
initiated field trials in Saxony-Anhalt because of the lack of coexistence and liability rules 
(DBV 2003a). Thus, even though the DBy continued to playa somewhat ambivalent role 
in the debate on agro-biotechnology it has over time become a supporter of a stricter 
regulatory policy course.135 
Consumer organizations: "Pseudo-choice as solution to dilemma I" 
The rise in prominence of consumer issues after the BSE crisis opened up new 
opportunities for consumer groups in the political and administrative realm.136 Along with a 
restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture, numerous previously disparate consumer lobby 
groups within Germany were bundled into one organization, the Federal Consumer 
Association (vzvb). With a prominent president137 and provided with considerable funding 
and personnel, this organization quickly became a critical political voice in Germany and 
more broadly involved in issues of food and agriculture. 
With respect to GM food, the right of consumers to free choice has always been the key 
principle in consumer lobby work. In the past this meant being i~volved in questions on 
comprehensive labeling policies, transparency and public information provision. New 
agricultural policies and the focus on precautionary consumer choice and process quality 
135 Critics argue that the DBV does not have a clear stance on the issue and they wonder which farming 
interests the DBV stands for: the GMO cultivators or the non-CUltivators. 
136 In the year 2001 a new consumer watchdog organization called "Foodwatch" was founded by the former 
head of Greenpeace International, Thilo Bode. Even though this organization has so far not been very visible 
In GM crops and food Issues, its rise clearly Indicates a growing awareness of food safety issues and an 
increase In consumer advocacy work. 
137 Edda MOiler, both former Lander Minister of Environment and former vice president of the UN 
Environmental Agency. 
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have widened the scope of issues and activities of consumer food policies beyond a mere 
focus on consumption and market activities (MOiler 2001). Supporting the link between 
agricultural practices, environmental protection and consumer choice consumer 
organizations became part of a grand alliance of actors strongly supporting the 
"Agrarwende" (Gemeinsame Plattform 2001). This new consumer choice approach is 
reflected in the following statement to the Diskurs. 
"As long as there are no clear answers with respect to opportunities and 
risks in agro-biotech it would not be in the interest of consumers to 
support measures which jeopardize or even render impossible 
alternative product markets and technological problem solutions. Fast 
track decisions 'justified' under the pressure of economic interests shall 
in no case jeopardize the proclaimed aims of the Agrarwende" 
(Verbraucherinitiative 2002). 
For German consumer organizations one thing is clear, "the majority of consumers don't 
want GM food" (vzbv 2002). In addition, German consumer groups stress uncertainties in 
risk assessment and safety questions. 
'There remains considerable scientific controversy about questions of 
risk assessment, safety, and reversibility. This needs to be assessed 
from a consumer protection pOint of view. These uncertainties with 
respect to risk potentials and consumer benefits do not allow the 
reduction of the question of agro-biotechnology to one of coexistence 
between different production systems. Moreover we need to do 
everything to guarantee safety and consumer choice" 
(Verbaucherinitiative 2002; similarly vzbv 2002). 
"Food prices need to speak the economic, ecological and social truth" and consumers 
should be fully informed about this, states one of the principles of the Federal Consumer 
Organization (vzbv 2002a: 46). For guaranteeing safety and consumer choice, consumer 
organizations were thus pushing the discussion on questions of thresholds, costs and 
liability.138 Regarding the coexistence line, which they accepted on the basis of low 
138 Consumer organizations hold that the cost of controlling contamination and of separating flows of goods 
should be bome by those who introduce the technology. 
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thresholds as being the only realistic alternative, for consumer groups one of the most 
pressing problems to be solved was that of the necessary conditions and practical steps 
to be taken for a workable coexistence between different forms of agriculture. As opposed 
to environmental groups, who initially showed reluctance in even discussing the question 
of coexistence, for the consumer organisations and organic farmers coexistence meant at 
least "pseudo-choice", and as such was for them the best of the possible alternatives 
(interview vzbv, 06/02).139 
Environmental NGOs: "Avoid creeping contamination I" 
There is no overall common approach within the environmental/anti-biotechnology NGO 
community as to how to handle the questions of GMOs in the future. In general, the NGOs 
still focus on a definite ban of GMOs and have thus for a long time been seemingly 
unwilling to start negotiations on thresholds, coexistence regulation or monitoring. 
"Coexistence is impossible" was the line taken by NGOs at the Diskurs (Kochlin 2002). 
Hence, for the NGOs the argument of consumer choice and coexistence did not really 
solve any of the fundamental opposition (Moldenhauer 2003). For them coexistence 
meant "contamination" and the concept of thresholds was seen as "the Trojan horse of the 
biotech industry" (ibid.: 251) and a "tranquilizer pill for consumers" (Nagy 2003: 3).140 
However, facing the reality of GM cultivation, critical groups have recently engaged more 
in the debates. 
"Coexistence may be impossible in many cases, but if we are to deal with GM CUltivation 
in Europe then we need to tackle the problem of contamination"" so one leading voice in 
the critic's camp (interview ZsL, 06/03). In this respect the EU Commission's proposal is 
absolutely unacceptable for these groups. Even though the environmental NGOs strongly 
1390uring the Diskurs there was disagreement on thresholds within the critic's camp: consumer NGOs and 
organic farmers were leaning towards higher thresholds out of fear that otherwise there would be practically 
nothing left labeled GMO-free. They urged the environmental NGOs to drop their reluctance and start 
negotiating about separation distances, costs and other practical steps to be taken to make coexistence and 
"pseudo-choice" possible (interview vzvb, 06/02). Officially, however, organic farmer's organizations support 
the "as low as possible line" with regards to thresholds. Organic farmers are thus caught In a dilemma. As a 
baseline they demand that "those who consciously reject the use of GMOs should be allowed to calf their 
products GM-free" (LOwenstein 2003). 
140 However, Greenpeace almost euphorically celebrated the new labeling and traceability requirements from 
July 2003 as progress for consumers. 
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side with the organic farmers, they stress that the question of coexistence is not just an 
economic, but also an environmental and ethical issue. They argue that outcrossing or 
unwanted spread of reproductive material poses an environmental risk, as this spread 
would be irreversible. On the grounds of precaution, introgression of GM material, 
especially in seed, should be avoided, not just minimized. Strict coexistence rules are thus 
regarded as a basic precautionary measure, as they alone provide the necessary 
conditions that would allow a withdrawal in case of damage or to keep certain areas free 
from GMOs (Muller 2002). For these groups, coexistence is thus more than just a matter 
of technical measures and commercial interests, being additionally an "issue of long term 
guarantee of the freedom to choose what to consume and how to produce" (Haerlin 2003: 
. 5). Given this opinion on the issue it is argued: 
"In cases in which the choice not to use and consume GMOs would 
become practically impossible, the right to avoid GMOs must prevail 
OVer the right to use GMOs ... [ ... ] freedom of choice in this context is 
primarily a defensive right to avoid a certain technology for precautionary 
and ethical reasons. It should not be mistaken for a general entitlement 
to use whatever technology or its products" (ibid.: 2). 
Facing the realities of a falling Moratorium, the NGOs run multiple strategies of damage 
prevention. One such strategy is to lobby for a ban of biotechnology on the basis of risk 
and uncertainty arguments. This includes public mobilization efforts and information 
provision of various kinds.141 However, as a new line of argument the NGOs stress the 
"Agrarwende" and support the opportunities of a developing quality food market, within 
which a GM-free Europe could stand out, serving the niche markets in the world 
(80scherUGiII 2003). The NGOs have thus taken up and further pushed the "Agrarwende" 
and quality food production rhetoric to keep transgeniC material away from the fields and 
the markets, thereby strongly supporting organic producers. For instance, Greenpeace 
Germany has recently merged the issue of pesticide contamination with the issue of agro-
141 I.e. The Greenpeace-Shopping net initiative. In March 1996 Greenpeace Germany started the campaign 
"Greenpeace.Shopping ner, a Greenpeace consumer service. In the context of this campaign, Greenpeace 
publishes· on the Internet, in booklets and in the media - information lists on retailer and producer's stance on 
GM sourcing and labeling policies. Greenpeace continuously updates this information and in 2003 
commissioned another poll (www.greenpeace.de). 
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biotechnology under the motto: "Stop poison and biotechnology in our food". 142 Friends of 
the Earth Germany (BUNO) has conducted a campaign on healthy food under the motto 
"For healthy food without biotechnology.,,143 Even the nature conservation movement 
(NABU) has come on board by lobbying for sustainable farming practices and against 
biotechnology under the mottos "Tasty country-side!" and "Nature conservation with the 
shopping bag" (NABU 1998). 
In more recent efforts aimed at protecting the right to stay GMO-free, NGOs lobby for 
stringent rules and community-based activities to protect non-GMO conventional and 
organic farming. They support the "Save'our Seed" campaign 144 for seed purity and the 
establishment of GMO-free areas. For instance, in 2003 Friends of the Earth Germany 
(BUNO) started the campaign "Fair neighbourhood,,145, in which it provides legal 
information and support to local communities for the establishment of GMO-free areas 
and GMO-free feed supply. 146 In these activities the BUNO is supported by the BfN. In the 
so-called "round table", an initiative supported by sixteen different groups consisting of the 
organic farming community and some conventional farming organizations (except OBV), 
including one Union, the consumer organization (vzbv) and various religious-based 
groups, environmental NGOs stage public events and write petitions to government in 
support of a restrictive transposition of the Genetic Engineering Act, including liability 
regulation and a "Reinheitsgebof' with seed (seed purity) (Offener Brief 2003). 
142 This new framing has had some effect on the way the subject is internally handled. Greenpeace Germany 
restructured its biotechnology section as to more Intensely focus on questions of food production and 
agriculture. At the website of Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND) the Issue of agro-blotechnology is now 
wholly subsumed under the topic of "Agrarwende: 
143 www.bund.net 
144 The "Save our Seed" campaign, led by the German Foundation on Future Farming (ZsL), lobbies for 
stringent seed purity legislation, that Is, for contamination thresholds at the level of detectability. The campaign 
leader Bennl Haerlin, both former activist of Greenpeace International and former member of the European 
Parliament for the Greens/EFA, has managed to gather 300 groups to support the Initiative for seed purity as 
a precondition for coexistence. Haerlin has become something of a multi plica tor for NGO activities in the 
German anti-biotech scene. 
145 www.faire-nachbarschaft.de 
1461n Germany Increasingly broad-spectrum based local groups (I.e. including Attac, farmer's organizations, 
environmental, nature conservation, consumer, religious groups etc.) are forming up to push for GMO free 
areas. 
171 
Biotech-industry: IIWhat's the problem anyway?" 
In the closing statement to the Diskurs industry stated the following, 
"We are very happy that the majority of societal groups represented at 
the Diskurs want coexistence. That is, they support the existence of 
different agricultural production systems and ways of food production" 
(Prante 2002: 2). 
Hence, for the biotech industry coexistence is first of all interpreted as a positive signal for 
an acceptance of agro-biotechnology. In moving the focus to cultivation, production chain 
and trade issues, the coexistence debate marks a move away from theoretical and 
fundamental discussions about risks towards more concrete questions of feasibility and 
practicability (ibid.). Industry considers coexistence as a mere economic issue and nothing 
new in the farming business. For them coexistence is a question of thresholds which need 
to be "plausible and workable". Thresholds as such do not have an environmental and 
health related relevancy, as released products have been tested in this respect. On the 
basis of thresholds "good exchange between neighboring farmers, combined with 
practical measures of good agricultural practices allow coexistence of different production 
systems" (Gent 2003). 
Thus industry finds the discussion about coexistence highly overrated and mainly pushed 
by "ideological interests" as these, so the argument goes, were pursuing the issue of 
coexistence as a means of stopping framers from growing GMOs. After all, "admixtures" 
(e.g. in case of herbicide residues) are a reality and accepted even in organic agriculture-
up to a certain threshold. Accordingly, industry supports the EU coexistence proposal in 
terms of subsidiarity and responsibility: "The state should be rolled back, the concerned 
parties are able to organize themselves" (interview industry, 06/03). With respect to 
liability, industry does not accept being held liable in case of contamination and does not 
see why contamination as such constitutes a problem. With respect to organic or "without 
genetic engineering" -labeled products they argue that "those who hope to benefit [from 
special production, K.B.] should be paying for it" (interview industry, 06/03). In this 
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respect, it is argued that making 'unreasonable demands' would render food items more 
expensive, this way contradicting majority consumer interests. 147 
In efforts to "safeguard innovation", to "promote diversity" and in establishing a general 
framework and a reliable legal basis from "farm to fork" (Warenkette 2003), the seed 
industry is supported by members of the food chain, such as the food & feed industry, 
German wholesalers and oil-millers.148 Against the public demand for safeguarding 
coexistence, industry is, nevertheless, showing efforts in contributing to the newly required 
knowledge base. In a common industry/Lander government cultivation programme 
planned in the Eastern German State of Saxony-Anhalt in the year 2003, biotech 
companies, including Bayer, Syngenta, Monsanto, BASF and farmers organizations were 
offering to address these questions on the feasibility of coexistence.149 Yet in November 
2003, when the joint agreement was due to be signed, of the original sixteen different 
programme supporters, only six companies had signed the agreement. The German 
Farmer's Organization (OBV) and other local farmer's organizations withdrew support 
because liability rules were still missing (Lohr 2003). 
147 It is interesting to see how this it put in a questionnaire handed out to participants of the Diskurs by the 
Moderation team. Question: What do you think should In any case not be one of the results of the Diskurs? 
Response DIS/IVA: "Ignoring majority interests, as organic food is only bought by a minority of customers" 
(DISIIVA 2002). , 
148 The Warenkette" is a common initiative supported by eleven organizations along the food chain. It 
involves the seed, food, feed Industry, German wholesalers and import/export firms, German oil-miller's 
association, the National Farmer's Organization, and the Union of the chemical Industry. This Initiative was 
formed during the course of the Diskurs. Together they developed a common stance on the Issue, published 
in (Warenkette 2002; Warenkette 2003 in German & English). In a press release of the 'Warenkette", which is 
much less focused on innovation potentials but is instead stressing the necessity of reasonable coexistence 
regulation and consumer choice, the initiative is also supported by the retail sector, the Union for agriculture, 
construction and environment (IG-SAU) and the Union for the food and restaurant sector (NGG) (Warenkette 
2002). . 
149 In 1998 Industry began to conceptualize cultivation programmes to gain experience in the field and to test 
the performance of the new crops. For instance Sayer (at this point Aventis), In cooperation with other 
companies, had started their own privately run cultivation programmes to monitor the performance and the 
cultivation practice of GM maize (Degenhardt et al. 2003). These programmes had been conducted with the 
use of special licensed seed contingents from the Federal Seed Agency (up to this point no transgenic seed 
had been given approval for cultivation in Germany) on several hundred hectares of farmland. Permission was 
given for the products to be used as animal feed. These programmes scarcely touched upon safety aspects 
but more importantly served the purpose of validating the company's performance enhancement claims. For 
example, In a publication Issued by Monsanto, Pioneer and Syngenta on a four-year cultivation programme in 
Germany, the issue is solely the efficiency of St maize as compared to other pesticide methods and the 
subsequent profitability calculations for the farmers (ibid.). 
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Food processors and retailers: "We should have it all." 
In a policy statement issued during the Diskurs the grand coalition of members of the food 
supply chain declared that: 
"consumer acceptance can be increased by ensuring freedom of choice 
and the coexistence of different agricultural practices" (Warenkette 2003: 
8). 
This goal to ensure "effective coexistence" (ibid.), however, can only be achieved on the 
basis of comprehensive and practical regulation. The food industry clearly wants the 
innovation potential of biotechnology to be realized (SVE 2002). For industry, coexistence 
means that consumers and members of the supply chain can be given the choice to buy 
or use genetically modified products. In this respect, the food industry rejects 
'disproportionate' regulation, including process based labeling schemes. 
A "Warenkette" press release from 2002, supported by the retail sector, stated that 
"coexistence is a dynamic process in which consumers and not interest groups decide 
over market shares" (Warenkette 2002). The retail sector thus supports the coexistence 
strategy, stressing that it offers a platform for every safe product. However the retail 
sector, another victim of the SSE crisis, is more cautious in terms of promoting such a 
consumer sensitive issue and argues neither in favour nor against GM products.15o In 
contrast to other members of the supply chain the retail sector wants coexistence to be 
regulated on a European level, as different understandings and regulations of coexistence 
would not bring closure to the debate which they think is, however, pivotal for finally 
achieving consumer confidence (interview BVL, 10103). 
In the past the retail sector played a pivotal role as gatekeeper for GM food products. On 
the basis of anticipated consumer refusal the sector refrained from stocking GM labeled 
products on its shelves, at least in its own-label products. The pressure of the retail sector 
150 The SVL in a policy statement; "The SVL has always pursued the goal of providing consumers with free 
choice by clearly labeling products. Against the background of experiences with SSE and the loss of trust in 
the safety and quality of food the realization of this goal Is ever more pressing" (SVL 2003). The retail sector 
has therefore not supported a 'Warenkette" policy statement, which was more openly supportive of the 
technology (Warenkette 2003). 
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in turn induced the food industry, itself vulnerable to the "stigmatization" of their brands, to 
avoid the use of transgenic material. However, during the Diskurs other members of the 
supply chain, such as the wholesalers and oil-millers, stressed the increasingly difficult 
conditions for the use of GMO-free bulk raw products (BGNVDOe 2002). 
On the basis of this, in 2003 the retail sector produced a policy statement in which it urges 
consumers to take into consideration the fact that new labeling requirements, together 
with global sourcing of raw materials, would be likely to render it more costly and difficult, 
if not impossible, to avoid the use of transgenic raw materials and to find non-GM 
substitutes for use in their products (BVL' 2003).151 As a result, it could become 
increasingly likely that rather than try to substitute materials and keep products GMO free, 
they would just be put on the market labeled as GM. 152 
However, the process of strategy discussions and decision making within and between 
the various members of the food chain on how handle the issue is still ongoing (interviews 
BVL, 10/03; BLL, 10/03) and, at the time of investigation, no final conclusion had been 
reached. Agro-biotech seems to remain a 'hot potato' - irrespective of its advances in the 
food chain and increased efforts to portray it otherwise - and likely to be passed around or 
'strategically defined' in the process of production and product marketing.153 How these 
151 One can also more frequently hear the argument that a negative public attitude towards GM products 
revealed by surveys may not actually translate into consumer boycotts of the specifically labeled product. A 
frequently cited example is the market situation of organic products, since these, although very highly valued 
by a majority of consumers, are rarely bought. Especially the German market has proven to be extremely cost 
sensitive, which leads to the suspicion that for the majority of customers it will be the price, and not the label 
that eventually determines purchasing decisions. 
152 This is, at least, what could also be concluded from the minutes of a meeting between the Metro 
Corporation (retailer) and some biotech companies. These internal minutes are available on the Greenpeace 
Shopping-Net website at www.greenpeace.de [28.08.2003]. 
153 In this respect the case of Edeka Nord is illustrative of the conflict: In 2003 Edeka Nord (retail chain) 
started sourcing meat from animals that were fed with GM-free fodder only. Even though the GM policies are 
up to the companies themselves, the strategy was criticized for being "consumer deceptive" for the following 
reason. Edeka Nord had argued on the grounds of offering only "GM-free" meat. This wording, however, does 
not comply with the regulation on labeling (Lebensmittelzutatenverordnung) which allows only the wording of 
"without genetic engineering" (meaning produced by non-intentional use of genetiC engineering). The 
argument was that Edeka Nord was unjustly playing on consumer worries using unlawful advertising slogans. 
With respect to product marketing, the German Federation of Food Law and Food Science (BLL), a pro 
biotech organization, recommends that its members refrain from giving written assurances about non-GM 
sourcing policies which they think cannot withstand market rationalities in the long run, I.e. with respect to the 
availability of GM-free feed. To "inform consumers truthfully" about GM material being used in their food and 
to give them a choice is thus considered as more helpful In building consumer trust in food products than 
providing potentially misleading information (interview BLL, 10/03). 
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tensions are being handled and how coexistence works in practice remain open questions 
to these actors. 
Science associations: "Coexistence regulation as blocking policy" 
The most important science association in Germany, the German Research Society 
(DFG), is one of the most significant supporters of biotechnological applications. In 2001 
the DFG published a new official statement regarding agro-biotechnology in which it 
recommended the 
" ... promotion of the responsible development of genetic engineering in 
plant breeding and food-related microbiology to the benefit of humans 
and the environment" (DFG 2001: 46). 
In response to the "Agrarwende", the DFG highlighted that "gene technology is not 
incompatible with new agriculture policies, which focus increasingly on quality rather than 
on quantity" (ibid.: 45). The science organization has always considered itself as being the 
rational, objective voice in the German debate, and with this statement it continued to 
stress that, "the DFG would like to make an objective contribution to this discussion, which 
has often been extremely emotional in recent times" (ibid.: 44). 
In this respect the Diskurs was criticized by the science organizations the DFG and DAF, 
the umbrella organization for the science associations in agricultural, forest, food and 
environmental research, for not being led by science-based facts, rather having been 
undermined by particular organized interests (DFG/DAF 2002).154 
"In the scientific community we support the fact that consumers have a 
right to information and freedom of choice and that thresholds need to 
be based on scientific criteria. At the same time we hold that labeling 
does not have anything to do with ecological and health risks. We 
154 NGOs have made the criticism that the science organizations do not consider themselves as stakeholders, 
rather they insist that they are objective, disinterested parties (Moldenhauer 2003a). The NGO representative 
states In a comment on the Diskurs that "it was particularly alienating that Prof. Buhk from the Robert-Koch 
Institut, the Competent Authority, spoke as a representative of the OAF demanding an extension of field 
research" (ibid.: 252). 
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scientists clearly deplore the fact that the Diskurs has not been able to 
convey this message" (ibid.: 3). 
In fact, with the coexistence debate it has been argued by these and other like-minded 
scientists that the discussion on GMOs has become even 'more ideological' in nature, and 
that with the new planned regulation on coexistence the government was implementing a 
"blocking policy" (agrar.de aktuell 2003a). 
In the past, and continuing to date, the science organizations have been professionally 
organized, for instance in the "Wissenschaftskreis grOne Gentechnik" and other expert 
panels or commonly staged symposiums. They are well integrated in the networks of 
associations and individuals that support biotechnology, as for instance in the 
"Gesprachskreis GrOne Gentechnik" a confidential pro-GMO public-private and business-
science expert circle. Yet this line of reasoning concerning coexistence mentioned above 
is not shared by the Association of German Scientists (VDW), which, together with the 
Cko-Institut, supports a strict coexistence policy. They demand strict regulation, including 
liability and the level of detectability in seed thresholds. In great contrast to the above 
mentioned science organizations, the VDW-scientists declare that their demands are 
justified by science and societal considerations (agrar.de aktuell 2003b). 
BMVEL: Safeguarding choice and preventing the "war in the villages" 
As was shown in Chapter six, with the new KOnast line the GM controversy has been 
embedded in a more fundamental discussion on food production and a restructuring of 
farming. KOnast made it no secret that GM crop cultivation did not fit into her scenario of 
more sustainable forms of future food production (KOnast 2002). Seen from this 
perspective the demand for coexistence means something more fundamental, beyond the 
direct impact on consumers and farmers and their economic interests. In that vein, the 
questions regarding the regulation of biotechnology in agriculture and food imply matters 
beyond health and the environment also affecting social and ethical concerns. However, 
as the minister declared, thresholds alone would not guarantee this freedom of choice as 
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long as organic, non-GMO conventional farmers and others affected by the introduction of 
GMOs into the food chain were not protected. That is why KOnast demands strict 
coexistence rules. She contends that the introduction of provisions on coexistence is 
required since this is the only way to "prevent war in the villages" and to achieve a 
'peaceful balance' between the interests of non-GMO and GMO cultivators and their 
clients (Berliner Zeitung 2004). Hereby the BMVEL considers that the coalition agreement 
and the EU Directive 2001/18 could be used as a statutory basis for such measures. In 
the latter, Art. 26a (new) states that member states can specify protective measures in 
order to avoid adventitious presence of GMOs in non-GM products. 
"Coexistence is not primarily a matter of safety considerations but there 
are connections to the safety question, e.g. with respect to monitoring 
and traceability. Coexistence allows an individual safety decision 
according to individual preferences. That's the basic principle" (interview 
BMVEL, 06/03). 
The Ministry is thus not primarily concerned about possible environmental safety aspects 
with respect to coexistence regulation. Interestingly enough though, nature protection is 
also framed as a coexistence issue in terms of safeguarding not only GM-free agricultural 
and food choices but also "GM-free nature", in particular with regard to protected areas 
(interview BMVEL, 06/03). 
With this policy line, KOnast is receiving a lot of support from the organic and 
environmenta.1 community, as they claim that current regulation does not sufficiently take 
into account the changing realities and altered background conditions concerning quality 
food production and sustainable agriculture. As is argued in the UBA coexistence report, 
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"The European lawmaker has recognized the growing significance for 
the consumer of foods produced through organic farming and is giving 
organic farming a role in the reorientation of the joint agricultural policy. 
[ ... ], the European lawmaker must find a way to settle the conflict of 
interest and keep the peace between the different forms of agriculture 
(UBA 2003: 35, 36). 
Current GMO regulation would thus contradict these aspirations. The report therefore 
suggests that the necessary protective measures for this non-GMO sector could be based 
on a "well founded protective and precautionary concept by the member state" (ibid.: 40). 
BMVEL thesis paper on coexistence of conventional and organic agriculture from 
09.05.2003 
After month of discussion on the subject, in May 2003 the Ministry of Consumer Protection 
had finally put forward the following proposed principles for GMO handling: 
• Polluter-pays principle 
• Coexistence requires specific measures to be put in place throughout the food chain 
• Coexistence requires thresholds (seed: as low as possible) 
• Even though specific measures need to be put in place throughout the food chain, 
most important will be to safeguard seed and agricultural production 
• To guarantee effective property protection of GMO-free cultures and to secure a 
"peaceful coexistence" of different production systems, a minimum of public regulation 
is needed. i.e. conditions at deliberate release, definition of good production practices 
in the handling of GMOs, general requirements with respect to qualification of farmers 
and information dispersal (maybe alongside voluntary agreements) 
• Liability for GMO producer and cultivator 
• Obligation to register GMO application in a public register (cultivation objective and 
production site) 
• Establishment of GM-free zones 
• Civil laws in case of property infringement on non-GMO products 
In this proposal (BMVEL 2003) it is stated that national measures are necessary, but for 
purposes of market harmonization a European regulatory framework is needed. The 
KOnast Ministry criticizes the EU Commission's advance in coexistence and instead 
formulates a clear demand for European and national regulation beyond voluntary 
agreements. In conceptualizing its coexistence strategy, the BMVEL has used a great 
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deal of expertise from the Oko-lnstitut155 and the organic community. However, the 
Ministry stresses that it does not speak only for the organic community, but for the 
majority of farmers and consumers. Coexistence provisions are considered as so pivotal 
to safeguarding choice and keepi~g peace between farmers that the BMVEL calls for a 
"duty to precautionary practices" ("Vorsorgepflicht") in order to strengthen damage 
prevention (Wollersheim 2003). 
8.1.3 Transposition of EU Directive 2001/18 into national law: the way to the new 
Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG) 
In July 2003 the EU Commission launched a lawsuit against the German and ten other 
European governments for not having transposed the new legislation on release of 
GMOs, Directive 2001/18, into national law. Yet already in 2002 a new version of the 
Genetic Engineering Act (GenTG) had been drafted by the BMGS but eventually fell victim 
to the new political constellation and subsequent changes in competence.156 This process 
of shifting of competence took up a great deal of time and political mediation at the 
highest level. In the meantime the process of drafting had been stopped and then taken 
up under a new political leadership and with new and different political priorities. 
In Spring 2003, a draft version newly worked out under the BMVEL was given green light 
from Minister KOnast and was circulated between the different ministries and 
administrative federal and Lander bodies involved in GMO regulation. The draft law was 
written in 'the new spirit' in terms of strengthening safety regulation and introducing a 
coexistence and liability regime. Even though the minister declared that the bill would 
pass in the year 2003, the process of commenting and first internal tuning already took 
much longer than expected. In the meantime stakeholders had organized themselves and 
ran multiple conferences, activities and events on the subject.157 To name just a few, 
155 In fact, according to insiders, KUnast was to a great extent taking on external forms of expertise mainly due 
to a lack of cooperation within her own ministry. 
156 For the development of the legislative process, see: http://keine-
~entechnik.de/polltiklcountdown/countdown_1 0.html.[1 0.01.05]. 
7 For instance, In April 2004 there was the biggest ever anti agro-biotech demonstration In the city of 
Stuttgart with over 10.000 participants. 
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GMO advocates initiated parliamentary hearings in the state of Saxony-Anhalt and the 
Bundestag to push the 'red-green' government toward a "quick and reasonable 
transposition" of the GenTG. GMO proponents supported the "Save our Seed" campaigns, 
'round table' initiatives and regional activities in support of GM-free (meaning cultivation 
free) zones 158 and strict regulation. In November 2003 the first voluntary GM-free 
cultivation zone was established in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, based on a 
common initiative of organiC and conventional farmers. Many more such initiatives were 
soon to follow. A public/private cultivation programme, similar to the one mentioned 
before, was finally started in May 2004 against strong and continuous protest. 159 In the 
community the topic was highest on the agenda and it was argued on all fronts that 
whatever happened now, would "seal the fate of agro-biotech in Germany". 
One of the bigger hurdles for the draft was overcoming the internal split between the 
coalition partners and the administration themselves. Giving proof of the ongoing 
struggles, 2003 is marked by contradictory developments. For instance, in May 2003 the 
RKI (BVL) approved a GM maize variant from Monsanto, based on a controversial risk 
assessment rationale, indicating that regulatory practice seemed to be continuing largely 
as before.16o In contrast to this, in October 2003 a GM apple field trial was stopped by an 
intervention of the BMVEL with green parliamentary members justifying the move on the 
grounds that "the development of alternative measures was more promising 
(Hermanau/Hettlich 2003). Likewise the strong precautionary nature of the bill triggered 
major arguments between the coalition partners. In particular the social democratic-led 
Ministry of Economics (BMWi) and the Ministry of Education and Science (BMBF). 
158 There is an important differentiation between GMO-free zones and GMO-free cultivation zones. As a GMO-
free zone suggests an entirely GMO-free area, and since this is difficult to guarantee both organic and 
conventional farmers refer to GMO-free cultivation zones. For instance in the MGMO-free cultivation zone 
Neckar-Alb", a region in the state of Baden-Wllrttemberg, animal feed containing GMOs can still be fed. 
Organic farmers are even running advertisements with signs on their fields saying MGMO-free cultivation". 
They say there is no 100% guarantee to avoid GMO Invasion In the fields and In seeds. 
159 In a so-called public/private biotechnology offensive, the States of Saxony-Anhalt, Bavaria and 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern together with private companies started GM crop trials in 29 different locations 
totaling approximately 300 ha of land. In order to get farmers on board, the State of Saxony-Anhalt put up a 
compensation fund of 240.000 EUR to be paid in case of economic damage. The trials came under attack 
because, among other reasons, locations were not disclosed, neither to the public nor neighboring farmers. 
160 Assessment concerns maize MON863 and hybrid MON863xMON81 O. The risk assessment from 
06.05.2003 is available on the website of the EU Joint Research Center. It was controversial, for instance, 
because the crop contained anti-biotic resistance marker genes. In the respective committee vote in Brussels, 
Germany, for the first time in a vote on GMO issues, abstained. 
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bastions of "Standort" based rhetoric, issued strong objections to the ministerial draft, 
which they claimed was too restrictive. 161 Accordingly in the process of finding a 
compromise, some features of the original draft version were changed. Finally in January 
2004, the 'red-green' government presented a common Cabinet proposal to the public. In 
May 2004 the draft proposal had its first reading in parliament. 
161 For Instance, the Minister of Economics has been quoted as saying that by protecting GMO-free production 
his colleague KOnast would "kill a future technology" (quoted in Moldenhauer 2003). 
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Box 3: The key provisions of the GenTG as of May 5, 2004 (Bundestag 2004) 
Coexistence as protection goal 
The GenTG proposal was written against the background of the consumer protection and 
coexistence problematique. The new law aims at ensuring GM-free production and the 
coexistence of GM crops and non GM-crops. This priority is highlighted by the fact that 
coexistence is added to the protection goals of the law in Paragraph One.162 This 
provision means that considerations other than scientific are added to the bill. However, 
the original draft proposal of the BMVEL was more outspoken on the issue. The 
respective compromise section reads as follows: The aim of the law is "to provide the 
opportunity to produce food and feed with conventional and organic, as well as 
biotechnological forms of production". 
The concept of economic damage 
Up to this point economic damage has been acknowledged neither in the law itself nor in 
judicial decisions. The new law proposal aims to protect non-GMO forms of land 
cultivation and hence introduces liability for economic damage. According to the polluter-
pays principle, GMO introgression, if resulting in damage, can trigger liability claims as 
specified in § 906 Civil Code neighborhood law. The law obliges GMO operators to take 
precautionary action by calling upon a "duty to precautionary practices" in order to prevent 
an "essential reduction of value" being inflicted on non-GMO crops. These precautionary 
practices are to be made concrete in the form of "Good Agricultural Practices" (Le. safety 
margins, pollen barriers etc.) to be specified in administrative rules. An "essential 
reduction of value" occurs when products cannot be placed on the m~rket because of 
cross contamination. Most controversially, planters of GM crops are held liable for 
economic damages to adjacent non-GM fields even if they followed planting instructions 
and other regulations. For easing proof of damage the new law establishes the principle of 
"joint and several liability" of all neighboring farmers which might have caused the cross 
contamination, so that the affected farmer can decide from whom to claim compensation. 
Publicly accessible cultivation register 
In order to provide cultivation information to all participating parties, a cultivation register is 
to be introduced where field trials, cUltivation sites and other specific data are listed. This 
was yet another point hotly debated between the coalition partners. The draft law of the 
162 Originally the goal of biotech promotion had been taken out in the BMVEL draft version, stressing the 
exclusively protective character of the bill. Keeping the goal of biotech promotion In the law was, however, 
strongly supported by biotech advocates in the government and hence reintroduced. 
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BMVEL foresaw full registration (exact locations of fields) and a publicly accessible 
register. Now only parties with a "justified interest" can have access. 
The Precautionary Principle (PP) 
The new law explicitly states the recourse to the Precautionary Principle in the aim of the 
law and in several passages, yet newly extended to include practices in coexistence. In 
the original BMVEL draft version, a reference to the PP was included in the part on risk 
assessment in order to stretch the scope of interpretation. This reference was omitted in 
the final version. However, the draft requires a minimization of outcrossing as a condition 
for field trial approval. 
Protection of "ecologically sensitive" areas 
Nature conservation concerns were explicitly added to the new law. For the sake of 
protecting "ecologically sensitive" areas, GM cultivation areas need to be registered at the 
local nature conservation office. However, cultivation can only be denied in cases of 
"considerable damage". 
Competent Authority 
The draft proposal reconfirms the change in competence - the shift of political 
responsibility for GM crops from the Ministry of Health (BMGS) to the Ministry of 
Consumer protection, Agriculture and Food (BMVEL) and the subsequent shift from the 
RKI to the BVL, as well as the shift from the UBA to the BfN. Whether the BFN was to 
have effective veto power in approval decisions was highly controversial. 
New composition of scientific advisory body (ZKBS) 
The proposed law suggests changes to the composition of the scientific advising 
committee ZKBS. This way it has taken on board a long-standing critique on the 
committee's composition in light of questions concerning environmental release. The law 
suggests splitting the committee in health and environmental related issues and changing 
the composition of the committee members such as to include additional expertise in the 
area of farming, consumer protection and nature conservation. 
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When introducing the Cabinet proposal to the public in January 2004, KQnast declared 
that a compromise was found which was "in the spirit of the BMVEL" and that the law "was 
a great success for consumers and for farmers" (quoted in Gaserow 2004).163 For 
consumer and environmental organizations and the organic farmers the law pointed in the 
right direction but was still not satisfactory as it left many questions, for example in the 
case of liability, un-addressed (Offener Brief 2004).164 Biotech proponents spoke of a 
"biotech prevention law" as the bill was found to be too restrictive, introducing 
"bureaucratization", posing obstacles to cultivation and stifling innovation (for example, 
DIB 2004). 
Since Lander competencies were bound to be involved in implementation, the bill needed 
to pass in the upper house (Bundesrat) as well. Already in April the opposition-dominated 
second legislative chamber issued a statement in which it suggested almost one hundred 
changes to the government proposal, mainly, however, in the area of coexistence and 
liability regulation (Bundesrat 2004).165 Yet the 'red-green' government and its respective 
majority in parliament did not signal its readiness to make any major concessions. In order 
to avoid lengthy conciliation procedures between the two legislative chambers and a 
watering down of what it considered to be 'central features of the new biotech legislation' 
the 'red-green' government changed the proposal such that it no longer needed consent 
in the second law-making chamber.166 Accordingly, the law was passed with strong 
backing of the Greens and the SPD Party in June 2004. It should be noted that the 
163 To underscore the Importance of regulation for consumer choice, alongside the GenTG proposal the 
SchrMer Cabinet approved a draft proposal introducing strong sanctions - including fines up to 50.000 EUR -
in case of non-compliance with new labeling laws as required by the EU legislation on food and feed stuff 
(agrar.de Aktuell 2004). This provision was, however, voted down by the Bundesrat (upper house) In April 
2004. 
164 However, It needs to be said that Kunast's law proposal was interpreted by many as an unnecessary 
"pressing ahead" In terms of clearing the way for new approvals (she was criticized, amongst others, by the 
Green/EFA group of the European Parliament). In fact, KOnast had always stressed the urgency of devising 
regulation to protect GMO-free agriculture in light of the lifting of the EU wide Moratorium. 
165 For instance, a farmer should only be held liable when violating good agricultural practices. The principle of 
joint and several liability should be dropped and Instead replaced by an public/private financed fund. The 
Bundesrat does not consider it to be necessary to formulate good agricultural practices (product Information 
labels on seed packages would be sufficient) or to require special competence In the handling of GMOs 
(Bundesrat 2004). Some of these proposed amendments were supported by social democratic Lander 
governments. 
166 The law stili has to go to the Bundesrat, however, It could only overrule the law adopted by the Bundestag 
with a two-thirds majority. Since this seems unlikely, according to Insiders, the Bundesrat can no longer 
prevent legislation, but only slow down the procedure. However, GMO proponents also question whether 
legislation complies with EU law and the German Constitution. 
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proposed coexistence legislation from June 2004 was even strengthened in some aspects 
by the parliamentary majority, for instance, liability claims could now be triggered by 
adventitious presence below 0.9%, giving in to central demands of organic farmers 
(Bundestag 2004).167 In this decisive session of the Bundestag, Herta Daubler-Gmelin168, 
a member of the SPD Party and chairperson of the Parliamentary Committee on 
Consumer Protection, stated the following, 
"As the European Directive stipulates, there should be a possibility to 
use GM crops and seed in agricultural production. However, our bill 
formulates strict rules for such usage. We think these rules are 
necessary because they guarantee and safeguard opportunities for 
those who do not want to use GMOs, and especially they protect organic 
farming. They are furthermore necessary because consumers, the great 
majority of whom reject GMOs, can continue to buy the products of our 
farmers. In the interest of these farmers and consumers we do not want 
GM foods to get on our shelves in a creeping and uncontrolled fashion. 
We not only want risks to be much more thoroughly assessed, but we 
want transparency, guarantees, truthfulness and clarity" (Daubler-
Gmelin 2004: 2). 
8.2 Explaining institutional and legislative change 
In this final narrative it was shown how the new debates developed and how they were 
having more significant effects, as in the reorganization of the Competent Authority, in 
stakeholder balance and in legislation. ThEa last analytical section will examine the 
narrative using Hajer and Sabatier's approaches. In particular, this section will test the role 
167 Further amendments: Reporting duties for GM cultivators were Increased. The amendment concerned 
changes to national nature protection law as providing a basis for refusal of cultivation in regionally specific 
sensitive areas. The law also gives the possibility to refuse and/or withdraw approval in case that coexistence 
Is not possible. With respect to liability, in case of damage despite compliance with good agricultural practices, 
the German Parliament suggested that farmers should take the matter of liability up with their seed providers 
(only weeks later the German insurance association declared that the cultivation risk was not insurable 
(agrar.de AktueIl2004). As another major change, the BfN's role in approval procedures was loosened so that 
only Its opinion and not its consent was required. 
166 There is an interesting connection between GM polices in Germany and the Iraq war. D~ubler-Gmelin, 
German Minister of Justice at the time of the US Iraq invasion in 2003, made a supposed comparison 
between Bush's Iraq policy and Hitler's foreign policies in the 1930s leading to her removal from office. She 
then became the chairperson of the Bundestag Parliamentary Committee on Consumer Protection, that is, in 
a leading brokering position between the parliamentary fractions. Ms Gmelin is a passionate, professional, 
very credible social democratic politician and was strongly supportive of the BMVEL policy approach. 
However, she was arguing more on the line of "transparency, guarantees, truthfulness and clarity". 
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of beliefs and discourse in coalition formation around coexistence and look at the quality 
of policy change. 
8.2.1 Discourse and story-lines as in Hajer 
Hajer introduces two concepts that allow us to judge when discourses become hegemonic 
and mark policy change. This is the case when a) the conditions of discourse structuration 
exist: "if the credibility of actors in a given domain requires them to draw on ideas, 
concepts, and categories of a given discourse" (Hajer 1995: 60). And b) discourse 
institutionalization is reached "when a given discourse is translated into institutional 
arrangements" (ibid.: 61). 
Coexistence - the conditions of "discourse structuration" and its effects 
In 2003 the coexistence issue became top of the biotech agenda throughout the German 
scene. As everybody talked about choice and coexistence, one could say that in the 
phase described above an actor's political credibility depended upon the usage of these 
terms. In fact, one could argue that coexistence needed to be considered for gaining 
public legitimacy, indicating that a condition of "discourse stucturation" existed. However, 
we can also see that coexistence meant different things to different people and groups. 
While for biotech critical discourse coalitions coexistence meant "the safeguarding of non-
GM alternative spaces and products", for the pro-GM discourse coalition coexistence 
meant "promoting diversity" in agricultural production and consumer choice, that is, 
coexistence meant the final breakthrough of agro-biotechnology. Both discourse coalitions 
thus related very different social, political and ecological imaginaries to the concept and, 
as a result, drew different conclusions for future measures. 
Coexistence: how new story-lines affect the balance between coalitions 
Coexistence brought about changes in the composition of discourse coalitions. In contrast 
to the 1990s when arguments of the "Standort" and "innovation" were paramount, the pro-
GMO communication changed. A stress on global "economic and food chain rationalities" 
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and "diversity" and free consumer choice, in combination with the demand for "reliable 
legal frameworks and planning security" brought together a great coalition of food chain 
actors to officially support a pro-GM policy line in the "Warenkette" initiative. This way the 
discourse coalition of the proponents was broadened, and, depending on what the 
emphasis was laid upon, be it "innovation/Standort" or "consumer choice", even the retail 
sector and some of the Unions (the NGG formerly belonging to the GMO critical camp) 
were joining in the discourse coalition of the GMO proponents. 
However, even though biotech proponents brought together a great coalition of actors in 
the "Warenkette" initiative, the coexistence issue put the GMO critical discourse coalition 
on the argumentative and political offensive, for the following reason: Coexistence means 
a shift in key terms, key practices and key actors. While the old biotech debate evolved 
primarily around environmental and health risks, the new coexistence debate is focused 
on more practical aspects of cultivation and separation of different production chains. 
Coexistence thus highlights different risks involved in biotech production than the ones 
that stood at the center of official attention before. Even though coexistence leads the 
focus away from environmental issues, the debate holds true for some of the story-lines 
that biotech critics had thrown into the debate for years, namely the risk potentials in 
outcrossing. The coexistence debate does not verify that outcrossing per se means 
damage, but it certainly consolidates that outcrossing and contamination are highly 
problematic in a political environment which is so divided on agro-biotech issues and 
moreover committed to new agricultural policies. This new prospect of possible economic 
damage was real. At this pOint a simple denial of this fact ceased to be an option. 
The "war In the village": creating new bonds between actors 
More importantly, as a DCF analysis illustrates, as the issue of agro-biotechnology finally 
"made it to the field" turning into a question of agricultural practices and local farming 
conditions, farmers have become increasingly involved in the policy discourse. Against the 
background of the "Agrarwende", the politically strengthened organic community had a 
strong case for demanding strict regulation, indeed, at the beginning of the story, the issue 
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was all about safeguarding organic farming. Yet the story-lines of "economic damage", 
"consumer boycotts" and finally the specter of a looming "war in the villages" suggested 
that coexistence was not just an issue for consumers or a minority of organic farmers, but 
that the legal and market insecurities of GM crops posed a potential economic risk to the 
whole farming business. In the farming community it is argued that farmers simply cannot 
afford to disregard consumer choice and to live in a constant state of mutual suspicion 
and legal quarrels with their neighbours. "Farmers should not be made to carry the risk of 
agro-biotech!" these sorts of story-lines thus create a common bond between conventional 
and organic farmers, working against an .organic/conventional farming divide. As a 
consequence, many conventional farmers have joined the discursive alliance of GM 
critical groups, including the DBV, although it remains committed to ambiguity on the 
subject. Together these forces build up a credible front against the "no problem" 
coexistence line of biotech proponents. 
Coexistence as "safeguarding alternatives": a powerful referential frame 
With "safeguarding alternatives in agriculture", the coexistence debate provided critical 
groups with new and hitherto neglected but highly plausible, political arguments of why 
GM technology, in the case that it was introduced, would have to be highly regulated and 
contained. In putting stress on the loss of choice for consumers and all farmers and in 
offering a positive scenario of quality food production, biotech critics have finally found a 
common powerful referential frame for their lobbying and other anti-biotech activities. 
Gaining external support also on the basis of economic interests, the discourse on free 
consumer choice and coexistence thus changed and strengthened the basis of the GM 
critical discourse coalition. The protest coalition, which used to be sustained mainly by 
environmental groups, was now strongly supported by consumer groups, nature 
conservationists, religious groups, local groups/initiatives and most of all farmers, 
altogether rendering protest more powerful, "tangible" and literally "down to earth", 
Bringing protest back to the communities, a sense of place - local eco-systems, local 
farming conditions (small-scale, small-patch) and local identities - are thus used to counter 
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the technocratic logic of free trade and technology intrusion.169 However, it should not be 
forgotten that GMO critical stakeholder input has gained momentum in legislative and 
community activities because it was supported at the highest political level. In this way the 
new discourse backed up the change in power relations between the protagonists and the 
opponents of GMOs. Given this political clout the BMVEL could, in turn, count on and 
point towards considerable public support for its new biotech strategy. 
Coexistence, expertise and possibilities of conflict solutions 
As mentioned earlier, through the new debates the concept of risks and expertise in agro-
biotechnology was extended and new knowledge (on organiC farming, nature 
conservation, crop separation, insurance schemes) found its way into biotech 
expert/stakeholder debates. In Germany this has found its expression in institutional 
redesigns to include new knowledge in expert procedures, such as the broadening of the 
scientific expert committee (ZKBS) or the installation of the BFN in crop approval. The 
question of coexistence further expands the range of possible socio-political concerns to 
be included in biotech deliberations. As shown in the narrative, biotech proponents, most 
of all those in the sciences, denounced this trend, calling it "ideological" or "unscientific", 
while others welcomed it as an opportunity to finally lay open the political and cultural 
choices inherent in technology regulation. Without a doubt, this discursive expansion 
further complicates the issue, as decisions need to take account of more divergent views 
and ask for even more scientific advice, for instance on questions of pollen flow or 
contamination pathways ("scientization").17o However, Hajer points to the opportunities of 
such arrangements when different discourses and concerns can be related to one another 
and those contested questions become part of the formal policy-making structure. More 
expertise can thus mean greater scope for mediation between socio-political and techno-
scientific interests and so contribute to solutions more acceptable for all. 
169 Although groups such as Attac are Involved In biotech protest activities the anti-globalization rhetoric has 
not really picked up In the German debate. This may be the case because it Is not supported by other 
important groups, such as the organic farmers. The localism German farmers adhere too is also less inspired 
by a romantic notion of locally specific rural life but rather concerns local patterns and conditions of farming 
and marketing. In contrast, for instance, to France (Heller 2002). 
170 For the concepts of ·scientlzatlon" and ·politlcization" see (Weingart 1999). 
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The BMVEL, BfN and the new GenTG - the conditions of "discourse 
institutionalisation" 
For Hajer discourse institutionalization is reached once a given discourse is translated into 
institutional arrangements, e.g. if the practical implications of contamination are translated 
into concrete policies (liability, good agricultural practices etc.). As shown in the narrative 
the institutional changes that took place in the year 2003/2004 give a strong indication of 
the consolidation of the new policy discourse. With the shift from the Ministry of Health to 
the Ministry of Consumer Protection, agro-biotechnology became wholly subsumed under 
consumer and agricultural policies. With the change from the UBA to the BfN, nature 
conservation and biodiversity related issues came to the foreground in biotech regulation. 
Finally, with new legislation focused on coexistence and liability regulation, the policy of 
free consumer choice and alternatives has received a relatively strong institutional base. 
Existing political institutions have thus internalized long-standing demands for 
incorporating new expertise (e.g. the change in composition of the ZKBS), and to deal 
with the new issues (liability). At this point in time (July 2004) one can safely say that the 
discourse of "Agrarwende" and "consumer choice" left its clear mark on the actual process 
of biotech regulation. 
8.2.2 Belief systems and change in the ACF 
How can one judge the developments in this phase from an ACF pOint of view? What is 
the role of beliefs in the framing of coexistence, could coalition building be explained on 
the basis of beliefs? On what basis can policy change be explained, external factors or 
belief system change (including learning)? 
The multiple frames of coexistence and the role of beliefs 
To recall, in the ACF actors perceive the world through different lenses consisting of their 
preexisting beliefs. This idea may again help in understanding the multiple frames of 
coexistence in the narrative. Previously, in Chapter four, two different belief systems of 
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advocacy coalitions were identified and qualitatively different risk frames were linked to 
these coalitions. It was argued that there is considerable evidence that it is beliefs that 
frame accounts of risks. When applying this idea to the coexistence debate, coexistence 
could be understood against the background of these various different risk frames 
identified in Chapter four. 
In 2003 coexistence became the top issue in the biotech scene and actors were forced to 
acknowledge this being a legitimate issue for consideration. However, as seen in the 
narrative, these actors were struggling to promote very different definitions of what they 
considered coexistence to be all about. The advocates of belief system two "alternatives 
instead of risks" posed coexistence as yet another risk issue. The specter of "creeping 
contamination" in the field and the market is understood as an environmental, societal and 
an ethical risk issue. Any gene transfer is considered as harmful, irrespective of its quality 
and quantity. In contrast to this, the advocates of belief system one "innovation and 
Standort" interpret coexistence as a mere economic issue. Once GMOs are approved as 
safe, so they argue, the problem of separation can be solved by thresholds, individual 
farmer's arrangements and management solutions. In stressing the point of 
"manageability" the risk framing of "contamination" was thus undermined. In fact, in this 
coalition there is no talk of "contamination" but only of "admixtures", giving proof of the 
strategic use of language in the struggle between the coalitions. In a similar vein, 
according to the risk precaution rationale, GMO critics understood that the EU Directive 
could be used as a legal basis to introduce new regulation, while the biotech proponents 
strongly rejected this proposal. The coexistence debate therefore still features different 
accounts of uncertainty and ideas about social order, pointing to a deeper conflict about 
core issues. 
Coalition building In times of coexistence 
When looking at the subsystem in the time period considered above, one can find new 
groups and alliances. There was on the one hand the 'Warenkette" initiative, a big group 
of various different actors supporting the pro-biotech stance, while on the other hand there 
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was the 'round table' initiative, a mixture of various different biotech critical actors. 
According to the ACF, coalitions are made up of actors that share core beliefs and engage 
in common activities. In the case of the two initiatives it can rightly be said that actors 
engaged in common activities, however, with respect to sharing core beliefs, the case 
may be a little more difficult. For sure, some of the actors present in these initiatives were 
considered part of advocacy coalitions in Chapter four, for instance, industry groups or 
Friends of the Earth Germany. Yet, looking at the "Warenkette" initiative, one can see that 
the Labour Union for the Food and Restaurant Sector (NGG), and even the retail sector 
supported biotech-friendly statements that were released during and after the Diskurs, 
groups that were not part of the prO-biotech coalition before. 
Some other cases of initiative-supporters are maybe even more puzzling. In the 1990s the 
National Farmer's Organization (DBV) was not part of the advocacy coalition "innovation 
and Standort", yet it could be counted as having been sympathetic to its goals. In 2003 
the DBV openly supported the 'Warenkette" initiative, but at the same time issued a 
common statement with the Nature Conservation Agency, an institution known for its 
opposition to agro-biotech. The Labour Union for Construction, Agriculture and 
Environment (IG BAU), another example, even appeared as a supporter on both sides, 
the 'Warenkette" initiative and the 'round table' initiative. Did all these actors and groups 
change their core beliefs when they joined the respective initiatives? How can they act in 
seemingly contradictory ways? Or would it make more sense to speak of pragmatic, 
incidental, or even strategic alliances that are discursively constructed, and that possibly 
"respond to simplified story-lines that symbolically reflect the con~erns of core beliefs" 
(Fischer 2003: 102)? Is joining a coalition more a matter of engaging in different social 
practices, such as cultivation, retail, environmental protection or similar, rather than a 
matter of core belief compliance? There is significant evidence that the latter assumptions 
may offer a more insightful explanation for coalition building than the restrictive belief 
system model of the ACF. 
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Coexistence as the basis for compromise between belief systems?1 
As shown in the narrative, at the beginning of the coexistence debate there was a clear 
division between the two advocacy coalitions. For advocacy coalition "innovation and 
Standort" coexistence was "no problem", while for the biotech critics coexistence was 
another risk issue and hence unacceptable. However, in the wake of the debate 
coexistence came to be posed as the ultimate fair compromise between the antagonists, 
as it seeks to ensure both the freedom of choice to produce GMOs as well as to 
guarantee the freedom to reject GM crops. Having learnt that coexistence has become 
another regulatory aspect, which needs to be considered for the sake of public 
acceptance, GMO advocates have incorporated a 'light variant' of coexistence regulation 
into their belief system (e.g. field research into the feasibility of coexistence). For the 
organic farmers and consumer organizations, coexistence meant at least a need for 
stringent rules to protect conventional and organic farming or to keep certain natural areas 
relatively free from GMOs. They came to accept coexistence and "pseudo choice", and 
considered the negotiation and technical discussions about concrete measures and 
obligations a feasible way out of the dilemma. The environmental NGOs original stance 
was "coexistence is impOSSible", finally, however, they accepted the coexistence frame. In 
a manner consistent with their core beliefs, they were eager to shape the rules and 
regulations in ways that would deter cultivation or the use of GM products (that is, by 
demanding zero tolerance, strict liability regulation or entirely GMO-free areas). Thus they 
accepted the debate on coexistence not because they had changed their core beliefs, but 
because they saw it as another way to prevent or restrict GMOs. From the point of view of 
belief systems, coalitions faCing external challenges find ways to adapt to them. 
Coexistence means such a challenge/opportunity to the belief systems of both advocacy 
coalitions, but this does not amount to changes of policy core beliefs, it only affects 
secondary aspects and strategies. 
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Between 'red' promotion and 'green' protection - policy beliefs and learning in the 
new GenTG 
Could using the ACF give some more inSight into the negotiations leading to the new 
GenTG (assuming the coalitions acting are actually advocacy coalitions)? Written against 
the background of precautionary consumer protection, the original BMVEL proposal 
showed strong precautionary features. As a novelty, precaution was applied not only in 
cases of environmental and health issues, but was extended to the area of coexistence 
regulation. The BMVEL proposal thus featured relatively strong beliefs of belief system 
-
two "risks therefore alternatives". The SPD Party pro-GM faction of the government would 
at first not support this exclusively 'safety-based approach' and pressed for a reinsertion 
of elements of the pro-GM belief system one. As a consequence, the compromise draft 
version from May 2004 reintroduced the policy belief of "biotech is useful and should 
hence be developed" by reinserting the biotech promotion purpose into article one. 
Furthermore, the compromise version omitted the reference to the PP in risk assessment, 
curtailed information rights and, in the later version approved by the Bundestag, took 
away the veto power from the BfN. 
Looking at the compromise version one can see that concessions between belief system 
one and belief system two were mainly made in the area of environmental risk 
assessment. The area of coexistence and liability regulation, in contrast, was even 
strengthened. How can this be explained? Part of the explanation can surely be attributed 
to an 'external event'. The strong election result for the Greens in 2002 shifted the power 
balance within the coalition government even more in favour of the minor coalition partner, 
obliging the Social Democrats to accept strong policy core beliefs of belief system two. In 
major contrast to 1998, these policy beliefs were not just put there as an adjunct to social 
democratic visions, rather they were marking an overall new approach in agro-biotech 
regulation. This, in turn, has further weakened the pro-GMO faction in the SPD Party. 
However, equally important may have been policy learning in the face of a continued 
antagonistic policy situation. The pro-GMO SPO Party learned to acknowledge that 
195 
meaningful coexistence regulation was necessary to protect their core values, that is, 
keeping biotech as an agricultural option. Based on a similar insight, they have learned to 
accept institutional frameworks that incorporate different expert opinions (e.g. in the 
ZKBS). The Greens, in turn learned that their policy core belief of protecting the 
environment may be equally well served by insisting on strong coexistence regulation (so 
they gave in on environmental risk issues), and that a compromise was only possible in 
case they accepted aspects of the opponent's beliefs, that is, the biotech promotion 
rationale as secondary aspect of the programme171 (one could also speak of "strategic 
retreat"). 
On the basis of these results, one could conclude that coexistence regulation, in terms of 
"providing the opportunity to produce food and feed with conventional, organic and as well 
as biotechnological forms of production", did provide an opportunity to supercede intense 
conflict between the different belief systems and to come to an agreement. Both members 
of coalitions have learned from their conflict and made concessions on secondary aspects 
of their belief system, but both sides can equally claim to have protected their values and 
clientele. Irrespective of these compromises, both advocacy coalitions can then go on and 
support either the building of GMO-free zones or the investment in biotech R&D. 
Coexistence as an ambiguous (discursive!) concept did not lead to belief system 
convergence, as fundamental disagreement persists, yet it could help in overcoming the 
deadlock between the governing parties and bring about policy change. Whether this is 
the end to the story (meaning policy closure) remains to the seen. For the ACF a lot will 
depend on how the new legal concepts are being applied and reworked in the context of 
administrative practice, and whose belief systems are best served in the practical context. 
171 In fact, the promotion rationale was taken up on the precondition of precaution. 
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Conclusion 
In the final narrative it was asked: how do new institutions and new regulation take 
account of these new issues? How does the new coexistence debate develop between 
the coalitions and what does coexistence mean for the developments in policy and the 
possibility of conflict solution? The following conclusion can be presented. 
Hajer's concepts of "discourse structuration" could be we" applied to the case study as 
coexistence had reached a state whereby it was too important to be ignored. Coexistence 
meant a shift in key terms, practices and actors. Yet far from being a 'set concept', 
coexistence was based on many different, partly competing story-lines. In this way many, 
including new actors could relate to it, with the effect of widening the spectrum of 
supporters on both sides of the divide. Coexistence thus brought about changes to the 
composition of discourse coalitions. However the most important discursive effect could 
be seen in the fact that by highlighting new risks, coexistence strengthened the basis of 
the GMO critical discourse coalition. Story-lines such as "safeguarding the alternatives in 
agriculture" and "the war in the villages" meant that the GMO critical discourse coalition 
gained powerful external support on the basis of economic and neighbourhood interests. 
This brought them onto the argumentative and political offensive and provided the 
grounds for strict coexistence and liability regulation in new biotech legislation. With the 
institutionalization of new expertise and coexistence regulation - in the BMVEL, the BFN 
and the new GenTG - one could even speak of "discourse institutionalization", For Hajer, 
this institutionalization of discourse clearly stands for policy change. Integrating different 
interests into the system does not necessarily mean the end of the conflict. Yet by 
incorporating more views, it may provide better means to deal with the different issues at 
stake surrounding agricultural an~ food systems. For the DCF it is discourses which made 
these remarkable results possible, as changes may be best understood as the product of 
a new discourse coalition that gained influence because new and important actors could 
relate to it. 
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The idea of the ACF that belief systems underlie coalition's policy-related actions could 
offer an explanation for the multiple frames of coexistence in the narrative. Against the 
background of various different risk frames, coalitions were struggling to promote very 
different definitions of what they found coexistence to be all about - yet another risk issue 
or merely an economic issue. Thus far from being a conflict about technical issues, the 
coexistence debate points to a deeper conflict about core issues. Looking at the 
subsystem, new groups and alliances appeared, especially the rather pro-biotech 
"Warenkette" initiative, and the biotech critical 'round table' initiative. The actors in those 
groups engaged in common activities, yet they did not fully share core beliefs. In the case 
considered, it was rather a common understanding of the problem and the solutions, 
somewhat independent of the ultimate motivation (economic interests, values), that 
brought actors together to form effective coalitions. Why has coexistence become such a 
powerful critical issue? The ACF again argues with power shifts in relation between 
coalitions (elections), which changed the 'opportunity structure' for implementing policy 
ideas (coexistence = risk issue) of the minority coalition. The demand for coexistence as a 
policy goal put pressure on all beliefs systems and coalitions attempted to adjust to it in 
ways consistent with their values. This implied learning effects in terms of concessions to 
secondary aspects and "strategic retreats". Coexistence as an ambiguous concept did not 
lead to belief system convergence, but it facilitated a way to find a practical compromise 
between the coalitions and to bring about policy change. That it is language (discourse) 
that ultimately helped in mediating relationships between coalitions, is something that the 
ACF cannot accommodate. Therefore, from the ACF point of view, policy change can only 
be understood as the result of external events, learning and strategic behaviour. 
198 
CHAPTER NINE 
9. Conclusion 
This thesis concerned the question of the policy shift with regard to agricultural 
biotechnology as it developed in Germany between the years 2000 and 2004. The task 
was to analyze the way in which the shock of the SSE crisis and the subsequent change 
in agricultural policies impacted on the agro-biotechnology policies of the country, that is, 
to analyze why and how the crisis affected regulation and whether it led to the 
institutionalization of new types of socio-political practices and relationships. 
To fulfill this purpose the thesis used cognitive-normative frameworks and discussed the 
role of beliefs and discourse on the German example of policy change in the field of agro-
biotechnology regulation. Using Maarten Hajer's discourse coalition framework (DCF) and 
Paul Sabatier's advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the thesis addressed the question of 
how can policy change be explained and illuminated by these two theories? What are their 
relative or different contributions - as two different cognitive and normative frameworks - to 
the study of policy processes and outcomes? Related to these main questions, the thesis 
addressed the sUb-questions: Do the approaches contradict or complement one another 
and what are their strengths and limitations? 
It can be concluded that, over the years, a great deal has changed in German agricultural 
biotechnology policy, concerning legislation, the political institutions and the actors 
involved in the subsystem. The cognitive normative frameworks applied have proven to be 
different, but useful tools in explaining and illuminating this process of transformation. In 
contrast to the 1990s, when Germany was spearheading the development of 
biotechnology in Europe, by the year 2004 the country had proposed tough GMO 
legislation, to date unique in the European Union, challenging some of the dominant 
scientific, economic and political interests in the country. Most importantly, it could be 
shown that this was to a large extent the consequence of the highly symbolic and 
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materially damaging BSE crisis of the year 2000 which, in the distinct German context, 
had unleashed specific dynamics that paved this way to policy change. 
9.1 Summary of findings - the theories explanatory powers 
Hajer's DCF and Sabatier's ACF were used in order to explain the dynamics of policy 
change. In Chapters four to eight, central features of their approaches were evaluated by 
using them on specific empirical/historical material. Chapter-wise, general aspects of how 
both approaches work and claim to explain the policy process, from a discourse analytical 
and a belief system point of view respectively could be highlighted. What can be 
concluded about the usefulness of the main concepts of both authors? 
The basis of coalitions: beliefs or discourses? 
. The thesis tested both concepts of coalition building, yet found that Hajer's concept of 
discourse coalitions worked better as an explanation. As the narrative showed, coalitions 
were built on the grounds of multiple motivations, be they environmental protection beliefs 
or economic interests of farmers. In fact, it was argued that it is because of this flexibility 
and ability to accommodate different interests and values within a discourse based 
coalition ("safeguarding the alternatives in agriculture") that powerful effective alliances 
could be built and the balance of power could be tipped in favour of GM critical groups. 
The role of language: means, meaning or power? 
In the analysis considerable plausibility was found for Hajer's central idea that language is 
more than a system of naming or signification but constitutive of reality ("the nature of the 
policy problem"), and a possible source of power. This could be convincingly illustrated in 
the case study: Before the BSE crisis, Germany's GM crop policies were predominantly 
driven by a neo-liberal framing of innovation and "Standort" and regulation was based 
entirely on a science rationale, that is, on evidence of environmental risks and safety. Post 
BSE, GM crop policy became part of a wider debate on sustainable food production and 
new agricultural practices. Regulation could no longer be seen as a 'merely' scientific 
200 
issue, different (perceptions of) risks could no longer be denied and new actors' views 
gained legitimacy in the course of the debate. Overall, what had previously been an issue 
for technology policy became one for agricultural policy and diversity in the food system. 
By changing the subject matter entirely through the use of new language, discourse not 
only conveyed (new) meaning, but also power to those who had previously been 
marginalized in the subsystem. This important aspect of the story could be very well 
illustrated by Hajer's discourse analytical framework. For the ACF language conveys 
beliefs and is a means for articulation and persuasion, but it is not understood as being 
essential for problem perception, let alone problem constitution. 
The role of knowledge and expertise: enlightenment or resource? 
The analysis applied the different approaches' ideas about the role and functioning of 
knowledge and expertise in the policy process. Confirming Hajer's ideas, it could show 
that the use of knowledge and expertise was tied up with power-related practices, for 
example by insulating the dominant discourse coalition from "un-scientific" claims, as was 
the case during the 1990s. Alternative discourses, for example on different agricultural 
practices, were expressed through counter-expertise, yet these only became legitimate 
claims (and eventually established) in the policy process as a result of the new 
"Agrarwende" discourse. Therefore, Hajer's constructivist understanding of the science-
politics interface was useful and illuminating for the policy analysis. There was little 
evidence found of the "enlightenment function" of science in policy-making, expertise as 
standing above beliefs, a central claim of Sabatier's approach. Rather than research or 
empirical evidence, it was found that the discourse of "Agrarwende" altered actor's 
perception of the biotech policy problem after SSE. In a similar vein, the Diskurs grane 
Gentechnik, an example of an 'expert-based', but highly politicized forum where 'facts', 
'science' and interest became inseparable posed difficulties for the ACF, as it can hardly 
accommodate such a dynamiC or explain the results of the deliberations at the Diskurs 
(only when using a concept of belief-guided discursive interaction). Again it was found that 
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in case of the role and functioning of 'science' in the German policy process, Hajer's 
concepts were more useful. 
The role of policy learning? 
Despite this criticism of the ACF, the analysis could make good use of the idea of policy 
learning advanced by Sabatier. The assumption that coalitions are motivated by their 
desire to realize their political goals and thus adapt to challenges and opportunities could 
be well applied. As learning is instrumental in the ACF, it could be shown that coalitions 
learned all kinds of things to adapt to new situations. They learned to take up a specific 
language (for example, "sustainability" or "innovation") to make their beliefs more 
defensible. They incorporated elements of other belief systems into their own, for example 
new coexistence requirements (on the level of secondary aspects) and they learned to 
make "strategic retreats", as seen in the case of the "Chancellor Initiative" or in the 
legislative brokering situation between the Greens and the SPD Party. At the level of 
explaining coalitions' behaviour and their reactions to both opportunities for and 
constraints on belief system realization (and unintended effects/spin-offs thereof), the ACF 
proved to be useful. Hajer's understanding of learning is different, being less focused on 
the rational, instrumental level. Instead, learning is the result of 'quality deliberation', which 
changes cognitive patterns (or interests) and 'the way things are looked at' - an idea 
applied in the case of the Diskurs. However, implicitly, the DCF seems to share an 
instrumental model of policy learning somewhat similar to the ACF in the concept of 
'argumentative strategies', that is, the conscious change in discourse in order to reach 
specific goals, such as accommodation of various beliefs, positioning, promotion etc. 
Minister KOnast's propositions could be well interpreted along these lines. 
The role of new actors (Inside/outside subsystems/coalitions) 
The role of new actors inside or outside the subsystem was found to be an important 
dimension in the explanation of policy change. It could be shown that the change in 
discourse had a powerful effect on the policy subsystem. With a redefinition of the 
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problem, from technology over food to agriculture, the actors and groups affected by a 
policy decision changed which could, in turn, strengthen one coalition over the other. This 
DCF hypothesis could be forcefully confirmed. The ACF assumes that new subsystems 
may emerge when new issues gain importance yet does not offer a convincing way of 
looking into these mechanisms more closely. It is not really clear how new actors get 
drawn into the debate (other than that they are somehow affected) or how stable policy 
preferences of actors who have not previously been involved in the policy issue, get 
established in the first place. New actors may have their worldviews and interests but do 
not (necessarily) have established or strong policy core beliefs. In such case of 
uncertainty, it was argued, following Hajer, that a lot depends on how issues are 
discursively anchored (e.g. whether gene-flow is referred to as "contamination" = 
problem/dangerous or "admixtures"= no problem/harmless) and which practices - science, 
agriculture or environment - are affected as a result. This, of course, relativizes one of the 
central claims of the ACF, namely that policy change is a process driven by actors that 
have their clearly defined value preferences. 
The question of power: traditional versus post-modern understanding 
The analysis could make good use of the two different understandings of power as 
advanced by the two theories. Hajer's understanding of the "microphysics of power" as 
working through discourses by positioning actors, assigning blame, responsibility, 
authority (e.g. through science) turned out to be particularly interesting and illuminating. 
Yet, there was also critical evidence found for Sabatier's more traditional understanding of 
power as a resource or institutional authorization. The change in power relationships as a 
result of the elections was a necessary but not a sufficient cause for change. The more 
dramatic effects only occurred later after SSE and were a product of discursive 
interaction. Altogether the case study revealed a very complex and dynamic web of power 
relations, mainly as a result of the application of the DCF. 
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The formation of interests: given or discourse dependent 
As a major claim, the DCF proposes that interests are not given but subject to discourse. 
In fact, the analysis could find some critical evidence for this idea, for instance with 
respect to economic interests, when in the late 1990s retailers realized through the 
"consumer choice" discourse that it was in their best economic interest to adopt a critical 
stance towards GMOs as the majority of consumers seemed to strongly object to agro-
biotech. In the same vein, when the debate turned towards the "Agrarwende" and the 
"safeguarding of alternatives" farmers realized that it was in their best interest to opt for 
more regulation as otherwise their daily practices and economic basis could be 
threatened. As shown in Chapter two the ACF framework is not very explicit on the 
relationship between beliefs and interests, one assumes that political and economic 
interests either follow from beliefs or that material interests have nothing to do with beliefs. 
The ACF can only understand these dynamics through changes in the belief system, that 
is, mainly through changes in secondary aspects. As these changes are only minor, the 
ACF is thus unable to explain how such dynamics could become important elements 
causal for major policy change. 
The cause/basis of policy change? 
When considering the two main arguments proposed for policy change, discourse on the 
one hand and beliefs/external events on the other, it can be concluded that both offer a 
different way of looking at the process of change. To recall, the DCF pointed to the 
structure of the discursive field and the "Agrarwende" as a powerful response to the SSE 
crisis because it "fit" the situation, was multi-interpretable and created new situations of 
trust. For the biotech subsystem this had the effect that the" Agrarwende" radically 
restructured the field of arguments, that it repositioned actors and changed the 
composition and political standing of discourse coalitions, which altogether opened the 
way for policy change. 
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The ACF argued instead with external events, policy learning and the change of power 
relations between coalitions. Here election results and institutional factors played a 
greater role. The ACF interprets BSE as an 'opportunity structure' (yet why it becomes 
such an opportunity is not entirely clear), as it undermined public support for the majority 
coalition and provided a "window of opportunity" for the minority coalition to undermine or 
promote specific beliefs. In the wake of the policy process belief systems are revised, yet 
only on the level of secondary aspects (content of revisions is also hard to explain for 
ACF). Major policy change is thus not the result of changed core beliefs of an advocacy 
coalition but of changed power constellations, coincidences and opportunities and finally 
strategic behaviour. 
Comparing these two approaches to policy change in this thesis, it was found that the 
DCF offered a more interesting and illuminating theoretical framework than the ACF. 
Being more complex in its interpretative logic, it is better able to explain the dynamics, to 
generate novel insights and to deal with the subtleties, the 'twists and turns' of the case 
study. Nevertheless, the ACF offered some useful contributions to the analysis. Thus in 
conclusion it can be reasonably argued that in order to understand the impact of the SSE 
crisis on agro-biotech policy, it is useful to consider elements of both approaches, for 
instance, of discursive mechanisms, of ideas of how an agency reacts to opportunities 
and constraints, and of some concept of power that goes beyond discourse. 
As the SSE case has shown, it is specific constellations that offer the potential for the use 
of new language to challenge dominant discourses. BSE, as a key event, provided such 
an opportunity for inserting new discursive categories into publiG policy and practices and 
to trigger a considerable change process in terms of problem perception, stakeholder 
(inter)action and proposed regulation. The "Agrarwende" discourse was successful 
because of the very specific circumstances at the time: a) SSE as a political, economic 
and cultural rupture, bringing together various discursive domains, b) the ability and 
willingness of a political elite for fundamental reforms, and c) the new 'choice' discourse 
as a 'catch-all' concept, forming a symbolically appealing and politically acceptable reply, 
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d) actors use of specific discourses to build alliances, that is to accommodate various 
interests and beliefs, and to promote their policy preferences and e) the change of themes 
and interests as a result of the new discourse. 
These combined circumstances and their specific mutually influential and reinforcing 
dynamic all played a role in explaining why the BSE crisis had the effects described on the 
biotech policy of the country. This, again, relativizes central aspects of both approaches. It 
shows that the change process cannot be understood without taking into account power 
resources other than discourse, at the same time as the developments cannot be 
understood on the grounds of the idea that BSE was about some objective, measurable 
facts and the changes the result of conscious, instrumental behaviour. 
9.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the approaches 
Both approaches contributed to an understanding of the policy process and the process of 
change. Unsurprisingly, Hajer and Sabatier's different theoretical angles illuminated or 
black-boxed different aspects of the story and offered different kinds of explanations for 
the events. Hajer's concepts were, however, found to have more strengths and fewer 
weaknesses than Sabatier's. To give a final account of strengths and weaknesses of the 
two approaches, the following can be said: 
The discourse coalition framework (DCF) 
Strengths 
• DCF represents a very useful tool to describe discourses, their changes, breaks and 
adaptations. This way it offers a very rich, innovative and sensitive means to 
understand the effects of language and representation by way of detailed examination 
of discursive relationships, contexts and micro-structures. 
• Due to the constructivist understanding of science, DCF gives a more insightful and 
accurate explanation of the science-policy interface. Knowledge plays a fundamental 
role In the policy struggle, however, knowledge does not develop and unfold in a 
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discourse, respectively belief system free environment. This central idea is forcefully 
pushed by the DCF. 
• DCF offers a tool to understand argumentative activity or discourse as an 
independent power practice, which is much more complex than a rational choice 
analysis suggests (for example a strategic discourse which unintentionally 
strengthens the opposition, the choice of language and its effects on interest 
positions, the manipulative potential of certain language use). 
• DCF alludes to the time/space contingent yet not arbitrary character of policy change. 
As the analysis showed the time and space constellations surrounding the SSE crisis 
and the development of agro-biotech were significant. 
Weaknesses 
• Actor's positions seem to show more resistance and are thus less manipulative than 
Hajer suggests. There is evidence that the different groups seek to protect some 
deeper values, that they act on the basis of deeper convictions and react to beliefs. 
• DCF needs to incorporate other, non-discourse bases of power. What will finally be 
relevant in the policy formulation process is a matter of relative power of actors in the 
policy subsystem. Power constellations can change through discourse but there is a 
need to better incorporate the institutional dimension or political-economic dynamics 
(after all, in the case described counter-discourses were mainly won with liberal and 
economic arguments, such as consumer/producer rights, diversity of markets. Also 
changes could correspond to real shifts in the economy). 
• Similarly, discourse reflects societal structures of power and can enshrine entrenched 
positions ("sound science"), but it also has the power to change them ("Agrarwende"). 
DCF alone cannot understand when ,and how dominant economic and political 
interests can be challenged. 
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The belief system approach (ACF) 
Strengths 
• Sabatier's notion that policies articulate social agendas beyond the stated objectives 
in the specific area of concern (visions of nature, democracy or the market), allows 
one to understand the persistence of specific (discursive) structures and the defence 
mechanisms kicking in once belief systems are under stress. Yet whether this is 
ultimately evidence of beliefs or of the strength of discursive patterns and practices 
remains difficult to know. The ACF does not provide a rigorous method to make that 
distinction. 
• The focus on a belief system consisting of a hard core and more readily changeable 
secondary aspects, in combination with the learning approach, allows a more in-depth 
understanding of the process of change by illuminating which particular aspects have 
changed. 
• The idea of stable belief systems enables one to trace representation or discourse 
more clearly back to an agency: What actors/policy makers do is instrumental in terms 
of realizing beliefs, reality is constructed so as to impose a specific understanding of a 
problem and to fit policy beliefs, the stories people tell are guided by their beliefs. 
• ACF takes more explicitly into account the role and power effects of institutions. 
Weaknesses 
• The ACF greatly underestimates argumentative exchange and the process of reality 
construction. For instance, how language can help forge alliances and help in bringing 
about policy change by building on ambiguous concepts (coexistence), how language 
can be used as a powerful strategic instrument in the policy process (in terms of 
confronting people on their own turf by employing their arguments or by framing 
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things as so to appeal to specific belief systems); more importantly, how language can 
change the meaning of 'things' and events and how language can be decisive when 
policy beliefs are not established. Finally there is a lack of understanding of how 
language use can have power-effects that are beyond the categories, institutions and 
resources, offered by the ACF. 
• There is a lack of understanding of how belief guided interactions, for example the 
strategic use of language, can trigger situations which are beyond the conditions that 
gave rise to it. 
• ACF does not understand how policy core beliefs become established in the first 
place. Does a positive attitude towards new technologies necessarily imply that 
biotechnology is embraced? The study suggests that this is not necessarily the case. 
• The ACF overestimates the effects of 'shocks' or external events. External events do 
not have objective impacts but are themselves mediated through beliefs, discourses 
and institutions. 
• As argued and shown in many instances during the case study, the role and nature of 
science and expertise in the policy process is poorly understood if not misleading. 
• ACF does speak of political-economic factors, but Sabatier fails to clearly link these to 
his framework (other than as external factors or material interests). 
9.3 Are these theories contradictory or complementary? 
The theories drew our attention to different aspects of the case study or offered different 
explanations for the same event. Looking at the conclusions above, it could be said that 
the two approaches could in some respects be used in a complementary fashion. As the 
narrative and analysis showed, discourse, belief system and institutional dynamics were 
highly intertwined. Commitments made actors talk the way they did, at the same time as 
talk itself could create new insights and commitments, as well as being shaped by 
institutional factors. In this study on agro-biotech policy change in Germany, these 
interrelationships could be very well shown: Discourse could create new meanings and 
alter cognitive patterns ("Agrarwende"), but the process was highly contingent. There was 
the momentum of institutional power to consider and value positions seemed to show 
considerable resistance (central policy beliefs of coalitions remained unchanged), 
Nevertheless, major policy change occurred and discourse could eventually trigger 
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dynamics that were beyond the conditions/beliefs that gave rise to it. In bringing out these 
different dynamics in the policy process described, the analysis could draw upon the key 
concepts of each of the authors, partly by reading them through the eyes of the other. 
This is not to say that, in general, one approach's strength is the other's weakness, and 
that one could be simply used as a refinement to the other. As mentioned and discussed 
in Chapter two, both approaches come from very different theory traditions. In Hajer's 
approach one faces a theoretical body that is radical constructivist. All the traditional ideas 
of actors, institutions, interests or power become radically questioned as everything is 'in 
flux' and becomes subject to argumentation. Sabatier's approach remains selective and 
limited, and is, in that respect, somewhat arbitrary in its interpretative scope. This central 
division comes out most clearly on the question of science and the role of expertise in 
both frameworks. In these accounts both frameworks are clearly contradictory in their 
assumptions and their predictions concerning policy development and change. Equally, 
the insistence on either beliefs or discourses (the DCF does speak of beliefs but does not 
say what these are in contrast to discourses, the ACF does not mention discourse), the 
idea that value positions are either fixed or changeable in the policy process indicates a 
fundamental incompatibility. 
Does policy change rather occur on the basis of discourse or on the basis of belief 
systems? Is change due to changing normative commitments or communicative 
practices? No clear answer appears in this respect from the study, as there is evidence for 
both. Values certainly playa great role in the policy process on agro-biotechnology but not 
necessarily only along the lines Sabatier predicts. Equally, discourses are essential, but 
these are not necessarily detached from values and they do not always have such great 
effects. In any case by focusing on beliefs and discourses, it was possible to get a strong 
sense of the interaction and the process-like character of policy continuity and change, but 
certainly this is far from being the whole picture. As the analysis showed, the 'reality' of 
the policy-making process is highly complex, as social action and structural conditions 
operate on a variety of scales. In this sense it may be useful to understand beliefs and 
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discourse as "distinctive moments" (Harvey 1996: 78) to the social process, next to 
institutions, social material practices, and relations, and forms of political-economic power. 
It is both interesting and very useful to focus on the interrelationship between discourse 
and beliefs, but more efforts could be made in order to find a more comprehensive and 
integrative way to understand the complexity of contemporary policy-making. 
211 
Bibliography 
Abel-Lorenz, E. (2000) Anrnerkungen zu OLG Stuttgart, Urt. v. 24.8.1999, 14 U 57/97. In: 
Zeitschrift fOr Umweltrecht, 1: 29-32. 
AbL (2002) Ob konventionell oder ekologisch: Wir wollen ohne Gentechnik arbeiten und 
arbeiten kennen. Stellungnahme der AbL zurn Diskurs grOne Gentechnik beirn BMVEL 
vorn 29.08.02, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
AGRA Presse (2004) OGM. Hebdo. L'agence d'information agro-economique - Paris-
Bruxelles, 19. 01. 2004. 
agrar.de Aktuell (2003) DBV/BfN: Gerneinsame Forderungen zur GrOnen Gentechnik -
Sonnleitner und Vogtmann fOr weitere Zusammenarbeit. www.agrar.de [23.10.2003]. 
agrar.de Aktuell (2003a) Experten bemangeln Rahmenbedingungen fOr Gentechnik in 
Deutschland. www.agrar.de [10.12.2003]. 
agrar.de Aktuell (2003b) Wer haftet, wenn Gen-Raps auf dem Nachbaracker auskeimt? 
Oko-Institut und VDW fordern, Wahlfreiheit fOr Verbraucher und Landwirte zu 
gewahrleisten. www.agrar.de[27.11.2003]. 
agrar.de Aktuell (2004) Kabinett beschlief1t drastische Strafandrohung bei Verstef1en 
gegen Kennzeichnungs-Pflicht bei gentechnisch veranderten Organismen. www.agrar.de 
[14.01.2004]. 
agrar.de Aktuell (2004a) Kein Versicherungsschutz fOr die grOne Gentechnik. 
www.agrar.de [05.07.2004]. 
AgrarbOndnis (2002) Agrarwende: Echte Wende oder am Ende? Positionspapier vom 
4.7.2002. 
Agra-Europe (2002) CDU will Zehn-Jahres Programm zur Entwicklung der grOnen 
Gentechnik. 11 (02), Marz 2002, www.agra-europe.de. 
Axelrod, R; Keohane, O. (1985) Achieving cooperation under anarchy. Strategies and 
institutions. In: World Politics 38, (1): 226-254. 
B'90/GrOne (2000) Wann, wenn nicht jetzt. Aufbruch in eine zukunftsfahige 
Landwirtschaft. Beschluss des Parteirats vom 04.12.2000. Berlin. 
B'90/GrOne (2003) Standortvorteil Verbraucherschutz. Zukunftsfahige Wirtschaftspolitik 
fOr das 21. Jahrhundert. www.grune-fraktion.de [22.12.204]. 
Bandelow, N. (1997) Ausweitung politi scher Strategien im Mehrebenensystem. Schutz vor 
Risiken der Gentechnologie als Aushandlungsmaterie zwischen Bundeslandern, Bund 
und EU. In: Martinsen, R. (ed.) Politik und Biotechnologie. Die Zumutung der Zukunft. 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
Bandalow, N. (1999) Lernende Politik. Advocacy-Koalitionen und politischer Wandel am 
Beispiel der Gentechnikpolitik. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Barben, D. (1997) Ungleichzeitigkeiten und Ungleichmassigkeiten zwischen 
wissenschaftlich-technischer, diskursiver und institutioneller Entwicklung der 
Biotechnologie. In: Martinsen, R. (ed.) Politik und Biotechnologie. Die Zumutung der 
Zukunft. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
212 
Barben, D. (1997a) Neoliberale Formierung der Biotechnologie? Zur 
Hegemoniegewinnung einer flexiblen Strategie. In: Das Argument 220: 383-395. 
Barl6sius, E. (1999) Soziologie des Essens. Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche 
EinfOhrung in die Ernahrungsforschung. MOnchen: Juventa Verlag. 
Barret, M. (1991) The politics of truth. From Marx to Foucault. Standford:UP. 
BBA (2000) Mitteilung der BBA Arbeitsgruppe: Anbaubegleitendes Monitoring 
gentechnisch veranderter Pflanzen im Agrar6kosystem. Erweiterte Fassung der 
Ver6ffentlichung im: Nachrichtenblatt Deutscher Planzenschutzdienst, 52 (9), www.bba.de 
[10.06.2001 ]. 
BBC (2000) German sausage linked to BSE. www.bbc.co.uk [21.12 2000]. 
BBC (2001) Germany's green revolution. www.bbc.co.uk [28.02.2001]. 
Beck, U. (1986) Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. 
Frankfurt/Main: Edition Suhrkamp. 
Behrens, M.; Meyer-Stumborg, S.; Simonis, G. (1997) Gen Food. EinfOhrung und 
Verbreitung, Konflikte und Gestaltungsm6glichkeiten. (Forschung aus der Hans-B6ckler 
Stiftung). Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Behrens, M. (1998) Nadel6hr Einzelhandel. In: GID 125/126: 14-18. 
Behrens, M.; Simonis, G. Draz, R. (2000) Die blockierte Demokratie. Von der politischen 
Regulierung gentechnisch hergestellter Nahrungsmittel. In: Martinsen, R.; Simonis, G. 
(eds.) Demokatie und Technik - (k)eine Wahlverwandtschaft. Opladen: Leske + Budrich: 
155-174. 
Bergmann, J. (2002) Struktur des Lebensmittelrechts. Funfte Diskursrunde 9.110. Juli, 
Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Berliner Zeitung (2001) Die Gentechnikfeier ist abgeblasen. www.berliner-zeitung.de 
[25.01.2001]. 
Berliner Zeitung (2004) Einen Krieg der Bauern wird es nicht geben -
Verbraucherministerin KOnast Ober Gen-Food, fliegende Pollen und das neue Gentechnik-
Gesetz. www.berliner-zeitung.de [12.01.04]. 
BGAlVDOe (2002) Einbindung Deutschlands in die arbeitsteilige Weltwirtschaft macht 
Koexistenz zur Realitat - Rahmenbedingungen jetzt definieren. Gemeinsames Statement 
des Verbandes Deutscher Olmuhlen und des Bundesverbandes des Deutschen Gror1-
und Aur1enhandels zum Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik vom 03. 09 2002. 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [12.12.2004]. 
BMBF (1996) Warum wir die Gentechnik brauchen. Bundesministerium fOr Bildung und 
Forschung. Bonn. 
BMBF (2000) Funding of Growth. Initiatives in Biotechnology. Bundesministerium fOr 
Bildung und Forschung. Bonn. 
BML (1997) Die grOne Gentechnik. Zukunftstechnologie, Landwirtschaft, Welternahrung, 
Verbraucherschutz. Bundesministerium fOr Landwirtschaft. Bonn. 
BMVEL (2001) Vertrauen durch Veranderung. Arbeitsplan nachhaltige Landwirtschaft. Ein 
Positionspapier des Bundesministeriums fOr Verbraucherschutz, Ernahrung und 
Landwirtschaft. www.verbraucherministerium.de [10.09.2001]. 
213 
BMVEL (2002) Ergebnisbericht des Lenkungsauschuss zum Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik 
vom 27.8.2002. www.transgen.de/diskurs [12.12.2004]. 
BMVEL (2003) Thesenpapier. Koexistenz von Gentechnik verwendender mit 
konventioneller und akologischer Landwirtschaft, 09.05.2003. 
BOLW (2003) Flyer: Fragen, Antworten. Okolandbau. Keine Gentechnik. 
BOLW (2003a) GrOne Gentechnik bedroht die akologische Lebensmittelwirtschaft. 
Presseerklarung vom 17.07.2003. www.boelw.de [22.07.2003]. 
BOLW (2003b) Presseerklarung zur Koexistenz vom 21.5.2003. www.boelw.de 
[22.05.2003]. 
Born, H. (2000) BSE-Krise - ein politischer Bannbruch. In: Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz, 12: 4-9. 
Born, H. (2002) GrOne Gentechnik - (k)ein Thema im Wahljahr. In: Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz, 2: 4-6. 
Boschen, S.; Vieh5fer, W.; Zinn, J. (2003) Rinderwahnsinn. Kannen Gesellschaften aus 
Krisen lernen? In: Berliner Journal fOr Soziologie, 13 (1): 35-58. 
Boschert, K.; Gill, B. (2003) German Workshop Report. 
http://technology.open.ac.uklcts/peg/index.htm [23.12.2004]. 
Boschert, K; Gill, B. (2004) Germany - Precaution for choice and alternatives. 
http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/peg/index.htm (forthcoming). 
Bove, J.; Dufour. F. (2001) Die Welt ist keine Ware. Bauern gegen Agromultis. ZOrich: 
Rotpunktverlag. 
Braun, D. (1998) Der Einfluss von Ideen und Oberzeugungssystemen auf die politische 
Problemlasung. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift (PVS), 39 (4): 797-818. 
Brauner, R (2002) Gene flow - so what? Scientific and legal issues. In: Genetic 
Engineering Newsletter, Special issue 11/12, December 2002. 
Bublizt, H. (2001) Differenz und Integration. Zur diskursanalytischen Rekonstruktion der 
Regelstrukturen sozialer Wirklichkeit. In: Keller, R; Hirseland A; Schneider, W.; Viehafer, 
W. (eds.) Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse, Band 1: Theorien und 
Methoden, Opladen: Leske + Buderich: 225-260. 
BUND (2002) Bleibt in Deutschland bei zunehmendem Einsatz der Gentechnik in 
Landwirtschaft und Lebensmittelproduktion die Wahlfreiheit auf GVO-unbelastete 
Nahrung erhalten? Studie im Auftrag des BUND (FoE Germany). 
Bundesrat (2004) Stellungnahme des Bundesrates. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Neuordnung des Gentechnikrechts. Drucksache 131/04 (Beschluss vom 02.04.04). 
Bundestag (2003) Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung von Zustandigkeiten im 
Gentechnikrecht. Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen SPD und B'90/GrOne, Drucksache 
15/996 vom 20.05.2003. 
Bundestag (2004) Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung. Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Neuordung des Gentechnikrechtes. Drucksache 15/3088 vom 5.5.2004. 
BVE (2002) Position der deutschen Ernahrungsindustrie zur 'GrOnen Gentechnik' vom 
10.01.2002. Berlin. 
214 
BVL (2003) Position des Bundesverband des Deutschen Lebensmittelhandels eV. zu 
Gentechnik und Koexistenz vom 6.6.2003. Berlin. 
Capone, G. (2001) Institutional reform, policy paradigm, and policy discourse. The case of 
Italien administrative reform during the 1990s: real change or the same old story? Paper 
prepared for ECPR Joint Session, Grenoble, France, 6.-11.4. 2001. 
CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2003) Commission recommendations 
of 23 July on guidelines for the development of the national strategies and best practices 
to ensure coexistence of GM crops with conventional and organic agriculture. Brussels. 
Cox, R. (1996) Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method 
(1993). In: Cox, R; Sincliar, T. (eds.) Approaches to world order. Cambridge studies in 
international relations: 40, Cambridge: UP, 124-143. 
Daubler-Gmelin, H. (2004) Redebeitrag Deutscher Bundestag 115. Sitzung, Berlin, 
18.6.2004. Stenographischer Bericht. Plenarprotokoll 15/115. 
DBV (2003) Koexistenz bei Gruner Gentechnik sicherstellen. Pressemitteilung vom 
3.06.2003. www.bauernverband.de [10.06.2003]. 
DBV (2003a) Einseitiges Vorgehen bei Gentechnik wenig forderlich. Pressemitteilung vom 
06.11.2003. www.bauernverband.de[7.11.2003]. 
DBV (2004) Richtungsweisendes danisches Gentechnik-Gesetz: Gangbarer Weg auch fUr 
Deutschland. Presseerklarung vom 18.02.2004. www.bauernverband.de [18.02.2004]. 
Degenhardt, H; Horstmann, F.; Mulleder, N. (2003) Bt Mais in Deutschland. 
Erfahrungen mit dem Praxisanbau von 1998-2002. In: Mais, 31 (2). 
Deichmann, T. (2002) Grune bringen grune Gentechnik zum welken. In: Novo-Magazin 
61/62, Nov. 02-Feb.03. http://www.novo-magazin.de/61/nov06124.htm [05.03.2004]. 
Der Spiegel (2001) Okolust statt Kornerfrust, 2001 (3): 25-34. 
Der Spiegel (2001 a) Von der Krise zur Agrarwende, 2001 (3): 20-24. 
DFG (2001) Genetic Engineering and Food. Report 3, edited by the Senate Commission 
on Genetic Research. www.dfg.de [10.09.2002]. 
DFG/DAF (2002) Stellungnahme zum Diskurs Grune Gentechnik vom 3.9.2002. 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [12.12.204]. 
DIB (2004) Kabinettsbeschluss ist ein Gentechnik-Verhinderungsgesetz, Presserklarung 
vom 11.02.2004. www.dib.org [12.02.2004]. 
DIBIIVA (2002) Antwort auf den Fragebogen des Moderationsteams. Deutsche 
Industrievereinigung Biotechologie u. Industrieverband Agrar. www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[12.12.2004]. 
Die Zeit (2000) Welche Wahrheit zahlt? (25), 15.06.2000. 
Dirscherl, C. (2003) Die "Agrarwende" - Debatte. Sozial Stimmungslagen in der 
Landwirtschaft. In: AgrarbOndnis (ed.): Landwirtschaft 2003. Der kritische Agrarbericht. 
Hamm: ABL: 34-38. 
Dolata, U. (1996) Politische Ckonomie der Gentechnik. Konzerstrategien, 
Forschungsprogramme, Technologiewettlaufe. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
215 
Dolata, U. (2001) Wirtschaftsinformation. GrOne Gentechnik in der Krise. In: Blatter fOr 
deutsche und internationale Politik. 11: 1398-1391. 
Dolata, U. (2003) Unternehmen Technik. Akteure. Interaktionsmuster und strukturelle 
Kontexte der Technikentwicklung: Ein Theorierahmen. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
DPA (Deutsche Presseagentur) (2001) Berlin stoppt zunachst Programm fOr Agrar-
Gentechnik, Pressemeldung vom 24.01.2001. 
Dressel, K. (2002) BSE - The new dimensions of uncertainty: The cultural politics of 
science and decision-making. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Dreyer, M.; Gill, B. (2000) Germany - 'elite precaution' alongside continued public 
opposition. In: Journal of Risk Research, 3 (3): 219-226. 
Dreyer, M; Gill, B. (2000a) Die Vermaktung transgener Lebensmittel in der EU - Die 
Wiederkehr der Politik aufgrund regulativer and 6konomischer Blockaden. In: Spok, A; 
Hartmann, K, et al. (eds.) GENug gestritten? Gentechnik zwischen Risikodiskussion und 
gesellschaftler Herausforderung. Graz: Leykam: 125-148. 
Dryzek, J.S. (1997) The politics of the earth. Environmental discourses, Oxford: UP. 
Ehrke, M. (2001) Frisch auf den Tisch. Die BSE Krise, die europaische Agrarpolitik und 
der Verbraucherschutz. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Schriftenreihe Internationale Politik. 
www.fes.de [31.04.2001]. 
Escobar, A (1996) Constructing Nature. Elements for a poststructural political ecology. In: 
Peet, R.; Watts, M. (eds.) Liberation Ecologies. Environment, development, social 
movements. London: Routledge: 46-68. 
FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) (2001) Wir leben nicht auf einer agrarpolitischen 
Insel. Agrarokonomen zur Neuorientierung der Agrarpolitik: Der Weg "klein" und "oko" 
fOhrt in eine Sackgasse. www.faz.net [17.01.02]. 
Federal Government (2001) The fight against mad cows disease (BSE). Version vom 
22.03.2001. www.bundesregierung.de [23.04.2001]. 
Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy. Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. 
Oxford: UP. 
Fischer, F.; Forester J. (ed.)(1 993) The argumentative turn in policy analysis and 
planning, Durham/London: Duke UP. 
Frauen, M. (2002) Innovationspotentiale und Zukunftsaussichten der Grunen Gentechnik -
Wettbewerbsf~higkeit und Arbeitsplatze. Stellungnahme, zweite Diskursrunde, 28.129. 
May 2002, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Friedt, W.; Niggli, U. (2002) Diskussion zu den Vortragen von. W. Fried und U. Niggli, 
zweite Diskursrunde 28.129 May 2002, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
Friedt, W. (2002) Landwirtschaft und Planzenzucht. 2. Diskursrunde, 28.129 May 2002, 
Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Friends of the Earth et al. (2003) Conference Report. GMOs - Coexistence or 
contamination? Organized by Friends of the Earth Europe, EuroCoop, the 
Greens/European Free Alliance and the Heinrich Boll Foundation, Brussels, 28.5.2003. 
216 
Gabriel, Y.; Lang, T. (1995) The unmanageable consumer. Contemporary consumption 
and its fragmentation. London: Sage. 
Gaserow, V. (2004) Zah. www.frankfurter-rundschau.de [16.01.2004]. 
Gaugitsch, H. (2002) Erfassung und Bewertung von Risiken und Chancen, Sicherheit. 
Erste Diskursrunde, 7.18. Mai 2002, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Gemeinsame Plattform (2001) Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Agrarpolitik in der 
europaischen Union. Gemeinsame Plattform von Verbanden aus Umwelt- und 
Naturschutz, Landwirtschaft, Tier- und Verbraucherschutz, Oktober 2001. 
Gent, R. (2001) Vorsorgeprinzip einheitlich bewerten. Positionspapier vom 05.06.2001, 
www.dib.org. [02.01.2005]. 
Gesprachskreis GrOne Gentechnik (2002) ROckverfolgbarkeit von gentechnisch 
veranderten Organismen (GVO) und GVO-Produkten. Hintergrundpapier. Marz 2002. 
http://www.monsanto.de/biotechnologie/publikationen/GGG_ Traceability. pdf [30.12. 04J. 
Gieryn, T. F. (1983) Boundary-work and the demarcation of science from non-science: 
Strains and interests in professional ideologies of scientists. In: American Sociological 
Review, 48: 781-795. 
Gill, B. (1993) Partizipative Technikfolgenabschatzung. Wie man Technology Assessment 
umwelt- und sozialvetraglich gestalten kann. In: Wechselwirkungen, 15: 36-40. 
Gill, B. (1993a) Technology assessment in Germany's biotechnology debate. In: Science 
as Culture, 4 (18): 69-84. 
Gill, B. (1994) Gentechnik - Nein Danke? Nach 10 Jahren ist es Zeit, Ziele und Kriterien 
der Kritik neu zu Oberdenken. In: GID, 100: 21-23. 
Gill, B. (1995) Germany - splicing genes, splitting society. In: Science and Public Policy, 
23 (3): 175-193. 
Gill, B.; Bizer, J.; Roller, G. (1998) Riskante Forschung. Zum Umgang mit Ungewissheit 
am Beispiel der Genforschung in Deutschland. Eine sozial- und rechtswissenschaftliche 
Untersuchung. Berlin: Edition Sigma. 
Gill, B. (2003) Streitfall Natur. Weltbilder in Technik- und Umweltkonflikten, Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Glaser, B.; Strauss, Anselm L. (1967) The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine. 
Goldstein, J.; Keohane, R. (eds.) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 
Gottweis, H. (1998) Governing Molecules. The discursive Politics of Genetic Engineering 
in Europe and the United States. Cambridge/MA: MIT Press. 
Grabner, P. Hampel J.; Lindsey, N. Togerson, H. (2001) Biopolitical diversity: the 
challenge of multilevel policy-making. In: Gaskell, G.; Bauer M. (eds.) Biotechnology 
1996-2000. The years of controversy. London: Science Museum: 15-34. 
Grafe zu Baringdorf, F. (2001) Agrarwende: Machtverschiebung mit offenem Ende. In 
AgrarbOndnis (ed.): Landwirtschaft 2002. Der kritische Agrarbericht. ABL: Hamm: 22-28. 
Greenpeace (2002) Umfrage: Bauern wollen keine Gentechnik. Presseerklarung vom 
09.08.2002. www.greenpeace.de [31.12.04J. 
217 
Grewer, A (1999) GrOne Gentechnikpolitik unter der Rot-GrOnen Bundesregierung aus 
parlamentarischer Sicht. In: Heinrich Boll Stiftung (1999) (ed.) GrOne Gentechnologie: 
Technologie der Zukunft oder Technologie ohne Zukunft. Fachgesprach. Berlin 
21.10.1999: 28-32. 
Haas, P (1992) Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. In: International Organization, 46 (1): 1-35. 
Haerlin, B. (2003) Considerations regarding the Co-existence of GMO, non-GMO and 
organic farming. www.zs-I.de [15.12.2003]. 
Hagedorn, K. (1996) Das Institutionenproblem in der agrarokonomischen Politikforschung. 
TObingen: J.C.B. Mohr. 
Hajer, M. (1995) The politics of environmental discourse - Ecological Modernization and 
the policy process. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hajer, M. (2003) Argumentative Diskursanalyse. Auf der Suche nach Koalitionen, 
Praktiken und Bedeutung. In: Keller, R. et al. (ed.) Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche 
Diskursanalyse, Band 2: Forschungspraxis. Opladen: Leske + Buderich: 271-298. 
Hall, P. A (1993) Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic 
policy making in Britain. In: Comparative Politics, 1993 (3): 275-296. 
Hammerbacher (2002) Basisreader der Moderation. Diskurs grOne Gentechnik. April 
2002, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Hammerbacher (2003) Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik. Abschlussbericht der Moderation, 
September 2003, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Hampel, J.; Pfennig, U.; Kohring, M.; Gorke, A.; Ruhrmann, G. (2001) Biotechnology 
boom and market failure: two sides of the German coin. In: Gaskell, G.; Bauer, M. W. 
(eds.) Biotechnology 1996-2000. The years of controversy. London: Science Museum: 
191-203. 
Harvey, D. (1996) Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Heinrich Boll Stiftung (ed.)(1999) GrOne Gentechnologie: Technologie der Zukunft oder 
Technologie ohne Zukunft. Fachgesprach der Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Berlin 21.10.1999. 
Heller, C. (2002) From scientific risk to paysan savoir-faire: peasant expertise in the 
French and global debate over GM crops. In: Science as Culture, 11 (1): 7-37. 
Hermenau, A; Hettlich, P. (2003) Freilandversuche mit genmanipulierten Apfelbaumen in 
Dresden-Pillnitz und Quedlinburg gestoppt, Presseerklarung Nr. 654 Parlamentsfraktion 
B'90/GrOne vom 24.10.03. 
Hirsch, J. (1995) Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat. Staat, Demokratie und Politik im 
globalen Kapitalismus. Berlin-Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv. 
Hoffmann, D. (1997) Barrieren fOr die Anti-Gen-Bewegung. Entwicklung und Struktur des 
kollektiven Widerstandes gegen Forschungs- und Anwendungsbereiche der 
Gentechnologie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Martinsen, R. (ed.) Politik und 
Biotechnologie. Die Zumutung der Zukunft. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft: 
235-255. 
Hoffmann, W. (2000) Tests gegen den Tod. Flachendeckende PrOfungen sollen die 
Seuche stoppen. Ein Risiko bleibt. In: Die Zeit, 48. 
218 
Hofstetter, M.; Then, C. (2001) Agrarwende und Gentechnik. In: AgrarbOndnis (ed.): 
Landwirtschaft 2002. Der kritische Agrarbericht. Hamm: ABL: 243-244. 
Hooper, J. (2001) Germany's BSE crisis claims two ministers. In: The Guardian, 
10.01.2001, www.guardian.co.uk [21.01.2001). 
Hooper, J. (2001 a) Germany's Greens win agriculture portfolio. In: The Guardian, 
11.01.2001, www.guardian.co.uk [21.01.2001). 
IFAV (Institut fOr angewandte Verbraucherforschung) (2000) Lebensmittelskandale in 
Deutschland. Eine Studie im Auftrage der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucherverbande 
(AgV) e.V., Bonn. Koln. 
Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995) Ideen und internationale Beziehungen. In: Zeitschrift fOr 
Internationale Beziehungen, 2 (2): 417- 442. 
Jacobsen, H. J. (2001) Stand der Entwicklung und Anwendung der GrOnen Gentechnik. 
Auftaktveranstaltung, Berlin 12.2.2001, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Jany, K.-D. (2002) Gesunde und sichere Ernahrung. Stellungnahme, dritte 
Diskursrunde, 11.112. Juni, Magdeburg, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004). 
Jasanoff, S. (1990) The Fifth Branch: Science advisors as Policymakers. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Havard UP. 
Jasanoff, S. (1999) The song lines of risk. In: Environmental Values, 8: 135-152. 
Jasper, U. (2001) ROckblick 2001: Das agrarpolitische Jahr. In: AgrarbOndnis (ed.) 
Landwirtschaft 2002. Der kritische Agrarbericht: Hamm: ABL 9-21. 
Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Sabatier, P.A. (1993) The Dynamics of Policy-Oriented Learning. In: 
Sabatier, P. A.; Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (eds.) Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview, 41-56. 
Joint Working Group (Bund/Uinder Arbeitsgruppe Monitoring) (2002) Draft Concept for 
Monitoring of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), 20 September 2002. 
Kienle, A. (2003) DBV Erklarung. Gentechnikfreie Produktion sichern! Fachgesprach zu 
Gentechnik, Landwirtschaft und Lebensmittel. Bundestagsfraktion B' 90/GrOne, Berlin, 
17.10.2003. 
Kiper, M. (1999) RotgrOne Milchzahne gegen Gentechnik. In: GID, 137: 47-50. 
Klopffer, W. (2002) Umweltbewertung gentechnisch veranderter Organismen. Prinzipien 
und Operationalisierung. Zusammenfassung des mOndlichen Vortrag, erste Diskursrunde, 
7.18. Mai 2002, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Kochlin, F. (2002) Unmogliche Koexistenz. In: GID, 154: 17-18. 
Kreisbauernverband TObingen/Zollernalb (2004) Information Nr. 2/2004 an aile Mitglieder, 
Juli 2004. 
KOnast, R. (2001) Regierungserklarung zur neuen Verbraucherschutz- und 
Landwirtschaftspolitik vor dem Deutschen Bundestag vom 8.2.2001. In: BMVEL-
Informationen Nr. 6 2002. 
KOnast, R. (2001a) Global denken, lokal essen. Der Verbaucherschutz muss Aufgabe des 
Staates und Anliegen der BOrger sein. In: FAZ (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), 
15.03.2001. 
219 
KOnast, R. (2001 b) Germany's ideas about a new European agricultural policy. Speech. 
International Conference 'Where next for European Agriculture?", London 17.7.2001. 
KOnast, R. (2001 c) Rede der Bundesministerin fOr Verbraucherschutz, Ernahrung und 
Landwirtschaft, Renate KOnast. Auftaktveranstaltung "Diskurs grOne Gentechnik", Berlin 
12.12.2001, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
KOnast, R. (2002) Klasse statt Masse. Die Erde schatzen, den Verbraucher schOtzen. 
MOnchen: Econ Ulistein List Verlag. 
KOnast, R. (2002a) Rethinking agriculture and food. In: OECD Observer, 233, August 
2002. www.oecdobserver.org [12.12.2002]. 
KOnast, R. (2002b) Standort Deutschland - verbraucherpolitische Herausforderungen. 
Tag der lebensmittelwirtschaft, 15.02.2002 Berlin www.verbraucherministerium.de 
[12.12.2002]. 
KOnast, R. (2002c) Stellungnahme von Renate KOnast zum Verlauf und zu den 
Ergebnissen des "Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik", Berlin, 3.9.2002, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
KOnast, R. (2003) Standortvorteil Verbraucherschutz. Zukunftsfahige Wirtschaftspolitik fOr 
das 21. Jahrhundert, Werlitz, B'90/GrOne, Januar 2003. 
Lemke, M; Winter, G. (eds.) (2001) Bewertung von Umweltrisiken von gentechnisch 
ver~nderten Organismen im Zusammenhang mit naturschutzbezogenen Fragestellungen. 
UBA Berichte 3/01. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. 
leopold, J. (2002) Koexistenz verschiedener Anbauverfahren. Stellungnahme, vierte 
Diskursrunde, 25.126. Juni, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
levidow, L.; Carr, S. (1997) How biotechnology regulation separates ethics from risks. In: 
Outlook on Agriculture, 26 (3): 145-150. 
Levidow, L.; Carr, S.; Wield, D. (1997) European Biotechnology Regulation: contested 
boundaries of environmental risks. In: BioSafety Online Journal, 3, Paper 1 (BY97001), 
http://www.bioline.bdt.org.br/by. 
levidow, L.; Bijman, J. (2002) Farm input under pressure from the European food 
industry. In: Food Policy, 27: 31-45. 
lehr, W. (1999) Rot-grOn macht sich stark fOr die Gentechnik. In: GID 134: 44. 
lehr, W. (2003) Bauern verweigern Gen-Mais. In: Tageszeitung, 10.11.2003, www.taz.de 
[23.12.2003). 
lowenstein, F. Prinz zu (2003) Offener Brief an den Beauftragten der CDUlCSU 
Bundestagsfraktion, Herrn Helmut Heiderich. www.agrar.de [30.03.2003]. 
lOnzer, I. (2000) Die Gentechnik passt nicht zu einer Okologischen Agrar- und Esskultur. 
In: Okologie & landbau 1: 6-12. 
Marsden, T.; Flynn, A; Harrison, M. (2000) Consuming Interests. The social provision of 
foods. London: UCL Press. 
Matthiesen, H. (2002) Bauer oder Verbraucher? Interview mit R. KOnast. In: 
Agrarjournalist 2002: 8-10. 
220 
Maxeiner, D. (2002) Vortrag zur "Generaldebatte": Nutzung oder Nicht-Nutzung der 
GrOnen Gentechnik. Vortrag, vierte Diskursrunde, 25,/26. Juni, Mayschoss, 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Merkel, A. (2001) "Wir brauchen neues Denken". Regierungserklarung und Debatte zur 
Neuorientierung der Verbraucher- und Agrarpolitik, Deutscher Bundestag, 8.2.2001. In: 
Das Parlament, 8 vom 16.2.2001. 
Michel, J. (2001) KOnast stoppt vorerst Zulassung von Genmais. In: Berliner Zeitung vom 
6.6.2001. 
Moldenhauer, H. (2003) GrOne Gentechnik in roten Zahlen. In: Tageszeitung vom 
08.09.2003. 
Moldenhauer. H. (2003a) Konsens im Dissens. Der Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik des 
BMVEL - eine Bilanz. In: Landwirtschaft 2003. Der kritische Agrarbericht. Hamm: ABL: 
249-253. 
Muhlenberg, K. (1997) Politik mit dem Einkaufskorb. In: GID 123: 10-12. 
Muhlenberg, K. (1997a)ZeitderAufklarung.ln: GID 117: 15-16. 
MOiler, E. (2001) Grundlinien einer modernen Verbraucherpolitik. In: Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, 24: 6-15. 
MOiler, W. (2002) Problematik der Koexistenz zwischen ekologischer, konventionell 
gentechnikfreier Landwirtschaft und dem Anbau von GVOs. Vortrag, vierteDiskursrunde, 
25,/26. Juni, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
NABU (1998) Landschaft schmeckt! Eine Aktion des NABU fOr naturnahe Landschaft, 
Bonn. 
Nagy, T. (2003) GrOne Gentechnik. Wahlfreiheit zur Beruhigung. In: punkt.um, 4: 3. 
Niggli, u. (2002) Innovationspotential des ekologischen Landbaus. Erlauterungstext zu 
den Folien. Zweite Diskursrunde, 28.129 Mai 2002, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
Nullemeier, F. (2001) Politkwissenschaft auf dem Weg zur Diskursanalyse? In: Keller, R.; 
Hirseland A; Schneider, W.; Viehefer, W. (eds.) Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche 
Diskursanalyse, Band 1: Theorien und Methoden, Opladen: Leske + Buderich: 285-312. 
Oftener Brief (2003) Oftener Brief an die Bundesregierung. Strenge Regeln fOr die 
Gentechnik vom 13.10.2003. www.boelw.de [31.12.04]. 
Oftener Brief (2004) Oftener Brief an die Parlamentarier. Strenge Regeln fOr die Agro-
Gentechnik. Die Agro-Gentechnik dart sich nicht ausbreiten, 26.05.2004. www.boelw.de 
[31.12.04]. 
Oko-Institut (2002) Forschungsvielfalt fOr die Agrarwende. Institute for applied Ecology, 
Freiburg/Breisgau. 
Pongratz, H. (1991) Bauerliche Tradition im sozialen Wandel. In: Kelner Zeitschrift fUr 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 43 (2): 235-246. 
Pongratz, H. (1992) Die Bauern und der ekologische Diskurs: Befunde und Thesen zum 
Umweltbewusstsein in der deutschen Landwirtschaft, Munchenl Wien: Profil Verlag. 
221 
Powell, W. W.; DiMaggio, P. J. (eds.) (1991) The new institutionalism in organizational 
analysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Prante, G. (2002) Manuskript fOr den DIB und IVA zur Ergebnistagung im BMVEL-Diskurs 
"GrOne Gentechnik", 3. September 2002, Berlin www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Rein, M.; Schon, D. (1993) Reframing policy discourse. In: Fischer, F.; Forester J. 
(eds.)The argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning, Durham/London: Duke UP, 
145-165. 
Reisch, L. A (2003) Strategische Grundsatze einer neuen Verbraucherpolitik. 
Diskussionspapier des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats fOr Verbraucher- und Ernahrungspolitik 
beim BMVEL. Stuttgart-Hohenheim/Berlin, (2. redaktionell Oberarbeitete Fassung). 
Renn, O. (2003) Symbolkraft und Diskursfahigkeit. In: Politische Okologie 81-82. 
Genopoly das Wagnis GrOnen Gentechnik: 27-30. 
Ribbe, L. (2001) Die Wende in der Landwirtschaft. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 24, 
8.6.2001: 30-38. 
Riedel, U. (1999) GrOne Gentechnik-Politik unter der rot-grOnen Bundesregierung aus 
Sicht der Regierung. In: Heinrich Boll Stiftung (ed.) GrOne Gentechnologie: Technologie 
der Zukunft oder Technologie ohne Zukunft. Fachgesprach, 21.10.99 in Berlin, 33-43. 
Riedel, U. (2001) Anwendung des Vorsorgeprinzips im gentechnikrechtlichen 
Genehmigungsverfahren am Beispiel des Bt-Mais. In: Lemke, M; Winter, G. (eds.): 
Bewertung von Umweltrisiken von gentechnisch veranderten Organismen im 
Zusammenhang mit naturschutzbezogenen Fragestellungen. UBA Berichte 3/01. Berlin: 
Erich Schmidt Verlag, 267-278. 
Riewenherm, S. (1997) Aufstieg und Niedergang. In: GID 117: 10-12. 
Riewenherm, S. (2001) Es grOnt so grOn. In: GID 144: 3-4. 
Sabatier, P. A (1993) Policy change over a decade or more. In: Sabatier, P.; Jenkins-
Smith, H. C. (eds.) Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach. 
Boulder: Westview Press: 13-38. 
Sabatier, P. A; Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (eds.) (1993) Policy Change and Learning. An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder: Westview. 
Sabatier, P. A.; Brasher, A. M. (1993) From Vague Consensus to Clearly Differentiated 
Coalitions: Environmental Policy at Lake Tahoe, 1956-1985. In: Sabatier, P.; Jenkins-
Smith, H. C. (eds.) Policy Change and Learning. An Advocacy Coalition Approach. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 177-210. 
Sabatier, P. A. (1998): The Advocacy Coalition Framework: revision and relevance for 
Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy, 5 (1): 98-130. 
Sauter, A; Meyer, R. (2000) Risikoabschatzung und Nachzulassungsmonitoring 
transgener Pflanzen. Sachstandsbericht. TAB-Arbeitsbericht Nr. 68. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1997) Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy 
Research, Boulder: Westview. 
Schiemann, J. (2002) Profil einer gentechnikfreien Produktion & Separierung von 
Produktion und Produkten. Vortrag, vierte Diskursrunde, 25.126. Juni, Mayschoss, 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
222 
Schmidt, G.; Jasper, U. (2001) Agrarwende oder die Zukunft unserer Ernahung. MOnchen: 
C.H. Beck. 
Schneider, M.-L. (2000) PartizipationsansprOche in Technikkontroversen: Die Regulierung 
der "grOnen" Gentechnik in Deutschland, Osterreich und der Schweiz. In: Barben, D.; 
Abels, G. (eds.) Biotechnologie - Globalisierung - Demokratie. Politische Gestaltung 
transnationaler Technologieentwicklung. Berlin: Edition Sigma, 291-312. 
Schon, C.-C. (2002) Chancen der Pflanzenbiotechnologie fOr den okologischen Landbau. 
Vortrag, vierte Diskursrunde, 25,/26. Juni, Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
Schon, C.-C. ; Leopold, J. (2002) Diskussion zu den Vortragen C.-C. Schon und J. 
Leopold, vierte Diskursrunde, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Schwab-Trapp, M. (2003) Methodische Aspekte der Diskursanalyse. Probleme der 
Analyse diskursiver Auseinandersetzungen am Beispiel der deutschen Diskussion Ober 
den Kosovokrieg. In: Keller, R.; Hirseland A.; Schneider, W.; Viehofer, W. (eds.) 
Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse, Band 2: Forschungspraxis, Opladen: 
Leske + Buderich, 169-196. 
Seifert, F. (2002) Gentechnik-Cffentlichkeit-Demokratie. Der osterreichische Gentechnik-
Konflikt im internationalen Kontext. MOnchenlWien: Profil Verlag. 
Skocpol, T. (1979) States and Social Revolutions: A comparative Analysis fo France, 
Russia and China. NY: Cambridge UP. 
Sonnewald, U. (2002) Perspektiven der GrOnen Gentechnik durch Forschung und 
Entwicklung. Vortrag, zweite Diskursrunde, 28./ 29 Mai 2002, Mayschoss, 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [22: 12.2004]. 
Sonnleitner, G. (2001) Agrarwende oder Bauernende? Rede zum Deutschen Bauerntag, 
MOnster 6.7.2001, http://www.zeit.de/redenllandwirtschaftspolitikl200129_sonnleitner.html 
[10.07.2001]. 
Sonnleitner, G. (2002) Gentechnik in Futtermitteln. Chance oder Risiken fOr Bauern und 
Verbraucher? Die Sicht der Landwirtschaft. Rede von. G Sonnleitner, Internationales 
Forum Agrarpolitik, 17.1.2002. Berlin. 
Sonnleitner, G. (2003) Von der Nische zum Segment? Die Zukunft des Ckolandbaus in 
Deutschland. Rede von G. Sonnleitner, Perspektivforum 2003, 23. Oktober 2003. Berlin. 
Spangenberg, J. (2002) Gentechnik und Welternahrung: Versprechen machen nicht satt. 
Vortrag, dritte Diskursrunde, 11.112. Juni, Magdeburg, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
SPD (2002) Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt - wir in Deutschland. SPD 
Regierungsprogramm 2002-2006. 
SPD/B'90/GrOne (2002) Koalitionsvetrag 2002-2006. Erneuerung- Gerechtigkeit-
Nachhaltigkeit. FOr ein wirtschaftlich starkes, soziales und okologisches Deutschland. FOr 
eine lebendige Demokratie. www.gruenefraktion.de [12.12.2002]. 
Spelsberg, G. (1990) Das Gentechnik-Gesetz. In: Okologische Konzepte, 32: 28-32. 
SRU (1998) Umweltgutachten 1998. Umweltschutz: Erreichtes Sichern - Neue Wege 
gehen. Rat der Sachverstandigen fOr Umweltfragen, Stuttgart: Metzler-paschel. 
223 
Steinbrecher, R. (2002) Unzulanglichkeiten der Risikoabschatzung und Bewertung, dritte 
Diskursrunde, 11.112. Juni, Magdeburg, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Surel, Y. (2000) The role of cognitive and normative frames in policy making. In: Journal 
of European and Public Policy, 7 (4): 495-521. 
SZ (SOddeutsche Zeitung) (2001) Politbarometer, die Stimmung im Marz, 17.03.2002. 
Tappeser, B. (2001) GrOne Gentechnik - Stand der Anwendung, Interessenkonflikte, 
Probleme. Vortrag zur Auftaktveranstaltung, Berlin 12.2.2000, www.transgen.de/diskurs 
[22.12.2004]. 
TAl (die tageszeitung) (2001) KOnast fehlt der Hofstaat, 05.03.2001. www.taz.de 
[06.03.01]. 
TAl (die tageszeitung) (2002) Ein Herz fUr Otto Normalbauer, 11.02.2002. www.taz.de 
[12.02.02]. 
Tkalec, M. (2001) SOnder, nicht SOndenbocke. Kommentar. In: Berliner Zeitung, 9.2.2001 
www.berliner-zeitung.de [ 09.03.2001]. 
Torgerson, D. (1995) The uncertain quest for sustainability: public discourse and the 
politics of environmentalism. In: Fischer, F; Black, M. (eds.): Greening environmental 
policy: the politics of a sustainable future. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Transgen (2000) Die Spitze des Eisberges. Artikel zur Stiftung Warentest 
Lebensmitteltestserie, Untersuchung 2000, Heft 8/00, www.transgen.de [03.05.2001]. 
Transgen (2001) Verzicht auf Artius - ROckenwind fOr die Kanzler-Initiative? 23.6.2001, 
www.transgen.de [20.07.2002]. 
UBA (2000) Analyse der bei Freisetzungen von gentechnisch veranderten Pflanzen 
durchgefOhrten Sicherheitsmaf1nahmen in Hinblick auf deren Effektivitat und Ableitung 
von Empfehlung fUr die zukOnftige Vollzugsarbeit, UBA-Texte 3/2000. 
UBA (2003) Genetic engineering and organic farming, UBA-Texte 0212003. 
Unabhangige Bauernstimme (2002) Die Macht des Bauernverbandes - Macht der Bauern 
oder Macht des Agrobusiness? In: AgrarbOndnis (ed.): Landwirtschaft 2002. Der kritische 
Agrarbericht. Hamm: ABL, 66-71. 
van Aken, J. (2002) Perspektiven der GrOnen Gentechnik: Eine realistische 
Bestandsaufnahme, Vortrag, zweite Diskursrunde, 28.129 May 2002, Mayschoss, 
www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
van den Daele, W. (1996) Abschied von den 'besonderen Risiken'. In: GID 112/113: 50-
51. 
van den Daele, W.; POhler, A.; Sukopp H. (1997) Transgenic Herbicide-Resistant Crops. 
A Participatory Technology Assessment. Summary Report WZB (FS /I 97-301). 
Verbraucherinitiative (2002) 1m Zweifel fUr Verbraucherinteressen. Stellungnahme der 
Verbraucher Initiative e.V. auf der Ergebnistagung des Diskurses "GrOne Gentechnik" am 
03.09.2002 in Berlin, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Virchow, D. (2002) Mit der Gronen Gentechnologie den Hunger in der Welt bekampfen? 
Moglichkeiten und Grenzen des Einsatzes von Gentechnologie, Vortrag, dritte 
Diskursrunde,11.112. Juni, Magdeburg, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
224 
Vogel, 8.; Tappeser, S. (2000) Der EinfluP., von Risikodiskussion und Risikoforschung auf 
die Genehmigungsverfahren zum Inverkehrbringen transgener Pflanzen. Gutachten im 
Auftrag des BOros fOr Technikfolgen-Abschatzung beim Deutschen Bundestag (TAB), 
Oko-Institut e.V. (Institut for applied Ecology), Freiburg/Breisgau. 
von Broock, R. (2002) Biodiversitat. Vortrag, erste Diskursrunde, 7.18. Mai 2002, 
Mayschoss, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
von Gleich, A. (1996) Der Umgang mit Nichtwissen. In: GID 112/113: 51-59. 
von Wedel, H. (2001) Organisation des gesundheitlichen Verbraucherschutzes 
(Schwerpunkt Lebensmittel). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 
Vorholz, F. (2001) Wo bleibt der SOden? In: Die Zeit, 43. www.zeit.de [31.12.04]. 
Vorholz, F. (2001a) Das Dilemma der Renate KOnast. In: Die Zeit, 24. www.zeit.de 
[31.12.04]. 
vzbv (2002) Gentechnisch veranderte Lebensmittel und Agrarprodukte nicht vorschnell 
zulassen. "Diskurs GrOne Gentechnik gab mehr Fragen als Antworten". Stellungnahme 
. yom 3.9.2002, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
vzbv (2002a) Die Kraft der Verbraucher. Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband eV., 
Jahresbericht 2001/2002. 
Warenkette (2002) Presseinformation. Warenkette zum Diskurs "GrOne Gentechnik": 
Koexistenz ermoglichen - Wahlfreiheit gewahrleisten, Berlin. 02.09.2002. 
Warenkette (2003) Vielfalt fordern - Innovationspotential wahren. Thesenpapier zur 
grOnen Gentechnik. Januar 2003. (Englisch: 'Promoting Diversity- Safeguarding 
Innovation Potential' Theses paper on Agricultural Biotechnology), www.bll-online.de 
[10.05.2003]. 
Weingart, P. (1999) Scientific Expertise and political accountability: paradoxes of sciences 
in politics. In: Science and Public Policy, 26 (3): 151-162. 
Weingast, B. R. (1996) Rational Perspective on Institutions. In: Goodin, R.; Klingemann, 
H.-D. (eds.) A Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: UP, 167-190. 
Windhoff-Heritier A. (1987) Policy Analyse. FrankfurVM.lNew York: Campus. 
Wollenteit, U. (2002) Sicherheit und Haftung. Vortrag, dritte Diskursrunde, 11.112. Juni, 
Magdeburg, www.transgen.de/diskurs [22.12.2004]. 
Wollersheim, R. (2003) Koexistenz - Die Sicht der Bundesregierung. Vortrag, Forum 
Gentechnik und Landwirtschaft - aber sicher? Berlin, 24.11.2003. 
Wolters, C. (1998) Die SSE Krise. Agrarpolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Handelsfreiheit 
und Konsumentenschutz. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. 
Wynne, B. (1992) Carving out Science (and Politics) in the Regulatory Jungle (Essay 
Review). In: Social Studies of Science, 22 (3): 745-758. 
ZKBS (2001) 11. Bericht nach Inkrafttreten des Gentechnikgesetzes. Die Arbeit der 
Zentralen Kommission fOr biologische Sicherheit (ZKBS) im Jahr 2000. In: 
Sundesgesundheitsblatt, 9. 
225 
ANNEXES 
Annex 1: Hypotheses (taken from Sabatier 1998) 
1. (revised) On major controversies within a mature policy subsystem when policy 
core beliefs are in dispute, the line-up of allies and opponents tends to be stable 
over a decade or so. 
2. Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues 
pertaining to the policy core, although less so on secondary aspects 
3. An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system 
before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 
4. (revised in 1993) The policy core attributes of a governmental program in a 
specific jurisdiction will not be significantly revised as long as the subsystem 
advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power within that 
jurisdiction- except when the change is imposed by a hierarchically superior 
jurisdiction. 
5. (1997) Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g. changes in socio-
economic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy 
outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of 
change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program. 
6. Policy oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an 
intermediate level of informed conflict between the coalitions. This requires that: a) 
Each has the technical resources to engage in such a debate; and that b) The 
conflict be between secondary aspects of one belief system and core elements of 
the other or, alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief 
systems. 
7. Problems for which accepted quantitative data and theory exist are more 
conducive to policy oriented learning across belief systems than those in which 
data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking. 
8. Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to pOlicy-oriented learning 
across belief systems that those involving purely social and political systems 
because in the former many of the critical variables are not themselves active 
strategists and because controlled experimentation is more feasible. 
9. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is a forum 
which is: a) Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to 
participate, and b) Dominated by professional norms. 
10. (new in 1993): Elites of purposive groups are more constrained in their expression 
of beliefs and policy positions than elites from material groups. 
11. (new in 1993): Within a coalition, administrative agencies will usually advocate 
more moderate positions that their interest group allies. 
12. (new in 1993): Even when the accumulation of technical information does not 
change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts on policy 
- at least in the short run - by altering the views of policy brokers. 
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Annex 2: Interviews 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (BMGS), Bonn (11.06.02) 
Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), Berlin (14.06.02) 
Federal Consumer Protection Agency (vzbv), Berlin (17.06.02) 
Greenpeace Germany, Hamburg (09.07.02) 
Union for Food Industry (NGG) Hamburg (09.07.02) 
German Biotechnology Association (DIB), Frankfurt (11.07.02) 
Association of organic farming (AGOl), lengfeld (11.07.02) 
Friends of the Earth, Germany (BUND), MOnchen (14.12.02) 
Competent Authority of Surveillance of the Genetic Engineering Act for Baden 
WOrttemberg (Regierungsprasidium), TObingen (28.11.02) 
Federal Ministry for Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture (BMVEl), Bonn 
(02.06.03) 
Federal Biological Research Centre for Agriculture and Forestry (BBA), 
Braunschweig (04.06.03) 
Robert-Koch Institute, Berlin (05.06.03) 
Green parliamentary party, German Federal Parliament, Berlin (6.6.03) 
Foundation on Future Farming (Zsl), Berlin (06.06.03) 
Bayer Crop Science, Frankfurt (13.6.03) 
TransGen (Phone interview 18.06.03) 
EU Commission, DG Environment, Brussels (09.07.03) 
Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN), Bonn (20.10.03) 
German Representative of Ecoropa, Bonn (20.10.03) 
German Federation Food law and Food Science (Bll), Bonn (21.10.03) 
Gen-ethisches Netzwerk (Biotechnology-critical NGO), Berlin (23.10.03) 
National Association of German Retail Industry (BVl), Berlin (24.10.03) 
Research Institute for Organic Farming (Fibl), Frankfurt (27.10.03) 
National farmer's organization (DBV) (Written response to interview questions, 
26.11.03) 
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Annex 3: Participating groups at the Diskurs griine Gentechnik 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bauerliche Landwirtschaft 
Association of small-scale farmers 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Okologischer Landbau e.v. 
Association of organic farming 
Bioland e.V.- Bundesverband 
(Organic certifier) 
Bund fOr Lebensmittelrecht und Lebensmittelkunde e.V. 
German Federation Food Law and Food Science 
Bundesfachverband Deutscher Reformhauser e.V. 
Federal Association of German Health Food stores 
Bundesverband des Deutschen Gro~- und Au~enhandels e.V. 
Federal Association of Wholesalers and Import/Export Firms 
Bundesverband des Deutschen Lebensmittelhandels e.v. 
Federal Association of the German Retail Industry 
Bundesverband Deutscher Pflanzenzuchter e.V. 
Federal association of German Plant breeders 
Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Ernahrungsindustrie e.v. 
Federal Association for the German Food Industry 
Dachverband wissenschaftlicher Gesellschaften der Agrar-, Forst-, 
Ernahrungs-, Veterinar- und Umweltforschung e.V. 
Umbrella organisation for the science associations in agricultural, forest, 
food and environmental research 
Deutsche Bischofskonferenz 
German Bishop's conference 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
German Research Society 
Deutsche Gesellschaft fOr Ernahrung e.V. 
German Nutrition Society 
Deutsche Industrievereinigung Biotechnologie 
German Biotechnology Association 
Industrieverband Agrar e.V. 
Association of agricultural companies 
Deutscher Bauernverband e.V 
National farmers' organization 
Deutscher Hausfrauen-Bund e.V. 
German housewives association 
Deutscher Naturschutzring e.V. 
Umbrella organization for environmental NGOs 
Deutscher Raiffeisenverband e.V. 
German agricultural supplier's association 
Deutscher Verband Tiernahrung e.V. 
German animal feed association 
Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst e.V. 
Development agency of protestant church 
Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststatten 
Union for the Food and Restaurant Sector 
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Greenpeace e.V. 
Industriegewerkschaft Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt 
Union for construction, agriculture and environment 
Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie 
National Union for Mining, Chemical and energy sector (IG BCE) 
Katholische Zentralstelle fOr Entwicklungshilfe e.V. 
Development agency of Catholic Church 
Rat der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland 
German Council of Protestant Church 
Verband Deutscher OelmOhlen e.v. 
Federal association of German ai/millers 
Verbraucher Initiative e.v. 
Consumer protection NGO 
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.v. -
Federal Consumer Protection Agency 
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